| Literature DB >> 31013993 |
Noshina Tariq1, Muhammad Asim2, Feras Al-Obeidat3, Muhammad Zubair Farooqi4, Thar Baker5, Mohammad Hammoudeh6, Ibrahim Ghafir7.
Abstract
The proliferation of inter-connected devices in critical industries, such as healthcare and power grid, is changing the perception of what constitutes critical infrastructure. The rising interconnectedness of new critical industries is driven by the growing demand for seamless access to information as the world becomes more mobile and connected and as the Internet of Things (IoT) grows. Critical industries are essential to the foundation of today's society, and interruption of service in any of these sectors can reverberate through other sectors and even around the globe. In today's hyper-connected world, the critical infrastructure is more vulnerable than ever to cyber threats, whether state sponsored, criminal groups or individuals. As the number of interconnected devices increases, the number of potential access points for hackers to disrupt critical infrastructure grows. This new attack surface emerges from fundamental changes in the critical infrastructure of organizations technology systems. This paper aims to improve understanding the challenges to secure future digital infrastructure while it is still evolving. After introducing the infrastructure generating big data, the functionality-based fog architecture is defined. In addition, a comprehensive review of security requirements in fog-enabled IoT systems is presented. Then, an in-depth analysis of the fog computing security challenges and big data privacy and trust concerns in relation to fog-enabled IoT are given. We also discuss blockchain as a key enabler to address many security related issues in IoT and consider closely the complementary interrelationships between blockchain and fog computing. In this context, this work formalizes the task of securing big data and its scope, provides a taxonomy to categories threats to fog-based IoT systems, presents a comprehensive comparison of state-of-the-art contributions in the field according to their security service and recommends promising research directions for future investigations.Entities:
Keywords: Internet of Things; big data; blockchain; edge computing; fog computing; security
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31013993 PMCID: PMC6515199 DOI: 10.3390/s19081788
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Figure 1Data intensive IoT applications.
Figure 2Fog-enabled IoT systems.
Figure 3Functionality-based fog architecture.
Security and privacy threats in IoT-enabled applications.
| Threat | Description |
|---|---|
| Forgery [ | Fake identities and profiles, fake information to mislead the user. Saturate resource consumption through fake data. That is, in E-Health and home automation systems, one can easily fake their identifications and profiles to generate any attack. |
| Tampering [ | Degrading the efficiency of fog by dropping/delaying transmitting data. That is, energy conservation systems are responsible to collect the data related to electricity supply, consumption patterns, smart metering, pricing and other details. As the data are very critical, dropping or delaying the data may cause problems. |
| Spamming [ | Spreading redundant information which causes to consume resources unnecessarily. The attack generated on smart cities lies in this domain. |
| Sybil [ | Legitimate user personal information and manipulation of fake identities to take over the illegal control on fog resources. That is, in smart home and smart cities, legitimate user can manipulate the fake identities to take control of the network. |
| Jamming [ | Jam communication network by spreading burst if dummy data on the network. Any type of smart environment can be attacked by Jamming. |
| Eavesdropping [ | Capturing of transmitting packets and try to read the contents. Any type of smart environment can be a victim of these attacks. |
| DoS [ | Flooding of superfluous requests to fog nodes to disrupt the services for users. The data generated by smart cities and smart agriculture can be a victim of DoS and flooding attacks. |
| Collusion | Acquiring unfair advantage through deceiving, misleading and defrauding legal entities by collusion of two or more parties. |
| Man-In-The-Middle [ | Involving between two parties and manipulate exchanged data between them. E-Health and Smart cities are the best fit examples. |
| Impersonation [ | Pretending the fake services as fog services to the users. |
| Identity Privacy [ | User personal information leakage such as phone number, visa number, etc. on a communication channel. |
| Data Privacy [ | Exposure of user data to unreliable parties considerably reaches to privacy leakage. Smart homes, smart cities and E-Health systems are commonly known victim of these types of attacks. |
| Usage Privacy [ | Leakage of services utilization pattern of users. |
| Location Privacy [ | Capturing user’s location information to expose or observe user moments. Smart homes, smart cities and E-Health systems are commonly known victims of these types of attacks. |
Internal attacks on fog-based IoT routing.
| Attacks | Description |
|---|---|
| Wormhole [ | Initial attacked node forms a path by colluding with other nodes to transfer malicious packets. The path formed among conspiring nodes is called wormhole. |
| Blackhole [ | A malicious node intervenes in route discovery to be a part of path. It then drops the packets instead of forwarding them. Some blackholes attack the received packets before forwarding. |
| Greyhole [ | A modified version of blackhole attacks. Data are dropped by the attacking node, but it tells the router that data are transmitted. This attack is difficult to detect by the router as it shows end-to-end connectivity. |
| Selective forwarding [ | Selective data packets that are required to be transmitted are dropped by nodes resulting in network performance degradation. |
| Local repair [ | Destabilizing the network and draining neighbor nodes battery by sending false link repair messages. It reduces packet delivery increases end-to-end delays. |
| Route cache poisoning [ | It involves the alteration of route tables by malicious nodes to poison route caches to other nodes. |
| Sybil [ | Assumptions of nodes to have multiple identities over the network to create confusion and disruption, which opens the opportunity for malicious nodes to operate. |
| Sinkhole [ | Malicious node pretends to be the optimal route to the destination node by sending false messages to the initiator node, thus after receiving traffic, it alters the routing and other data to complicate the topological structure of the network. |
| Hello flood [ | The attacker node broadcasts links to other nodes. The unsuspecting nodes accept that link and consider the attacker node to be the neighbor node. The unsuspecting node start sending packets that are actually wasted as the adversary node is far away and not the neighbor. This creates a routing loop within the network. |
| Neighbor [ | The neighbor node considers the attacking node (while broadcasting DIO messages with no DIO details) as a newly joined node, which could be a parent node, but this node is out of reach when the neighbor node tries to select it as a parent node. |
| Version number [ | The attacker node alters its version number in DIO messages and broadcasts to neighbor nodes. This results in routing loops in the network, which disrupt the network topology and deplete nodes energy resources. |
| Modification [ | Malicious nodes take advantage of no trust levels being measured in the ad-hoc networks to engage in discovering, altering and disrupting the routing in the network. This attack causes traffic redirection and DoS attacks by modifying the protocol messages. |
| Fabrication [ | Creates forged routing information using routing table overflow attacks, resource consumption and fake route error messages. |
| Byzantine [ | Aims to decline the network services; the attacker node selectively drops route packets, which create routing loops and send forward those route packets through non-optimal paths. |
| Location spoofing [ | Pretends to be the nearest destined node to disrupt normal network protocol operations. |
Figure 4Taxonomy of IoT-based fog security challenges.
Core-network and service level challenges and solutions with respective limitations.
| Challenges | Solution | Limitations |
|---|---|---|
| Identity Verification |
Identity authentication Co-operative authentication Anonymous authentication |
Difficult identity authentication realization due to decentralized nature of fog computing Difficult to manage the increased number of users Authentication overhead and delays due to the mobility of IoT devices Redundant authentication efforts are needed Cooperation of fog nodes is needed Privacy preservation is needed Response delay is not acceptable for real time services |
| Access Control |
Role-based Access Control policy Attribute-based Access Control policy Device and key management |
Strong credential handling policies are needed to ensure trustworthiness Federated and distributed access control architecture is needed due to mobility and dynamic device management by the user Multiple device management is needed when accessed by a single user There must be consistent access policy for each user employing different devices to access the services Key management is needed |
| Lightweight protocol design |
Lightweight cryptographic techniques Lightweight elliptic curve cryptosystem |
Need to design efficient lightweight protocols to support real time services of fog assisted IoT applications |
| Intrusion Detection |
Host-based Intrusion Detection system (IDS) Network-based IDS Distributed IDS Mobile Sybil defence Cryptography-based Sybil defence |
It is challenging to design a robust, reliable and efficient IDS for fog computing due to its heterogeneous, decentralized and distributed architecture Local as well as global intrusion detection systems are needed in fog computing Behavior features sharing is needed among cooperative fog nodes; the way information is shared in a decentralized architecture to obtain quick detection of intrusion and its prevention is a challenging matter The basic information of the user is needed by the detector to differentiate between legitimate and Sybil user resulting in privacy leakage In Sybil Defence, the data available on single fog node might not be enough to know if the user is Sybil or not because of crucial cooperation among fog nodes |
| Trust Management |
Evidence-based trust model Monitoring-based trust model Reputation management |
Behavior information of fog nodes is difficult to collect and maintain in order to maintain the trust evaluation of fog computing in decentralized architecture Situational trust matrices are needed for various services and applications Adaptive, scalable and consistent trust management design is needed due to IoT device mobility |
| Privacy-conserving packet forwarding |
Privacy-preserving packet forwarding |
Users privacy leakage |
| Rogue fog node detection |
Trust-Based Routing Mechanism |
Complex calculations Scalability issues Message overhead Slow convergence |
Data center level challenges and solutions with respective limitations.
| Challenges | Solution | Limitations |
|---|---|---|
| Data identification, aggregation and integrity |
Symmetric encryption Asymmetric encryption Homomorphic encryption One-way trapdoor permutation Key distribution and key agreement Homomorphic signature Provable data possession |
Overhead of identifying sensitive data Difficult to protect sensitive data due to the large number of IoT devices Data aggregation requirements vary due to heterogeneous IoT application. Difficult to check the integrity of data due to transient storage, user mobility and variety of keys used by IoT devices Data integrity verification is comparatively less efficient |
| Secure data distribution |
Proxy re-encryption Attribute-based encryption Key-aggregate encryption |
Due to time-consuming bilinear pairing, secure data sharing is not very efficient Key management is challenging |
| Secure content distribution |
Secure service discovery Broadcast encryption Key management mechanism Anonymous broadcast encryption |
Key management and broadcast encryption is challenging Simultaneous secure service discovery and anonymous broadcast encryption is needed |
| Secure big data analysis |
Fully homomorphic encryption Differential privacy |
Computational overhead Designing decentralized big data analysis is challenging with differential privacy |
| Secure computation |
Server-aided exponentiation Server-aided verification Server-aided encryption Server-aided function evolution Server-aided key exchange |
Execution of complex computational tasks heavier than exponentiation, encryption/decryption and signature verification Smaller multiple fog nodes are even powerful than a single server |
| Verifiable computation |
Privately verifiable computation Publically verifiable computation |
Mostly based on theoretical approaches Due to distributed architecture of fog computing, an error may be spread to other nodes resulting incorrect final results Verification of results is needed Tracing of compromised fog node is needed |
Device level security challenges and solutions with respective limitations.
| Challenges | Solution | Limitations |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality |
Authentication protocols Privacy preservation techniques |
Difficult identity authentication realization due to decentralized nature of fog computing Scalability issues Response delay due to the mobility of IoT devices Memory and processing overhead due to fixed and predefined large sized keys High computation cost Key management is needed |
| Light-weight trust management |
Trust-based routing protocols |
Trade-off between computation cost and security requirements Scenario specific Compatibility issues with resource-constrained IoT devices |
Blockchain-based security solutions in IoT systems.
| Description | Advantages |
|---|---|
| A distributed IoT network architecture consisting of an SDN base network using the blockchains technique [ |
Improved system’s performance and capacity Threat prevention and protection, data protection, access control, and mitigate network attacks such as cache poising/ARP spoofing, DDoS/DoS attacks |
| An efficient decentralized authentication mechanism based on the public blockchain, Ethereum to create secured virtual zones for secure communication [ |
Not limited to specific IoT services and scenarios Relies on a public blockchain, hence possesses all of its security properties Well defined security requirements for authentication |
| A lightweight BC-based hierarchical architecture for IoT that uses a centralized private Immutable Ledger and a distributed trust to reduce the block validation processing time [ |
Lightweight yet retains privacy and security benefits of classical blockchain security solutions Elimination of overheads associated with conventional blockchain No mining and its processing related delays Low packet and processing overhead |
| A decentralized network model based on blockchain approach for data preserving, data integrity and blocking of unregistered devices using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Ethereum [ |
Unique identity to each IoT device Defense against botnets and bogus requests such as Denial of Service (DoS), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Data provenance and integrity |
| A blockchain-based decentralized, infrastructure-independent proof-of-location technique for location trustworthiness and user privacy preservation [ |
Unlimited identifiers for users to avoid location attacks Blockchain is used to store proofs of location Geographic location verification User location privacy preservation |
| A cloud-based blockchain solution for identifying IoT devices manufacturing provenance while enforcing users privacy preservation using EPID (Enhanced Privacy Identity protocol) of Intel to incentivize IoT devices for data sharing [ |
Support anonymous device commissioning and incentive to IoT devices Ensures privacy-preservation |
| A blockchain-based scheme called Healthcare Data Gateway (HGD) architecture to enable patient to own, control and share their own data easily and securely without violating privacy [ |
No need for trusted third party Ensures privacy-preservation Ensure data confidentiality, data authenticity and data integrity |
| A blockchain-based security and privacy scheme for smart homes [ |
Low packet, time and energy overheads Ensured availability of devices Resilient against DDoS and linking attacks |
| A blockchain solution for preserving data privacy in Internet of Things using smart contracts along with a firmware scheme using blockchain for prevention of fraudulent data [ |
Trustless access control management constrained IoT device tampering to prevent fraudulent data |
| A blockchain-based proof of concept for securing consumer/home-based IoT devices and the networks by using Ethereum [ |
No significant storage and CPU overheads Utilization of built-in asymmetric key encryption and digital signatures present in Ethereum protocol |