| Literature DB >> 31062337 |
Steven J Hoffman1,2,3,4,5, Maria I Creatore6,7, Ariane Klassen6, A Morgan Lay6, Patrick Fafard8,9,10.
Abstract
Governments around the world vastly underinvest in public health, despite ever growing evidence demonstrating its economic and social benefits. Challenges in securing greater public health investment largely stem from the necessity for governments to demonstrate visible impacts within an election cycle, whereas public health initiatives operate over the long term and generally involve prevention, statistical lives and underlying conditions. It is time for the public health community to rethink its strategies and craft political wins by building a political case for investing in public health-which extends far beyond mere economic and social arguments. These strategies need to make public health visible, account for the complexities of policymaking networks and adapt knowledge translation efforts to the appropriate policy instrument.Entities:
Keywords: Evidence-based policy; Knowledge translation; Policy making; Politics; Public health
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31062337 PMCID: PMC6964539 DOI: 10.17269/s41997-019-00214-3
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Can J Public Health ISSN: 0008-4263
Implications of different policy instruments for KT approaches (Source: Fafard P, Hoffman SJ. Rethinking knowledge translation for public health policy. Evidence & Policy 2018; 1–11. doi:10.1332/174426418X15212871808802)
| Policy instrument | Implications for KT approaches |
|---|---|
| a) Regulating (for example, food safety regulations) | • Regulators often rely on highly structured processes of consultation and input such as regulatory hearings, which may supersede dyadic KT approaches. |
| • Decisions might be subject to judicial review such that regulatory processes often discourage informal or non-transparent inputs. | |
| b) Communicating (for example, healthy food guides) | • Communications can come from different kinds of actors and in different forms, from elected politicians giving speeches to public servants publishing documents. |
| • Traditionally, public health officials have wide decisional authority on the messages they communicate, especially on highly technical matters and during crises. | |
| • A wider range of economic departments and central policy agencies will be involved when messages could create economic winners and losers. | |
| c) Taxing (for example, tobacco taxes) | • Ministries of finance and central agencies usually control taxation. • Tax policy creates winners and losers, attracts significant lobbying from powerful stakeholders, and is rife with follow-on consequences. |
| • Proposed public health policies are often contested on ideological grounds and actors who stand to be taxed may seek to undermine public health research. | |
| d) Spending (for example, free vaccinations) | • Ministries of finance and central agencies ultimately control budgeting, although budget requests typically originate in line departments. |
| • Public health officials’ control over spending decisions typically increases as those decisions move from broad policy objectives towards specific implementation of those policies; in turn, scientific evidence may become even more influential. | |
| • Some measures that would improve population health (for example, reducing income inequality by means of redistribution) are very costly and, absent tax increases, mean less money for other priorities. |