First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game.

In this paper, we deduce the first-order effect of frequency-dependent viability and fertility selection on the probability of fixation of a mutant in a large finite haploid population with a fixed age structure by applying a direct small perturbation method to the neutral two-timescale genealogical process. This effect is expressed in terms of fixation-fitness coefficients times ancestry coefficients that are related to the effective population size. In the case of constant selection, the fixation-fitness coefficients are functions of the coefficients of viability and fertility selection weighted by reproductive values and population-structure coefficients for the different age classes. This explains the difference between the effects of viability selection and fertility selection on fixation probability in age-structured populations. With frequency-dependent selection in the form of a public goods game, the fixation-fitness coefficients depend also on the public good allocation strategy of the population and the resource allocation strategies of the individuals. In this case, the results show that weak selection may favor the fixation of cooperation if the cooperators allocate more resources to reproduction versus survival than the defectors do.