| Literature DB >> 30901376 |
Gizem Arikan1, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom2.
Abstract
Current literature presents conflicting findings concerning the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards redistribution. This paper attempts to reconcile these findings by arguing that the belief and social behavior dimensions of religiosity affect support for redistribution via different mechanisms, and that these effects are moderated by state welfare generosity. Using multilevel path analysis models on data from the World Values Survey, we show that the effect of the religious belief on attitudes towards redistribution is mediated by competing personal orientations-prosocial values and conservative identification-while the religious social behavior dimension significantly decreases support for redistribution via increased levels of happiness. Lower levels of welfare generosity increase the positive effect of prosocial orientations and weaken the negative effect conservative identification, leading to positive or null indirect effect of religiosity. These findings show the importance of taking into account the multiple dimensions of religiosity and institutional context when studying the relationship between religion and redistribution attitudes.Entities:
Year: 2019 PMID: 30901376 PMCID: PMC6430507 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0214054
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Pairwise correlations between religious belief and support for income inequality in selected countries included in the dataset.
Entries are pairwise correlations calculated using data from World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 5.
Fig 2The proposed model.
Support for redistribution: Multilevel path models.
| Model 1.1 | Model 1.2 | Model 1.3 | Model 1.4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Religious belief → Prosocial values | . | |||
| Religious belief → Conservative identification | ||||
| Religious social behavior → Happiness | ||||
| Religious belief → DV | ||||
| Prosocial values → DV | ||||
| Conservative identification → DV | ||||
| Religious social behavior → DV | -.057 (.067) | -.046 (.072) | -.065 (.064) | -.051 (.069) |
| Happiness → DV | ||||
| Corr. (Religious belief, religious social behavior | ||||
| Age → Prosocial values | - | - | ||
| Gender (Male = 1) → Prosocial values | - | - | ||
| Low education (dummy) → Prosocial values | - | - | ||
| Age → Conservative identification | - | - | .000 (.000) | .000 (.000) |
| Gender (Male = 1) → Conservative identification | - | - | ||
| Low education (dummy) → Conservative identification | - | - | -.001 (.011) | -.003 (.012) |
| Age → Happiness | - | - | ||
| Gender (Male = 1) → Happiness | - | - | -.001 (.004) | .001 (.004) |
| Low education (dummy) → Happiness | - | - | ||
| Age → DV | - | - | -.001 (.002) | -.002 (.002) |
| Gender (Male = 1) → DV | - | - | ||
| Low education (dummy) → DV | - | - | ||
| Social Security Laws Index | - | - | ||
| GDP per capita (PPP), logged | - | .158 (.195) | - | .194 (.183) |
| Religious fractionalization | - | -.352 (.449) | - | -.246 (.439) |
| CFI / TLI / RMSEA | .982/.954/.006 | .983/.948/.007 | .933/.816/.011 | .946/.837/.010 |
| Chi2 model fit for baseline model | 889.241 | 895.297 | 1346.825 | 1205.400 |
| N1/N2 | 65980 / 49 | 55681 / 40 | 65278 / 49 | 55028 / 40 |
Entries are coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Italic entries indicate p < 0.1 (two-tailed) and bold entries indicate p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Moderation of paths 1 and 2: M-SEM analysis.
| Model 2.1 | Model 2.2 | Model 2.3 | Model 2.4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prosocial values → DV | . | |||
| Conservative identification → DV | ||||
| Religious belief → DV | ||||
| Age → Prosocial values | ||||
| Gender (Male = 1) → Prosocial values | ||||
| Low education (dummy) → Prosocial values | ||||
| Age → Conservative identification | ||||
| Gender (Male = 1) → Conservative identification | ||||
| Low education (dummy) → Conservative identification | ||||
| Age → DV | -.001 (.002) | -.001 (.002) | ||
| Gender (Male = 1) → DV | ||||
| Low education (dummy) → DV | ||||
| SSLI → Path 1 | ||||
| SSLI → Path 2 | .056 (.066) | .072 (.065) | .044 (.065) | .062 (.064) |
| SSLI → Prosocial values | ||||
| SSLI → Conservative identification | -.043 (.072) | -.076 (.068) | -.037 (.074) | -.068 (.070) |
| SSLI → DV | ||||
| GDP per capita (PPP), logged → DV | - | .184 (.208) | - | .232 (.198) |
| Religious fractionalization → DV | - | -.216 (.387) | - | -.302 (.363) |
| -2 x Log likelihood | 199853.54 | 191835.74 | 194300.59 | 186527.27 |
| AIC | 199901.54 | 191887.74 | 194366.59 | 186597.27 |
| BIC | 200115.36 | 192118.28 | 194660.26 | 186907.25 |
| n-adj. BIC | 200039.09 | 192035.65 | 194555.39 | 186796.02 |
| N (Level 1 / Level 2) | 54680/ 42 | 54413 / 40 | 54126 / 42 | 51878 / 40 |
Entries are coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Italic entries indicate p < 0.1 (two-tailed) and bold entries indicate p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Fig 3Results of Model 1.1 (within-level effects).
Coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Italic entries indicate p < 0.1 (two-tailed) and bold entries indicate p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Fig 4Predicted indirect effects of religious belief and religious social behavior on support for income inequality, moderated by SSLI (with 95% CIs).