A Status-Seeking Account of Psychological Entitlement.

We propose that people high in entitlement are characterized by motivation to attain status. Five studies (total N = 2,372) support that entitlement promotes motivation to seek status. This motivation, in turn, relates to affective processes when facing upward comparisons and contributes to status attainment. Specifically, entitlement fostered prestige and dominance motivation. These, in turn, predicted greater benign and malicious envy, respectively, when encountering high-status others. The indirect effects occurred when entitlement was measured (Studies 1A and 1B) and manipulated (Studies 2A and 2B). Finally, entitlement related to status attainment, yet not always in line with more entitled people's motivation. Although they ascribed themselves both more prestige and dominance, others ascribed them only more dominance, yet less prestige (Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C). These findings suggest that a status-seeking account offers important insights into the complexities of entitled behavior and its social consequences.

Social status offers privileged access to resources and influence. It promotes well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012), fuels self-esteem (Fournier, 2009), and confers health benefits (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). However, the promise of high social rank attracts people to varying degrees (Anderson & Cowan, 2014). What explains this variation? In other words, which personality characteristics predict status-seeking?

We propose that one central motivator of status-seeking is psychological entitlement. More entitled people exhibit behavioral patterns consistent with seeking status in social hierarchies. They promote their own advancement at others’ expense (Tamborski, Brown, & Chowning, 2012), seek to dominate others via aggressive tactics (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), and organize their lives around gaining power and socially valued achievements (Redford & Ratliff, 2018). Thus, we propose that status-seeking is a motivational orientation characterizing people higher in entitlement.

Moreover, if more entitled people are motivated to pursue status, two implications follow. First, status goals should be threatened by encountering high-status others. In such situations, people higher in entitlement may be more likely to respond with affective reactions functional for coping with such threats. Second, status-seeking should manifest in status attainment. Therefore, people higher in entitlement may attain peer-rated social rank. In sum, our goal was to investigate the motivational and affective processes, as well as social outcomes of status-seeking in entitlement.

Psychological Entitlement

Psychological entitlement refers to an inflated and pervasive sense of deservingness, self-importance, and exaggerated expectations to receive special goods and treatment without reciprocating (Fisk, 2010; Grubbs & Exline, 2016). This conceptualization of entitlement draws on clinical and personality theory, describing individual differences in noncontingent, excessive entitlement present across domains.

Entitlement is conceptually distinct from other constructs. First, this broad view differentiates it from its former, more narrow definition as deservingness in response to specific group-based distributive norms (e.g., Major, 1994). Second, entitlement is not identical to narcissism (e.g., Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013; Campbell et al., 2004). In particular, recent theorizing has established entitlement as related to, but distinct from, specific grandiose (e.g., leadership, assertiveness, thrill-seeking) and vulnerable (e.g., contingent self-esteem) features of narcissism (Krizan & Herlache, 2017). Methodologically, entitlement is captured by the entitlement subscale of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988) or by the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004). However, modeling both as a single factor leads to lower model fit compared with a two-factor solution (Campbell et al., 2004). Furthermore, the Psychological Entitlement Scale appears to capture variance in entitlement in the general population, whereas the entitlement subscale of the NPI may be more suitable as a measure of pathological facets of narcissism (Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013). Therefore, we used the Psychological Entitlement Scale in the current studies.

Entitlement is theorized to be maladaptive because of the cognitive distortions it may fuel. People higher in entitlement often do not attain their exaggerated expectations (Grubbs & Exline, 2016). This may then lead to distress and dissatisfaction, in turn reinforcing their desire to be special and raising expectations even more. Our proposal that more entitled people are characterized by status-seeking is designed to offer insight to how these cognitive distortions might work in concert with motivational, emotional, and social mechanisms known to be associated with status and its attainment.

Entitlement and Status Motivation

Status has been conceptualized in different ways. For example, it has been conceptualized as unequally distributed prestige (Blader, Shirako, & Chen, 2016), a standard amount of respect that can be distributed equally within a group (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010), or admiration received from others (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). In the current research, we draw upon evolutionary and anthropological perspectives on status that aim at integrating diverse conceptualizations (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008). Specifically, we define status as a hierarchy based on social rewards. That is, status brings influence, access to resources, and the attention of others. As a consequence of these adaptive benefits, research ascribes humans an enhanced motivation to attain status (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010). Yet motivation to attain status may not necessarily lead to actual status attainment, as actual status attainment relies on social consensus among peers. Precisely, low-ranked members of the hierarchy defer to high-ranked members (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Therefore, both levels—the motivation to attain status and actual status attainment in others’ eyes—contribute to the understanding of status.

The pursuit of status is fundamental, cross-situational, and pervasive across cultures (Anderson et al., 2015). Nevertheless, people higher in entitlement should be especially characterized by motivation to attain it, because status fulfills entitled desires. It promotes privileged access to the best treatment and goods, others’ acknowledgment of a person’s specialness, and validation of the person’s self-concept as especially deserving. Consequentially, status has various adaptive benefits such as support and deference from peers (Von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2011). Moreover, evidence indicates that more entitled people desire status. Entitlement correlates with increased motivation to acquire high-status symbols such as a perfect romantic partner (Campbell, 1999). Moreover, entitlement correlates with self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2004), a general indicator that tracks social status (Mahadevan, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2018). Thus, people higher in entitlement should seek status.

How might status-seeking specifically manifest in people higher in entitlement? We argue that entitlement relates to different pathways toward social rank. Status can be attained via two different routes (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Maner & Case, 2016). Prestige-based routes to status involve gaining rank by sharing expertise, possessing skills, or realizing socially valued achievements. Such distinctions promote others’ respect and voluntary deferral. Dominance-based routes to status involve fear gained by intimidation and coercion. Such strategies are characterized by power and control over subordinates and can occur despite their resistance. Both prestige-based and dominance-based routes to social status involve different tactics, interpersonal behaviors, and outcomes, but both afford social rank and influence.

Several behaviors characteristic of people higher in entitlement suggest that dominance motivation may partly explain their behavior. First, more entitled people show increased aggressiveness in social interactions (e.g., Campbell et al., 2004; Reidy, Zeichner, Foster, & Martinez, 2008). Second, they are selfish. Specifically, people higher in entitlement allocate unearned money to the self (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010), take candy from a bowl intended for children (Campbell et al., 2004), and behave unethically to advance themselves at others’ expense (Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013; Tamborski et al., 2012). Finally, they endorse social power as a life-guiding personal value (Redford & Ratliff, 2018). Such tendencies are indicative of forceful self-promotion and other-related hostility, relating to dominant pathways to social rank (Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007).

People higher in entitlement may also seek prestige, although less research has investigated such a relationship. Broadly, more entitled people pursue chronic goals to construct and defend their positive self-image (Moeller, Crocker, & Bushman, 2009). These goals could be fulfilled by receiving the deferral, respect, and admiration from others that comes with prestige. Moreover, people higher in entitlement attach importance to achievement in life (Redford & Ratliff, 2018), congruent with the expertise and social value required to attain prestige.

Together, these findings suggest that desires for prestige- and dominance-based social rank may drive behavioral patterns of people higher in entitlement. If so, these desires could integrate disconnected findings, explaining why more entitled people simultaneously show tendencies toward aggression and forceful self-promotion, interest in power and achievement, and support for hierarchies. Thus, our primary proposal is that both types of status motivation characterize people higher in entitlement.

Beyond this direct effect, what does a status-seeking account of entitlement imply? Importantly, status is social consensus among peers, individuals who may themselves strive for higher rank. Therefore, the fulfillment of status motivation is constantly threatened. In fact, it may never be satisfied entirely. Consequentially, we argue that a status-seeking account of entitlement has at least two implications. That is, people higher in entitlement should react to status threats and their desired status may or may not be attained.

Implications for Affective Processes and Status Attainment

Everyone’s social rank is relative and fragile. Status hierarchies change continuously, and one person’s comparative gain in rank can come at one’s own expense. Even elevated motivation to attain status may not lead to actual status attainment. This instability has profound effects on people (Pettit, Doyle, Lount, & To, 2016; Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008). If entitlement relates to status-seeking, such effects should also apply. That is, a status-seeking account of entitlement should have at least two central implications.

As a first implication, the goal of attaining status should be particularly threatened when encountering high-status others. Such goal-relevant situations elicit emotional reactions that are in turn functional for the pursuit of a person’s particular motivation (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Encountering high-status others fosters envy (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange, Blatz, & Crusius, in press; Lange & Crusius, 2015b), especially among people with enhanced status motivation (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2016). Envy’s social function, then, is to reduce status discrepancies between the self and an upward comparison target (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). Therefore, one implication of a status-seeking account of entitlement is that this motivation should relate to higher envy when facing high-status others.

Envy is not a uniform emotion—it occurs in two forms (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Benign envy reduces status discrepancies by improving the self. Evidence supports that prestige motivation predicts benign envy, which is functional for prestige attainment. Specifically, benign envy relates to increased efforts in achievement tasks (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011), especially when facing prestigious others (Lange & Crusius, 2015b). This should lead to prestige conferral by others. In line with this notion, benign envy predicts prestige-congruent outcomes such as peers’ positive evaluation (Lange et al., 2016). Thus, we hypothesize that entitlement—via prestige motivation—predicts benign envy.

In contrast, malicious envy reduces status discrepancies by harming the status of upward comparison targets. Evidence supports that dominance motivation predicts such reactions, as they are functional for dominance attainment. Specifically, malicious envy predicts aggressiveness in competitive situations (Lange & Crusius, 2015b) that can regulate dominance hierarchies (Lange & Boecker, in press). This could lead to dominance conferral by others. In line with this notion, malicious envy predicts dominance-congruent outcomes such as peers’ perception of proneness to social conflict (Lange et al., 2016). Thus, we hypothesize that entitlement—via dominance motivation—predicts malicious envy.

As a second implication, if status-seeking characterizes people higher in entitlement, they could also be more likely to attain status in the eyes of others. Their status motivation may promote efforts to reach the desired goal. Therefore, another implication of a status-seeking account of entitlement is that entitlement should predict peer-rated status attainment. However, these motives might also fail to generate higher status. Given the fragile nature of the social consensus of status, even high motivation may not guarantee its attainment. Especially entitled desires are fundamentally excessive. Consequently, these desires often remain unfulfilled (Grubbs & Exline, 2016). Next to this, the status of people higher in entitlement may follow more easily from dominance than prestige motivation. Specifically, people can attain dominance through coercive tactics despite others’ resistance. Attaining prestige, however, requires voluntary deference. Therefore, gaining dominance could be easier than gaining prestige. Furthermore, the attainment of prestige appears to be inconsistent with the social functioning of entitlement. A prestige strategy is directed at enhancing a person’s value to social groups (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009) by unselfishly giving help (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). In contrast, more entitled people are uncooperative and antagonistic (Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013). Moreover, an entitled worldview indicates that the person deserves the best without effort or contribution. Thus, the feelings of specialness that produce prestige motivation may ironically inhibit efforts that could grant prestige conferral.

Therefore, we can derive competing hypotheses. On one hand, it is possible that entitlement promotes status attainment simply by virtue of greater motivation to achieve it. On the other hand, entitlement may promote status attainment as dominance more than prestige. We investigated these hypotheses by using entitlement to predict both self- and peer-rated prestige and dominance attainment.

The Current Research

The current research tested a status-seeking account of entitlement. Our primary goal was to investigate whether people higher in entitlement are motivated to attain both prestige and dominance. Moreover, a status-seeking account of entitlement has two central implications. First, more entitled people’s status motivation should predict greater envy when facing high-status others. Specifically, prestige motivation should predict benign envy, whereas dominance motivation should predict malicious envy. Second, more entitled people’s status motivation should manifest in status attainment as rated by peers. However, we investigated whether they attain prestige and dominance or whether their prestige desires remain unfulfilled. We conducted seven studies examining these hypotheses.

We report all studies we have conducted in this line of research as well as all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures. The de-identified data, analysis scripts, and materials are available on the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/sb3kw/).[1]

Studies 1A and 1B

The goal of Study 1A and its preregistered replication, Study 1B, was to test the status-seeking account of entitlement and its affective implication. We hypothesized that entitlement predicts prestige and dominance motivation. Furthermore, these motivations should in turn predict benign and malicious envy, respectively. Moreover, these relationships should remain when controlling for social desirability, narcissism, and self-esteem. In both Studies 1A and 1B, we controlled for social desirability to demonstrate the unique effects of entitlement beyond impression management. In Study 1B, we additionally controlled for self-esteem, another predictor of prestige (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) that also relates to entitlement (Campbell et al., 2004). Moreover, we controlled for narcissism given that entitlement and narcissism are related but distinct (e.g., Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013; Campbell et al., 2004). Narcissism also includes an entitlement/exploitativeness facet. This may bias analyses. Therefore, we conducted additional analyses reported in the supplementary materials on OSF without this facet. The results were not affected. We preregistered the methods and hypotheses for Study 1B on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/uw768.pdf).

Method

Participants

Participants of Study 1A were 424 American Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers (M = 34.44, SD = 11.9, range: 18-76; 57% male). Participants of Study 1B were 618 American MTurk workers (Mage = 36.18, SD = 11.0, range: 19-77, 53% male). We excluded one additional participant because of missing data on all variables. In both studies, we aimed to have at least 95% power to find a small effect of R2 = .03 with α = .05 and a two-tailed test.

Materials and procedure

Participants first completed the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004). It measures entitlement with nine items (e.g., “I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others”), rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Subsequently, they indicated how motivated they are to attain prestige (e.g., “I try to get members of my group to respect and admire me”) and dominance (e.g., “I try to control others rather than permit them to control me”). These items were adapted from the Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng et al., 2010). Rather than referencing actual or attained status as in the original items, we reformulated them to reflect participants’ desires to be prestigious or dominant. For example, “Members of my peer group respect and admire me” was adapted to “I try to get members of my group to respect and admire me.” The prestige and dominance items were presented in randomized order.

Afterward, participants completed the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS; Lange & Crusius, 2015a). It measures dispositional tendencies to experience benign (e.g., “Envying others motivates me to accomplish my goals”) or malicious envy (e.g., “I feel ill will toward people I envy”), rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Finally, we assessed three control variables. In Studies 1A and 1B, participants completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Form C (Reynolds, 1982). In Study 1B, we additionally measured narcissism, using a 16-item version of the NPI (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006), and self-esteem, using a single-item measure (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001).

Results

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations can be found in Table 1. We examined the predicted effects with a path model. In the model for Study 1A, we specified effects of entitlement on prestige and dominance motivation. These, in turn, predicted benign and malicious envy, respectively. The error terms of the mediators and the error terms of the envy forms were free to covary. We used maximum likelihood estimation with the Wishart approach. We tested for mediation with 5,000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The model also controlled for social desirability. It predicted prestige motivation, dominance motivation, benign envy, and malicious envy, and was free to covary with entitlement.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of all Measures in Studies 1A and 1B.

	M1A (SD1A)	M1B (SD1B)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Entitlement[a]	3.51 (1.19)	3.60 (1.26)	.90/.90	.24*	.61*	.28*	.37*	−.04	—	—
2. Prestige motivation[b]	4.46 (0.90)	4.49 (0.96)	.29*	.79/.80	.34*	.41*	.16*	−.15*	—	—
3. Dominance motivation[b]	3.18 (1.18)	3.15 (1.26)	.64*	.32*	.88.88	.34*	.49*	−.19*	—	—
4. Benign envy[c]	4.03 (1.03)	4.10 (1.08)	.29*	.49*	.30*	.88/.89	.12*	−.10*	—	—
5. Malicious envy[c]	2.49 (1.12)	2.48 (1.19)	.45*	.14*	.54*	.21*	.89/.90	−.33*	—	—
6. Social desirability[d]	1.42 (0.25)	1.44 (0.25)	−.08*	−.18*	−.20*	−.15*	−.30*	.77/.79	—	—
7. Narcissism[e]	—	0.26 (0.24)	.58*	.20*	.68*	.23*	.38*	−.05	.85	—
8. Self-esteem[f]	—	4.67 (1.73)	.21*	.12*	.25*	.19*	−.04	.24*	.35*	—

Note. N = 424; N = 618. Study 1A above diagonal; Study 1B below diagonal. Cronbach’s αs are displayed on the diagonal, while Studies 1A and 1B are displayed before and after the slash, respectively, if the respective measure was assessed in both studies. As self-esteem was measured with a single item, Cronbach’s α could not be determined.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree).

Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) adapted to measure motivations. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree).

Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (Lange & Crusius, 2015a). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (slightly agree), 5 (moderately agree), to 6 (strongly agree).

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Form C (Reynolds, 1982). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (True) to 2 (False).

Narcissistic Personality Inventory–16 (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006). Answers were given on a scale from 0 (non-narcissistic) to 1 (narcissistic). The scale was administered only in Study 1B.

Single-item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree). The scale was administered only in Study 1B.

The model fit was unsatisfactory, χ2(4) = 35.59, p < .001, comparative fit index (CFI) = .94, root mean square error approximation (RMSEA) = .137, 90% confidence interval (CI) [.098, .180]. Thus, we explored whether an alternative model, including the direct effects from entitlement on benign and malicious envy, would improve model fit. It did, Δχ2(2) = 26.77, p < .001. This model fit the data well, χ2(2) = 8.82, p = .01, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .090, 90% CI [.036, .154].

Results are depicted in Figure 1a. In line with our primary hypotheses, entitlement predicted both prestige, B = 0.18, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.11, 0.25], p < .001, and dominance motivation, B = 0.60, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.52, 0.67], p < .001. Moreover, the indirect effects of entitlement via prestige motivation on benign envy, ab = 0.07, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.04, 0.11], p < .001, and of entitlement via dominance motivation on malicious envy were significant, ab = 0.21, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.14, 0.28], p < .001. The direct effects of entitlement on benign, B = 0.17, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.09, 0.24], p < .001, and malicious envy were significant, B = 0.13, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.04, 0.23], p = .01.

Figure 1.

Path model with entitlement predicting prestige and dominance, which in turn predict benign and malicious envy in Studies 1A (panel a) and 1B (panel b).

Note. Coefficients represent unstandardized regression weights and correlation coefficients. In Study 1A, the model controlled for social desirability. In Study 1B, the model controlled for social desirability, self-esteem, and narcissism. Covariates are omitted for clarity.

*p < .05.

For Study 1B, the model was specified as in Study 1A, but also controlled for narcissism and self-esteem. Again, the initial model fit was unsatisfactory on some indices, χ2(4) = 29.60, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .102, 90% CI [.069, .138]. Thus, as preregistered, we investigated whether an alternative model, including the direct effects from entitlement on benign and malicious envy, would improve model fit. It did, Δχ2(2) = 24.56, p < .001. This model fit the data well, χ2(2) = 5.03, p = .08, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .050, 90% CI [.000, .106].

Results are depicted in Figure 1b. Replicating Study 1A, entitlement predicted both prestige, B = 0.18, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.11, 0.25], p < .001, and dominance motivation, B = 0.36, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.30, 0.42], p < .001. Moreover, the indirect effects of entitlement via prestige motivation on benign envy, ab = 0.09, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.05, 0.13], p < .001, and of entitlement via dominance motivation on malicious envy were significant, ab = 0.13, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.09, 0.17], p < .001. The direct effects of entitlement on benign envy, B = 0.09, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.02, 0.16], p = .01, and malicious envy remained significant, B = 0.18, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.10, 0.26], p < .001.[2]

Discussion

Studies 1A and 1B support the status-seeking account of entitlement. Entitlement predicted greater prestige and dominance motivation, even when controlling for social desirability, narcissism, and self-esteem. Moreover, in line with one implication of the status-seeking account of entitlement, prestige and dominance motivation in turn predicted benign and malicious envy, respectively. However, Studies 1A and 1B were correlational. To establish entitlement’s causal effects, we manipulated it in Studies 2A and 2B.

Studies 2A and 2B

The goal of Study 2A and its preregistered replication, Study 2B, was to again test the status-seeking account of entitlement and its affective implication. To allow causal conclusions, we manipulated rather than measured entitlement. Studies 2A and 2B also sought to extend the generalizability of Studies 1A and 1B, investigating whether entitlement predicts not only dispositional envy but also state envy elicited during the course of the study. Specifically, we measured participants’ benignly and maliciously envious reactions to perceiving an upward comparison standard. We again expected that entitlement promotes prestige and dominance motivation. These motivations should in turn predict benign and malicious envy, respectively. We preregistered Study 2B on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/kf6sn.pdf).

Participants of Study 2A were 325 American MTurk workers who completed all study materials and passed the manipulation check (Mage = 34.9, SD = 11.41, range: 19-68, 48% male).[3] We solicited responses from more than 420 people to have 80% power to detect the smallest estimated effect observed in Study 1B, d = 0.28, with α = .05.

Participants of Study 2B were 641 American MTurk workers who completed all study materials and passed the manipulation check (Mage = 34.28, SD = 11.7, range: 18-77, 50% male). We solicited responses from more than 800 people to have at least 80% power to detect two indirect effects with effect sizes similar to Study 2A (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007) following exclusions based on the manipulation check.

Participants completed an entitlement manipulation in which they listed reasons for three statements (Redford & Ratliff, 2018; Zitek & Vincent, 2015). In the entitlement condition (n2A = 152, n2B = 295), they were asked to list one reason each for why they (a) should demand the best in life, why they (b) deserve more than others, and why they (c) should get their way in life. In the control condition (n2A = 173, n2B = 346), they listed reasons why they (a) should not demand the best in life, why they (b) do not deserve more than others, and why they (c) should not expect to get their own way in life. As manipulation check, participants responded to the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004).

Then, we measured prestige and dominance motivation as in Studies 1A and 1B (Cheng et al., 2010). Subsequently, participants imagined a situation in which they are outperformed by a same-gender target in an academic setting. During an imagined conversation with the target, participants viewed an image of the target expressing pride (Lange & Crusius, 2015b; image from Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). After imagining the situation, participants rated their envy with a scale based on the Pain-driven Dual Envy Theory (Lange et al., 2018). It measures benign envy (e.g., “I would feel deep longing for the other student’s success”), malicious envy (e.g., “I would feel hostile toward the other student”), and pain (e.g., “The situation would make me feel depressed”). Benign and malicious envy should be positively correlated with pain to ensure that envy is present. This was the case in Studies 2A and 2B (Tables 2 and 3). Beyond this, pain was not considered in the analyses.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of All Measures in Study 2A.

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Entitlement[a]	3.57 (1.25)	.91	.33*	.55*	.00	.27*	.08
2. Prestige motivation[b]	4.61 (0.87)	.22*	.76	.36*	.33*	.09	.17*
3. Dominance motivation[b]	3.10 (1.23)	.47*	.38*	.88	.08	.28*	−.02
4. Benign envy[c]	5.01 (1.13)	.19*	.29*	.11	.75	.00	.23*
5. Malicious envy[c]	2.68 (1.37)	.24*	.15[†]	.42*	−.08	.84	.52*
6. Pain[c]	4.23 (1.42)	.08	.23*	.15[†]	.25*	.58*	.80

Note. N = 325. Participants in control condition (n = 173) above diagonal. Participants in entitlement condition (n = 152) below diagonal. Cronbach’s αs are presented on the diagonal. For all items, answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree).

Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004).

Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) adapted to measure motivations.

State envy scales from Pain-driven Dual Envy Theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).

p < .10. *p < .05.

Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of All Measures in Study 2B.

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Entitlement[a]	3.57 (1.29)	.92	.27*	.60*	.10[†]	.31*	.09
2. Prestige motivation[b]	4.63 (0.92)	.30*	.79	.34*	.44*	.19*	.29*
3. Dominance motivation[b]	3.18 (1.20)	.55*	.37*	.88	.12*	.38*	.11*
4. Benign envy[c]	4.94 (1.14)	.23*	.47*	.12*	.69	−.08	.17*
5. Malicious envy[c]	2.82 (1.51)	.30*	.15*	.39*	−.06	.88	.54*
6. Pain[c]	4.15 (1.50)	.12*	.34*	.13*	.37*	.48*	.80

Note. N = 641. Participants in control condition (n = 346) above diagonal. Participants in entitlement condition (n = 295) below diagonal. Cronbach’s αs are presented on the diagonal. For all items, answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree).

Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004).

Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) adapted to measure motivations.

State envy scales from Pain-driven Dual Envy Theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).

p < .10. * p < .05.

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations can be found in Tables 2 and 3 for Studies 2A and 2B, respectively.

Manipulation check

We checked whether our manipulation of entitlement was successful. We used a t-test with Condition (control vs. entitlement) as independent variable and the score on the Psychological Entitlement Scale as the dependent variable.

In Study 2A, the control condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.12) resulted in lower scores than the entitlement condition (M = 4.01, SD = 1.24), t(323) = −6.30, p < .001, g = −0.70, 95% CI of mean difference [−1.08, −0.57]. In Study 2B, the control condition (M = 3.17, SD = 1.24) also resulted in lower scores than the entitlement condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.19), t(639) = −9.01, p < .001, g = −0.72, 95% CI of mean difference [−1.06, −0.68]. Thus, the manipulation was effective.

Effects of entitlement

We first assessed the effects of Condition on all four outcome variables. We used a multivariate analysis of variance with Condition (control vs. entitlement) as independent variable and prestige motivation, dominance motivation, benign envy, and malicious envy as dependent variables.

In Study 2A, the multivariate effect of Condition was significant, F(4, 320) = 4.25, p = .002, = .05. Our predictions were largely confirmed (Table 4). The entitlement condition led to greater prestige motivation, greater dominance motivation, marginally greater benign envy, and greater malicious envy as compared with the control condition. In Study 2B, the multivariate effect of Condition was also significant, F(4, 636) = 5.60, p < .001, = .03. The entitlement condition led to greater prestige and dominance motivation than the control condition. Contrary to expectations, it did not lead to greater benign or malicious envy.

Table 4.

Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses of Variance for the Effect of Condition on Prestige Motivation, Dominance Motivation, Benign Envy, and Malicious Envy in Studies 2A and 2B.

	Mcontrol (SD)	Mentitlement (SD)	F(df)	p	ηp2
Study 2A			(1, 323)
Prestige motivation[a]	4.45 (0.85)	4.79 (0.86)	12.11	<.001	.04
Dominance motivation[a]	2.96 (1.16)	3.26 (1.28)	4.98	.03	.02
Benign envy[b]	4.90 (1.08)	5.15 (1.17)	3.97	.05	.01
Malicious envy[b]	2.52 (1.28)	2.87 (1.45)	5.28	.02	.02
Study 2B			(1, 639)
Prestige motivation[a]	4.54 (0.93)	4.74 (0.89)	7.65	.01	.01
Dominance motivation[a]	2.99 (1.19)	3.41 (1.17)	20.39	<.001	.03
Benign envy[b]	4.91 (1.13)	4.99 (1.16)	0.76	.38	.001
Malicious envy[b]	2.75 (1.53)	2.89 (1.49)	1.43	.23	.002

Note. N2A = 325, nControl = 173, nEntitlement = 152. N2B = 641, nControl = 346, nEntitlement = 295. For all items, answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly agree), 6 (moderately agree), to 7 (strongly agree).

Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) adapted to measure motivations.

State envy scales from Pain-driven Dual Envy Theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).

We examined our predicted effects with a path model. As in Studies 1A and 1B, we specified effects of Condition (−0.5 control vs. 0.5 entitlement) on prestige and dominance motivation. These, in turn, predicted benign and malicious envy, respectively. We used maximum likelihood estimation with the Wishart approach. We tested for mediation with 5,000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

In Study 2A, the model fit was satisfactory, χ2(4) = 3.99, p = .41, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, 90% CI [.000, .084]. Results are depicted in Figure 2a. In line with our primary hypotheses, Condition predicted both prestige, B = 0.33, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.15, 0.52], p < .001, and dominance, B = 0.30, SE = 0.14, 95% CI [0.04, 0.57], p = .03. Moreover, the indirect effects of Condition via prestige motivation on benign envy, ab = 0.14, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.05, 0.27], p = .01, and of Condition via dominance motivation on malicious envy were significant, ab = 0.12, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.02, 0.26], p = .047. We also explored whether an alternative model including the direct effects from Condition on benign and malicious envy would improve model fit. It did not, χ2(2) = 3.71, p = .16.

Figure 2.

Path model with condition predicting prestige and dominance, which in turn predict benign and malicious envy in Studies 2A (panel a) and 2B (panel b).

Note. Coefficients represent unstandardized regression weights and correlation coefficients. Entitle = Entitlement.

*p < .05.

In Study 2B, the model fit was also satisfactory, χ2(4) = 3.14, p = .53, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, 90% CI [.000, 0.054]. Results are depicted in Figure 2b. Replicating Study 2A, Condition predicted both prestige, B = 0.20, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.06, 0.34], p = .01, and dominance, B = 0.42, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.24, 0.61], p < .001. The indirect effects of Condition via prestige motivation on benign envy, ab = 0.11, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.03, 0.20], p = .01, and of Condition via dominance motivation on malicious envy were significant, ab = 0.20, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.12, 0.31], p < .001. We also explored whether an alternative model including the direct effects from Condition on benign and malicious envy would improve model fit. It did not, χ2(2) = 0.58, p = .75.

Studies 2A and 2B support the status-seeking account of entitlement. As entitlement was manipulated, they are in line with the idea that entitlement has causal effects on status motivation. In terms of effects on envy, the results differed slightly from Studies 1A and 1B. Direct effects of entitlement on envy did not consistently emerge in Studies 2A and 2B. The fact that indirect effects were more stable could indicate that entitlement per se does not necessarily implicate envy, but that entitled status-striving is what translates entitlement into affective outcomes. Nevertheless, in all four studies, entitlement produced the predicted indirect effects from entitlement via prestige and dominance motivation to benign and malicious envy, respectively.

Studies 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B provide robust support for our primary hypothesis that entitlement relates to motivation to attain prestige and dominance. Moreover, they support the affective implication of the status-seeking account of entitlement that these motivations predict benign and malicious envy, respectively. Yet, how effective are people higher in entitlement in attaining prestige and dominance in the eyes of others?

Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C

The goal of Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C was to investigate a second implication of the status-seeking account of entitlement. That is, status motivation characterizing people higher in entitlement should predict status attainment in the eyes of others. We had competing hypotheses. It is possible that more entitled people attain status simply by virtue of their greater motivation to achieve it. However, it remains unclear whether their often-maladaptive behavioral patterns might impede or enhance progress toward this goal. Thus, it might be that their dominance motivation results in dominance attainment more easily than prestige motivation results in prestige attainment. Next to peer-rated status attainment, we also assessed self-rated status attainment to contrast potentially distorted self-perceptions of people higher in entitlement with reality.

Studies 3A and 3C are direct replications, except that for Study 3C we collected data partly in the United States and partly in Germany. Across studies, we used different measures of prestige and dominance to test the robustness of our predicted effects. We assessed them with established scales (Cheng et al., 2010) and characteristic social outcomes such as social value or aggressiveness (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). As all studies tested the exact same hypotheses, we present the results in a meta-analysis. We preregistered Study 3B on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/3up3m.pdf) based on the results of Study 3A. We preregistered Study 3C (https://aspredicted.org/h33dn.pdf) based on the results of both previous studies.

Participants of Study 3A were 364 passersby in dyads approached in the center of a large German city (M = 34.33, SD = 15.2, range: 18-75, one missing value, 21% same-gender male dyads, 37% same-gender female, 42% mixed-gender dyads).[4]

Participants of Study 3B were 382 passersby in dyads approached in parks of a large German city (M = 23.99, SD = 7.05, range: 15-67, 10% same-gender male dyads, 56% same-gender female, 34% mixed-gender dyads). Study 3B also included additional measures irrelevant for the current purposes. All measures are available on OSF.[5]

Participants of Study 3C were 366 passersby in dyads approached in the city centers of a medium-sized U.S. and a large German city (M = 26.84, SD = 9.85, range: 14-72, seven missing values, 11% same-gender male dyads, 53% same-gender female, 37% mixed-gender dyads, four missing values).[6]

Participants also rated how well they knew the partner on a scale from 1 (not at all), 2 (fleeting), 3 (a little bit), 4 (pretty well), to 5 (extremely well). The mean in Study 3A was 4.08 (SD = 0.85, range: 1-5), in Study 3B it was 4.03 (SD = 0.82, range: 1-5), and in Study 3C it was 4.25 (SD = 0.78, range: 1-5, three missing values). Sample size was chosen to achieve enough power to estimate a respective path model with more than five observations per parameter.

Experimenters invited people passing by in pairs and being engaged in a conversation to ensure that they were at least acquainted. Dyad members were then separated and completed the questionnaire individually on tablets.

First, participants completed the English or German version of the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004; Morf et al., 2016). Subsequently, they rated their prestige and dominance attainment. In Studies 3A and 3C, they rated how often certain items apply to themselves and their dyad partner on a scale from 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (often), 5 (very often), to 6 (extremely often). The items were inspired by theoretical conceptualizations of prestige and dominance (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016) as well as previous research (e.g., Lange et al., 2016). Specifically, they measured prestige attainment with items assessing expertise and skills (“I/My acquaintance reach/es my/his/her ambitious goals,” “I/My acquaintance help/s others with my/his/her knowledge and experience”), social value (“I/My acquaintance am/is a role model for others”), and other’s voluntary deference (“I/My acquaintance am/is admired by others,” “I/My acquaintance receive/s compliments”). Moreover, they measured dominance attainment with items assessing aggressive intimidation (“I/My acquaintance force/s others to do what I/s/he want,” “I/My acquaintance gossip/s about others,” “I/My acquaintance express/es schadenfreude”) and involuntary deference (“I/My acquaintance am/is feared by others,” “Others do not dare to disagree with me/my acquaintance”). To take into account that status attainment relies on social consensus among peers, the items were phrased such that they refer to multiple peers at the same time and not only the idiosyncratic opinion of the participant or the partner for the self- or peer-ratings, respectively.

To test the factor structure of this scale, we conducted principal component analyses. In each study, separately for self- and peer-ratings, parallel analyses with 1,000 randomly generated data sets supported that only two components surpassed the 95% confidence interval. Thus, we forced the extraction of two components using oblimin rotation. For the self-ratings, the two factors explained 46% to 50% of the variance. All items loaded > .47 on the predicted factor and < |.35| on the unpredicted factor. For peer-ratings, the two factors explained 53% to 57% of the variance. All items loaded > .55 on the predicted factor and < |.30| on the unpredicted factor.

In Study 3B, we selected eight items from the Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng et al., 2010) that represented its breadth. For all scales, we averaged the self-ratings to self-rated prestige and dominance. Correspondingly, we averaged the peer-ratings to peer-rated prestige and dominance.

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for randomly separated partners and partner similarity for all measures are displayed in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C, respectively. Dyad members were similar on many measures, indicating interdependence in the data.

Table 5.

Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures Separated by Partner and Partner Similarity in Study 3A.

	M (SD)	α	1	2	3	4	5
1. Entitlement[a]	3.24 (0.97)	.75	.11	.10	.22*	−.03	.22*
2. Self-rated prestige[b]	3.49 (0.60)	.73	.21*	.20*	.15*	.43*	.11
3. Self-rated dominance[b]	2.20 (0.62)	.61	.36*	.27*	.07	−.06	.63*
4. Ratings of other’s prestige[b]	3.77 (0.66)	.78	.01	.38*	.09	.21*	−.04
5. Rating of other’s dominance[b]	2.09 (0.73)	.75	.27*	.12	.66*	.11	.19*

Note. N = 364. Within-person correlations of randomly separated partners. Partner 1 above diagonal and Partner 2 below diagonal with n = 182 each. Within-dyad correlations on diagonal in italics with n = 182 dyads.

German version of the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Morf et al., 2016). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree strongly).

German scale assessing prestige and dominance. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (often), 5 (very often), to 6 (extremely often).

p < .10. *p < .05.

Table 6.

Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures Separated by Partner and Partner Similarity in Study 3B.

	M (SD)	α	1	2	3	4	5
1. Entitlement[a]	3.14 (1.06)	.83	.08	.30*	.48*	.08	.31*
2. Self-rated prestige[b]	4.65 (1.01)	.77	.34*	−.01	.23*	.38*	.01
3. Self-rated dominance[b]	2.63 (1.13)	.77	.36*	.10	.03	.05	.41*
4. Ratings of other’s prestige[b]	5.16 (1.01)	.84	.14[†]	.45*	−.10	.21*	.03
5. Rating of other’s dominance[b]	2.35 (1.24)	.84	.16*	.01	.26*	−.02	−.02

Note. N = 382. Within-person correlations of randomly separated partners. Partner 1 above diagonal and Partner 2 below diagonal with n = 191 each. Within-dyad correlations on diagonal in italics with n = 191 dyads.

German version of the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Morf et al., 2016). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree strongly).

Prestige and Dominance Scale. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all), 4 (somewhat), to 7 (very much).

p < .10. *p < .05.

Table 7.

Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures Separated by Partner and Partner Similarity in Study 3C.

	M (SD)	α	1	2	3	4	5
1. Entitlement[a]	3.05 (1.08)	.82	.21*	.30*	.26*	.06	.25*
2. Self-rated prestige[b]	3.89 (0.78)	.81	.23*	.24*	.07	.51*	.06
3. Self-rated dominance[b]	2.13 (0.60)	.62	.31*	.08	.21*	−.06	.48*
4. Ratings of other’s prestige[b]	4.35 (0.83)	.85	−.03	.56*	−.14[†]	.30*	−.01
5. Rating of other’s dominance[b]	2.07 (0.78)	.73	.30*	.05	.54*	−.07	.25*

Note. N = 366. Within-person correlations of randomly separated partners. Partner 1 above diagonal and Partner 2 below diagonal with n = 183 each. Within-dyad correlations on diagonal in italics with n = 183 dyads.

German or English version of the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; Morf et al., 2016). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree strongly).

English translation and German scale assessing prestige and dominance. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (often), 5 (very often), to 6 (extremely often).

p < .10. *p < .05.

Next, we tested whether self- and peer-ratings converged. Across studies, for Partner 1, self-rated prestige attainment was associated with peer-rated prestige attainment, rs = .18-.30, and self-rated dominance attainment was associated with peer-rated dominance attainment, rs = .20-.24. For Partner 2, we found similar correlations for prestige, rs = .12-.28, and dominance attainment, rs = .19-.29. Overall, convergence was modest. Therefore, we analyzed self- and peer-ratings separately.

In each sample, we analyzed the data with an Actor–Partner Interdependence Model (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006) with two outcomes. We specified the same model in all studies for both self- and peer-ratings (Figure 3). Specifically, we specified actor and partner effects from entitlement to both prestige and dominance attainment. As partners could not be distinguished based on any categorical variable (e.g., gender), we specified the model for indistinguishable partners. That is, all corresponding paths, means, intercepts, and (co)variances were set equal between partners. We used maximum likelihood estimation with the Wishart approach.

Figure 3.

Actor–partner interdependence model tested in Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C.

Note. All corresponding paths, intercepts, means, and (co)variances were set equal between partners. p = Person.

The results of each model are depicted in Table 8. All models fit the data. For self-ratings, entitlement was significantly positively related to prestige and dominance attainment. For peer-ratings, entitlement was consistently negatively related to prestige attainment, yet significantly so only in Study 3C. In addition, entitlement was consistently positively related to dominance attainment, yet significantly so only in Study 3A.

Table 8.

Results of Actor–Partner Interdependence Models for Indistinguishable Partners for Self- and Peer-Ratings in Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C.

Model	B	SE	p	B CI 95%	Model fit
					χ2(12)	CFI	RMSEA [90% CI]
Study 3A
Self-rating					12.66, p = .39	0.99	0.017 [0.000, 0.079]
Prestige[a]	0.095	0.032	.003	[0.032, 0.157]
Dominance[a]	0.180	0.032	<.001	[0.118, 0.243]
Peer-rating					12.04, p = .44	1.00	0.005 [0.000, 0.076]
Prestige[a]	−0.011	0.035	.755	[−0.081, 0.058]
Dominance[a]	0.117	0.038	.002	[0.043, 0.191]
Study 3B
Self-rating					12.40, p = .41	1.00	0.013 [0.000, 0.076]
Prestige[b]	0.311	0.046	<.001	[0.220, 0.402]
Dominance[b]	0.453	0.049	<.001	[0.357, 0.549]
Peer-rating					8.60, p = .74	1.00	0.000 [0.000, 0.054]
Prestige[b]	−0.053	0.048	.271	[−0.147, 0.041]
Dominance[b]	0.086	0.058	.141	[−0.029, 0.201]
Study 3C
Self-rating					6.53, p = .89	1.00	0.000 [0.000, 0.036]
Prestige[c]	0.185	0.036	<.001	[0.113, 0.256]
Dominance[c]	0.169	0.028	<.001	[0.115, 0.224]
Peer-rating					3.81, p = .99	1.00	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]
Prestige[c]	−0.097	0.040	.015	[−0.175, −0.019]
Dominance[c]	0.031	0.036	.391	[−0.040, 0.103]

Note. N3A = 364 (182 dyads). N3B = 382 (191 dyads). N3C = 366 (183 dyads). For self-ratings, the coefficients represent relationships of self-rated entitlement with self-rated status attainment. For peer-ratings, the coefficients represent relationships of self-rated entitlement with peer-rated status attainment as rated by the partner. CI = confidence interval; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

German scale assessing prestige and dominance. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (often), 5 (very often), to 6 (extremely often).

German translation of items from the Prestige and Dominance Scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all), 4 (a bit), to 7 (very much)

English translation and German scale assessing prestige and dominance. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (often), 5 (very often), to 6 (extremely often).

Collapsing across the studies, we ran multivariate random-effects meta-analyses for correlated outcomes with maximum likelihood estimation for self- and peer-ratings. That is, we analyzed the relationships of entitlement with prestige and dominance attainment in the same model, separately for self- and peer-ratings. As prestige and dominance attainment were assessed on partly different scales across studies, we used the standardized regression coefficients taken from the Actor–Partner Interdependence Models as effect sizes (Kim, 2011). As we tested the exact same model in each study, the standardized regression coefficients were directly comparable.

The meta-analysis supported the above pattern. For self-ratings, entitlement correlated positively with prestige, = .247, SE = .043, p < .001, 95% CI [.162, .332], and dominance attainment, = .342, SE = .040, p < .001, 95% CI [.263, .422]. In contrast, for peer-ratings, entitlement correlated negatively with prestige, = −.067, SE = .033, p = .043, 95% CI [−.133, −.002], but positively with dominance attainment,= .090, SE = .033, p = .007, 95% CI [.025; .155].[7]

Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C investigated a second implication of the status-seeking account of entitlement, namely whether people higher in entitlement attain status in the eyes of others. In line with their cognitive distortions (Grubbs & Exline, 2016), status attainment diverged between self- and peer-ratings. More entitled people ascribed themselves more prestige and dominance, whereas others ascribed them more dominance and less prestige.

General Discussion

Seven studies provide evidence consistent with a status-seeking account of entitlement. Specifically, people higher in entitlement indicated increased prestige and dominance motivation. As a first implication, more entitled people’s prestige and dominance motivation in turn predicted greater benign and malicious envy, respectively, when encountering high-status others. These indirect effects occurred when entitlement was measured (Studies 1A and 1B) and manipulated (Studies 2a and 2B). Finally, as a second implication, people higher in entitlement attained status (Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C). However, they attained only peer-rated dominance. In contrast, they attained less peer-rated prestige. Note that the effect sizes on peer-ratings were rather small in an absolute sense, which might be common for such designs (e.g., Kenny & Acitelli, 2001). Finally, in line with their cognitive distortions (Grubbs & Exline, 2016), more entitled people ascribed themselves both prestige and dominance.

Collectively, the studies support that status-seeking is a central motivational component of people higher in entitlement. This motivational component may explain and consequentially integrate the diverse behaviors characterizing more entitled people from the pursuit of achievement (Redford & Ratliff, 2018) and the establishment of a positive self-image (Moeller et al., 2009) to interpersonal aggressiveness (Reidy et al., 2008) and antagonism (Ackerman & Donnellan, 2013). Desires for prestige and dominance, respectively, could drive these consequences. In Studies 1A and 1B, more entitled people’s dominance motivation was larger than their prestige motivation. This finding dovetails with evidence that entitlement is, overall, more strongly predictive of interpersonal conflict than prosocial tendencies (Grubbs & Exline, 2016). However, this difference did not occur in Studies 2A and 2B in which we manipulated rather than measured entitlement. Therefore, any conclusions as to whether dominance or prestige motivation is more pronounced remain tentative. Interestingly, the desires of people higher in entitlement remain partly unfulfilled. They even attained less peer-rated prestige. This is in line with evidence that the self-presentational concerns characterizing more entitled people promote conflict with others over time (Moeller et al., 2009) and that they have decreased status in long-term relationships (Carlson & DesJardins, 2015). In sum, a status-seeking account provides new perspectives on the dynamics of entitled behavior and its social outcomes.

If status-seeking underlies entitlement, new predictions can be derived. For instance, the current approach highlights how entitlement might interact with affective processes to regulate hierarchies. One affective, social-functional means to regulate status hierarchies is envy toward high-status others (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange & Crusius, 2015b). In the current research, entitlement had the predicted indirect relationships via prestige and dominance motivation to both benign and malicious envy. Notably, there was some inconsistency in whether entitlement had direct effects on envy. In Studies 1A and 1B, entitlement had direct and indirect effects on dispositional envy, whereas in Studies 2A and 2B, the direct effect of entitlement on state envy was less consistent. Nevertheless, the consistent emergence of the indirect effects implies that people higher in entitlement are prone to status-related affective reactions that contribute to experiences and outcomes in social hierarchies. If so, then they may be better understood by examining whether they are more likely to experience other status-related emotions, including pride, shame, and contempt (Steckler & Tracy, 2014).

One way in which entitlement may be associated with status-related emotions is by amplifying the experiences, displays, and outcomes of these emotions. For example, if more entitled people are prone to shame following failure to meet status goals, that shame could foster peer-perceptions of low status, in turn fueling more shame (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012). Similarly, if they are prone to hubristic pride following successful pursuit of status goals, this could in turn promote even higher peer-perceptions of dominance, fueling status conflict. In sum, the amplification of social-functional emotions and their effects could be a defining process of people higher in entitlement and lend insight into how they navigate social hierarchies.

Moreover, there are several possible explanations of why more entitled people’s prestige motivation did not translate into prestige attainment. These might be investigated more closely in future research. One explanation could be their self-enhancing misperceptions. Specifically, they may invest less effort to gain social value because their distorted self-image indicates that prestige has already been attained. This could directly be examined by investigating their persistence and effort.

Another explanation for their failure to attain prestige arises from the voluntary versus forcible natures of dominance and prestige conferral. Dominant strategies imply force upon others despite resistance. Their use, influence, and recognition by others may be easier, faster, and more direct than prestige strategies, whose influence ultimately depends on the ability to elicit voluntary deferral. Consequentially, it is desirable but difficult to elicit prestige conferral.

People higher in entitlement may also misperceive that they pursued prestige strategies when they resort in fact to dominance strategies. Some status cues like wealth are especially ambiguous in that they can be interpreted or enacted as prestigious, dominant, or both (Cheng & Tracy, 2013). It would be interesting to examine more entitled people’s perceptions of status-seeking strategies.

Limitations and Future Directions

The conclusions about the effect of entitlement on prestige attainment are constrained by limitations of the current research. First, they are silent about how status may vary over time and across contexts. In other words, it is possible that the current research missed a time point or context in which people higher in entitlement attain prestige. It is conceivable that they attain prestige in initial interactions but lose it eventually because of aggressive, dominant tendencies. Longitudinal studies starting at zero acquaintance would offer insight into this possibility. Second, gender differences in entitlement are also worth considering in future studies. More entitled men may have more success with self-promotion and self-enhancement, as women often experience backlash for the same strategies (Moss-Racusin & Rudman, 2010). More broadly, the effect of entitlement on status attainment might be more context-sensitive than our studies have investigated.

Moreover, the current research has the strength of assessing both self- and peer-rated outcomes, but these ratings are necessarily reliant on explicit verbal reports. Future research could complement the current findings by exploring actual behavioral attempts to gain prestige and dominance. Doing so could also help address our speculation that people higher in entitlement are characterized by self-enhancing misperceptions of prestige and status-seeking. Such methods could compare their perceptions of interactions to their actually employed strategies. This could be directly informative as to the processes that lead to the maintenance and construction of the entitled self-image.

Conclusion

The current research illustrates the value of understanding status-seeking as a fundamental motivational component of people higher in entitlement. This approach offers an integrative perspective on how they might influence the emergence and bases of status hierarchies. These insights inform future research about entitlement, suggesting exploration of affective, social, and cognitive processes that stem from and support the pursuit of status underlying it.

Click here for additional data file.

Supplemental material, Lange_OnlineAppendix for A Status-Seeking Account of Psychological Entitlement by Jens Lange, Liz Redford and Jan Crusius in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin