L Teare1, N Martin2, W Elamin3, K Pilgrim3, T Tredoux4, J Swanson5, P Hoffman6. 1. Department of Microbiology, Broomfield Hospital, Chelmsford, UK. Electronic address: louise.teare@meht.nhs.uk. 2. St Andrew's Burn Service, Broomfield Hospital, Chelmsford, UK; Centre for Trauma Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK; Academic Department of Military Surgery and Trauma, Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, Birmingham, UK. 3. Department of Microbiology, Broomfield Hospital, Chelmsford, UK. 4. St Andrew's Burn Service, Broomfield Hospital, Chelmsford, UK. 5. Infection Prevention and Control Department, Broomfield Hospital, Chelmsford, UK. 6. HCAI & AMR Division, National Infection Service, Public Health England, London, UK.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Five cases of multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumanii (MRA) producing OXA-23 and OXA-51 occurred in a regional burn intensive care unit (BICU). Three were repatriated from other parts of the world (Dubai and Mumbai) and colonized on admission. Despite optimal precautions, two patients acquired MRA. Both had been nursed in the same room. METHODS: Multi-disciplinary outbreak investigation of MRA in a regional BICU. FINDINGS: The mechanism of transfer for the first case is thought to have been contaminated air from theatre activity releasing MRA bacteria into the communal corridor. No MRA patients went to theatre between the first and second acquired cases. The mechanism of transfer for the second case is thought to have been via a shower unit that was decontaminated inadequately between patients. CONCLUSION: In an outbreak where contact precautions and environmental cleaning are optimal, it is important to give careful consideration to other mechanisms of spread. If there is a failure to do this, it is likely that the true causes of transmission will not be addressed and the problem will recur. It is recommended that burn theatres within burn facilities should be designed to operate at negative pressure; this is the opposite of normal operating theatre ventilation. Where showers are used, both the shower head and the hose should be changed after a patient with a resistant organism. The role of non-contact disinfection (e.g. hydrogen peroxide dispersal) should be reconsidered, and constant vigilance should be given to any 'trojan horse' item in the room.
BACKGROUND: Five cases of multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumanii (MRA) producing OXA-23 and OXA-51 occurred in a regional burn intensive care unit (BICU). Three were repatriated from other parts of the world (Dubai and Mumbai) and colonized on admission. Despite optimal precautions, two patients acquired MRA. Both had been nursed in the same room. METHODS: Multi-disciplinary outbreak investigation of MRA in a regional BICU. FINDINGS: The mechanism of transfer for the first case is thought to have been contaminated air from theatre activity releasing MRA bacteria into the communal corridor. No MRA patients went to theatre between the first and second acquired cases. The mechanism of transfer for the second case is thought to have been via a shower unit that was decontaminated inadequately between patients. CONCLUSION: In an outbreak where contact precautions and environmental cleaning are optimal, it is important to give careful consideration to other mechanisms of spread. If there is a failure to do this, it is likely that the true causes of transmission will not be addressed and the problem will recur. It is recommended that burn theatres within burn facilities should be designed to operate at negative pressure; this is the opposite of normal operating theatre ventilation. Where showers are used, both the shower head and the hose should be changed after a patient with a resistant organism. The role of non-contact disinfection (e.g. hydrogen peroxide dispersal) should be reconsidered, and constant vigilance should be given to any 'trojan horse' item in the room.