| Literature DB >> 30944502 |
Abstract
Development programs and policies can influence smallholder producers' abilities to adapt to climate change. However, gaps remain in understanding how households' adaptive capacities can become uneven. This paper investigates how development transitions-such as the recent adoption of 'green revolution' agricultural policies throughout sub-Saharan Africa-intersect with cross-scale social-environmental processes to unevenly shape smallholders' adaptive capacities and adaptation pathways. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative material from a multi-season study in Rwanda, we investigate smallholder adaptation processes amid a suite of rural development interventions. Our study finds that adaptive capacities arise differentially across livelihood groups in the context of evolving environmental, social, and political economic processes. We show how social institutions play key roles in shaping differential adaptation pathways by enabling and/or constraining opportunities for smallholders to adapt livelihood and land use strategies. Specifically, Rwanda's Crop Intensification Program enables some wealthier households to adapt livelihoods by generating income through commercial agriculture. At the same time, deactivation of local risk management institutions has diminished climate risk management options for most households. To build and employ alternate livelihood practices such as commercial agriculture and planting woodlots for charcoal production, smallholders must negotiate new institutions, a prerequisite for which is access to capitals (land, labor, and nonfarm income). Those without entitlements to these are pulled deeper into poverty with each successive climatic shock. This illustrates that adaptive capacity is not a static, quantifiable entity that exists in households. We argue that reconceptualizing adaptive capacity as a dynamic, social-environmental process that emerges in places can help clarify complex linkages among development policies, livelihoods, and adaptation pathways. To ensure more equitable and climate-resilient agricultural development, we stress the need to reformulate policies with careful attention to how power structures and entrenched social inequalities can lead to smallholders' uneven capacities to adapt to climate change.Entities:
Keywords: Adaptation; Agricultural intensification; Climate change; Institutions; Livelihoods; Vulnerability
Year: 2019 PMID: 30944502 PMCID: PMC6358117 DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.11.022
Source DB: PubMed Journal: World Dev ISSN: 0305-750X
Four study umudugudu characterized in terms of type and degree of Crop Intensification Program (CIP) attributes.
| Type of Intensification | Degree of Intensification | Number of surveys | Number of interviews | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Terraced: high Marshland: none; Other CIP: some | Highest | 109 | 27 |
| B | Terraced: none Marshland: some Other CIP: high | Medium-high | 119 | 11 |
| C | Terraced: some Marshland: some Other CIP: low | Medium-low | 67 | 9 |
| D | Terraced: none Marshland: low Other CIP: low | Lowest | 117 | 24 |
Household livelihood capitals organized into four groups through cluster analysis. Means and percentages displayed by group for the 8 variables that comprised the cluster analysis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) finds significant across-group variation for all 8 variables at p < .05 level.
| Agriculture | Income streams | Homestead | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generic capacity level | N | Land | Cows | Pigs, goats or sheep | Non-farm income (RWF) | Farm-labor income (%) | Concrete floor (%) | Brick or cement walls | Electricity |
| Low | 117 | 0.12 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 5252 | 91.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.7 |
| Medium low | 137 | 0.29 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 21,268 | 69.4 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Medium high | 128 | 0.65 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 147,576 | 52.9 | 8.6 | 15.6 | 13.6 |
| High | 49 | 1.54 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 611,676 | 34.4 | 24.5 | 36.6 | 26.7 |
| All groups | 431 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 120,640 | 71.8 | 6.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 |
| Sig. | – | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Specific capacities for adapting to and coping with climate shocks in Kibirizi, their related social institutions. Followed by new specific adaptive capacities and new institutions regulating them.
| Type of specific adaptive capacity | Example of specific adaptive capacity in Kibirizi | Related social institutions | New specific adaptive capacities | New institutions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercrop fields | Household decision-making autonomy | Commercial agriculture generates money | Govt crop decisions | |
| Many field locations | Cooperative/Tubura | |||
| Select low risk crops | Convert crops to woodlots | Sale of low fertility land | ||
| Prepare fields early | Available labor | Pay for field preparation | Low-cost labor supply | |
| Plant marshland in dry season | Common property | Access valley/marshland | Cooperatives/cash | |
| Adjust crop choice | Household decision-making autonomy | Crop insurance | Cooperative/Tubura | |
| Abandon field | Cooperative gives seed to replant | Cooperative/Tubura | ||
| Seed sharing (for next season) | Social capital | Seeds to replant from cooperatives | Cooperative/Tubura | |
Results of ANOVA and Chi-Square, displaying variation in membership rates in key institutions associated with the CIP as well as the percent of CIP land where yield-reducing challenges were indicated.
| Tubura Member | Cooperative Member | Land in CIP | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generic capacity level | N | Percent of group | N | Percent of Group | Percent total land | Percent of parcels | Percent CIP land with challenges |
| Low | 21 | 20.8 | 22 | 19.0 | 34.4 | 34.0 | 36.1% |
| Medium low | 52 | 40.3 | 32 | 23.7 | 30.3 | 32.2 | 29.8% |
| Medium high | 61 | 50.0 | 25 | 19.8 | 24.8 | 29.4 | 21.6% |
| High | 28 | 58.3 | 14 | 28.6 | 19.0 | 30.6 | 14.7% |
| All | 162 | 40.5 | 93 | 21.8 | 28.3 | 31.6 | 26.3% |
| Sig. | 0.000 | 0.104 | 0.366 | 0.000 | |||
Results of ANOVA and Chi-Square, displaying differential access to valley land, parcels outside of formal CIP jurisdiction, and unevenness and change in number of parcel locations operated according to socioeconomic groups.
| Land in Valleys | Parcel Locations (1–5 locations) | Has field (s) beyond CIP | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generic capacity level | Proportion of total cropland | Cultivate in dry season (% of group) | Number of locations | Locations decreased | Locations increased | N | Percent of Group |
| Low | 11.7% | 29.2 | 1.8 | 19.1 | 13.6 | 47 | 46.1 |
| Medium low | 8.7% | 37.6 | 2.0 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 61 | 48.8 |
| Medium high | 18.0% | 43.2 | 2.2 | 12.2 | 17.9 | 68 | 58.6 |
| High | 28.1% | 57.1 | 2.5 | 8.2 | 22.4 | 30 | 68.2 |
| All | 14.6% | 39.3 | 14.9 | 17.1 | 206 | 53.2 | |
| Sig. | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.039 | ||||
Results of binary logistic regression and of multivariate regression analysis of land use access and outcomes associated with the adoption of CIP agriculture in Kibirizi.
| Factor or coefficient | Place to plant food security crops | Household operates season C | Consume household produced food earlier | Percentage of challenges on CIP land | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sig. | B | Sig. | B | Sig. | B | Sig. | B | |
| CIP Intensity | 0.000*** | −0.503 | 0.988 | −0.002 | 0.003*** | 0.33 | 0.098* | 0.015 |
| Generic capacity level | 0.068* | 0.372 | 0.014** | 0.402 | 0.219 | 0.231 | 0.000*** | −0.061 |
| Gender of HH head | 0.396 | −0.284 | 0.443 | −0.23 | 0.199 | 0.447 | 0.677 | −0.011 |
| Age of HH Head | 0.722 | 0.003 | 0.113 | −0.012 | 0.851 | −0.002 | 0.126 | −0.001 |
| Percent OffFarm work | 0.042** | 1.217 | 0.578 | −0.269 | 0.011** | 1.431 | 0.159 | −0.064 |
| Percent Nonfarm work | 0.596 | −0.488 | 0.306 | −0.856 | 0.105 | −1.457 | 0.441 | 0.064 |
| Number of parcels | 0.436 | 0.06 | 0.934 | −0.005 | 0.175 | −0.089 | 0.783 | −0.001 |
| Field locations total | 0.609 | −7% | 0.645 | −6% | 0.758 | −4% | 0.000*** | −0.046 |
| Livestock | 0.111 | −0.464 | 0.492 | 0.16 | 0.002*** | −0.798 | 0.437 | 0.017 |
| Constant | 0.052 | 1.619 | 0.584 | −0.387 | 0.635 | −0.383 | 0.000 | 0.548 |
Results of Chi-Square and ANOVA indicating variation across household livelihood groups in the amount and proportion of woodlots among their landholdings, and whether they have expanded woodlots in the past ten years.
| Household Land in Woodlots | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generic capacity level | Mean woodlot (ha) | Proportion of total land | Expanded woodlots in past ten years (% of group) | Trees have increased in umudugudu |
| Low | 0.001 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 77.3 |
| Medium low | 0.043 | 11.8 | 16.8 | 75.6 |
| Medium high | 0.225 | 29.2 | 26.0 | 70.5 |
| High | 0.911 | 46.6 | 51.0 | 75.0 |
| All | 20.5 | 21.3 | 74.5 | |
| Sig. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.668 |
Fig. 1Differential livelihood pathways emerge out of uneven adaptive capacities. Institutional change prohibits traditional risk management and the resulting scenarios for wealthier households (adaptation as adoption of new specific adaptive capacities through use of livelihood capitals) and poorer households (continued poverty due to lack of options for diversifying livelihoods and land uses while also being forced to adopt commercial agriculture).