| Literature DB >> 30059822 |
Caitlin Carroll1, Michael Chernew2, A Mark Fendrick3, Joe Thompson4, Sherri Rose2.
Abstract
We study how physicians respond to financial incentives imposed by episode-based payment (EBP), which encourages lower spending and improved quality for an entire episode of care. Specifically, we study the impact of the Arkansas Health Care Payment Improvement Initiative, a multi-payer program that requires providers to enter into EBP arrangements for perinatal care, covering the majority of births in the state. Unlike fee-for-service reimbursement, EBP holds physicians responsible for all care within a discrete episode, rewarding physicians for efficient use of their own services and for efficient management of other health care inputs. In a difference-in-differences analysis of commercial claims, we find that perinatal spending in Arkansas decreased by 3.8% overall under EBP, compared to surrounding states. The decrease was driven by reduced spending on non-physician health care inputs, specifically the prices paid for inpatient facility care. We additionally find a limited improvement in quality of care under EBP.Entities:
Keywords: Bundled payment; I1; I11; Incentive contracts; Perinatal care; Physician payment methods; Physician productivity
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 30059822 DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.06.010
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Health Econ ISSN: 0167-6296 Impact factor: 3.883