Roger Lee Mendoza1. 1. a School of Business, Wilmington University, New Castle , DE , USA.
Abstract
Aim: Drug innovation is strongly driven by economic incentives. How these incentives work in determining or changing the level of activity of innovators and the direction of their innovation remains understudied. We seek to address these issues in reviewing recent literature on drug innovation, which offers one major unifying theme of pharmacoeconomic scholarship presented at the 2019 AEA-ASSA annual convention. Methods: Drawn from three AEA-ASSA convention panel sessions, papers were reviewed for newly charted research terrains and new research trajectories, and their theoretical and practical implications on efficiency, effectiveness, and value in the production and utilization of pharmaceutical products. Results: While high and continuously rising drug prices are typically claimed as the price of scientific innovation, the reviewed literature finds that this link only partially accounts for the problem. High risk aversion owing to information asymmetries and vastly intractable uncertainties is prevalent among innovating firms. Predatory business models abound. Reverse predatory strategies also exist to maintain product exclusivity without much added clinical benefits, and to constrain generic competition. CEO compensation practices contribute to rising drug prices. Finally, the US government's hands-off policy on drug list prices leave the forces of supply and demand to allocate them and reward innovation (at times perversely), even as the government extensively regulates or over-regulates practically every other aspect of innovation. Conclusions: Price-elasticity of demand is critical in drug innovation. The drug value chain is price-sensitive to the balance of incentives and disincentives to innovation. American health policy should consider charting a middle course that introduces some form of regulatory price control, while stimulating and sustaining the benefits of market competition. That should incentivize stakeholders to take into account both resources and value for money in making decisions based on best-quality, clinical-economic evidence.
Aim: Drug innovation is strongly driven by economic incentives. How these incentives work in determining or changing the level of activity of innovators and the direction of their innovation remains understudied. We seek to address these issues in reviewing recent literature on drug innovation, which offers one major unifying theme of pharmacoeconomic scholarship presented at the 2019 AEA-ASSA annual convention. Methods: Drawn from three AEA-ASSA convention panel sessions, papers were reviewed for newly charted research terrains and new research trajectories, and their theoretical and practical implications on efficiency, effectiveness, and value in the production and utilization of pharmaceutical products. Results: While high and continuously rising drug prices are typically claimed as the price of scientific innovation, the reviewed literature finds that this link only partially accounts for the problem. High risk aversion owing to information asymmetries and vastly intractable uncertainties is prevalent among innovating firms. Predatory business models abound. Reverse predatory strategies also exist to maintain product exclusivity without much added clinical benefits, and to constrain generic competition. CEO compensation practices contribute to rising drug prices. Finally, the US government's hands-off policy on drug list prices leave the forces of supply and demand to allocate them and reward innovation (at times perversely), even as the government extensively regulates or over-regulates practically every other aspect of innovation. Conclusions: Price-elasticity of demand is critical in drug innovation. The drug value chain is price-sensitive to the balance of incentives and disincentives to innovation. American health policy should consider charting a middle course that introduces some form of regulatory price control, while stimulating and sustaining the benefits of market competition. That should incentivize stakeholders to take into account both resources and value for money in making decisions based on best-quality, clinical-economic evidence.
Keywords:
D22; D62; D82; Drug innovation; I11; I18; R&D; drug list prices; predatory business models; regulation; risk; supply chain