| Literature DB >> 30007212 |
Abstract
Performance-raising practices tend to diffuse slowly in the health care sector. To understand how incentives drive adoption, I study a practice that generates revenue for hospitals: submitting detailed documentation about patients. After a 2008 reform, hospitals could raise their Medicare revenue over 2% by always specifying a patient's type of heart failure. Hospitals only captured around half of this revenue, indicating that large frictions impeded takeup. Exploiting the fact that many doctors practice at multiple hospitals, I find that four-fifths of the dispersion in adoption reflects differences in the ability of hospitals to extract documentation from physicians. A hospital's adoption of coding is robustly correlated with its heart attack survival rate and its use of inexpensive survival-raising care. Hospital-physician integration and electronic medical records are also associated with adoption. These findings highlight the potential for institution-level frictions, including agency conflicts, to explain variations in health care performance across providers.Entities:
Keywords: Firm performance; Healthcare; Hospitals; Technology adoption; Upcoding
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 30007212 PMCID: PMC9175183 DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.06.005
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Health Econ ISSN: 0167-6296 Impact factor: 3.804