| Literature DB >> 30200494 |
Fei Wang1, Xin-Bo Cong2, Chen-Guang Shi3, Mathini Sellathurai4.
Abstract
Although radiation power minimization is the most important method for an advanced stealth aircraft to achieve the low probability of detection (LPD) performance against the opposite passive detection system (PDS), it is not always effective when the performance of PDS is advanced. In a target tracking scenario, an interference tactic is proposed in this paper to keep the airborne radar in an LPD state. Firstly, this paper introduces the minimization radiation power design of airborne radar based on the distance between the radar and the target, and introduces the minimization radiation power design of the airborne jammer based on the predicted detection probability of the opposite PDS. Then, after consulting the most commonly used constant false alarm rate (CFAR) technologies in passive detection systems, including the cell average CFAR, the greatest of CFAR, the smallest of CFAR and the ordered statistic CFAR, this paper analyzes their relationships and points out the way of interference. Finally, based on the constraints, not only including the predicted detection probabilities of airborne radar and opposite PDS, respectively, but also including the time synchronization which is necessary to avoid the leaked interference power generated by airborne jammer jamming the airborne radar echoes from the target, this paper establishes a math model to minimize the total interference power of airborne jammer without interfering target tracking. Simulation results show that the proposed model is effective.Entities:
Keywords: constant false alarm rate (CFAR); jamming; low probability of detection (LPD); passive detection system (PDS); tracking
Year: 2018 PMID: 30200494 PMCID: PMC6165476 DOI: 10.3390/s18092903
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Figure 1Combination of tracking and jamming at the target equipped advanced passive detection system.
Figure 2Relationship between radar echo and jammer echo.
Parameters of the airborne radar.
| Radar | Values | Radar | Values | Radar | Values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| 30 dB |
| 30 dB |
| 1 m |
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| 3 dB |
| 1 MHz |
| 2 dB |
|
| 15 dB |
| 1 |
| 10 ms |
|
| 20 kw |
| 10 w |
| 0.03 m |
Figure 3Detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 6.
Figure 4Detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 8.
Figure 5Detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 12.
Figure 6Detection probability of airborne radar after jamming.
Figure 7Comparing to [31,32], detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 6.
Figure 8Compared to [31,32], detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 8.
Figure 9Compared to [31,32], detection probability of CA, GO, SO, and OS-CFAR before and after jamming when the number of reference units is 12.
Figure 10Acceptable synchronization error for different reference cells during tracking process.
Maneuvering process of target.
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