| Literature DB >> 29962655 |
Laura Helbling1, Shireen Kanji2.
Abstract
Job insecurity has become increasingly evident in European countries in recent years. In Germany, legislation has increased insecurity through erosion of the standard employment relationship. Fixed-term contracts are central to definitions of insecurity based on atypical or precarious work but there is still limited understanding of what creates insecurity and how it affects workers. Drawing on Bourdieu's thesis that "insecurity is everywhere", the relationships between subjective and objective measures of insecurity are examined for their impact on the 5-year trajectories of life satisfaction of men and women in the age group 27-30. Latent growth curve analysis of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 2010-2014 highlights the adverse and lasting effects of subjective concerns about job insecurity on life satisfaction trajectories. This association cuts across educational groups, with far reaching implications as subjective concerns about job security permeate young worker's lives well beyond the objective condition of being employed on a fixed-term contract.Entities:
Keywords: Fixed-term employment; Job insecurity; Life satisfaction; Subjective indicators
Year: 2017 PMID: 29962655 PMCID: PMC5984641 DOI: 10.1007/s11205-017-1635-z
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Soc Indic Res ISSN: 0303-8300
Worries about job loss and contractual insecurity
| Permanent contract | Fixed-term contract | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not worried | 53% (344) | 35% (85) | 49% (429) |
| Worried | 47% (414) | 65% (125) | 51% (539) |
| Total | 100% (758) | 100% (210) | 100% (968) |
Percentages are weighted values, number in brackets refers to unweighted sample sizes
Design-based F (1, 653) = 3.9, significant at p ≤ 0.05
Fig. 1Unconditional growth curve model. ls10-14 stand for life satisfaction in each of the years 2010–2014
Fig. 2Conditional growth curve model. ls10–14 stand for life satisfaction in each of the years 2010–2014 For illustration purposes, the covariance among growth parameters as well as paths from each explanatory variable and control variables to latent growth parameters are not shown. Underlying this conditional growth-curve model is the baseline model illustrated in Fig. 1
Mean scores of life satisfaction for workers aged 27–30 in the SOEP 2010–2014
| Mean scores | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Rate of change (mean slope) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Life satisfaction | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 0.01 n.s. |
Job insecurity and life satisfaction
| Effect (M1) | SE | Effect (M2) | SE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept life satisfaction | 7.62*** | 0.09 | 7.09*** | 0.37 |
| Slope life satisfaction | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.19(*) | 0.11 |
|
| ||||
| Fixed-term contract | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.35 | 0.42 |
| Worries about job security | −0.34* | 0.16 | − | 0.16 |
| Interaction | −0.50 | 0.47 | −0.31 | 0.45 |
| Partner | – | – |
| 0.16 |
| Wage |
|
|
| 0.01 |
| Previous unemployment |
|
| − | 0.18 |
|
| ||||
| Fixed-term contract | −0.04 | 0.07 | −0.05 | 0.07 |
| Worries about job security | −0.01 | 0.05 | −0.02 | 0.06 |
| Interaction | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.11 |
Significant effects are highlighted in bold and discussed in the results section
(*) ≤0.1; * ≤0.05; ** ≤0.01; *** ≤0.001
M1 (no controls), N = 966: MLRx2 = 28.8, df = 19, x2/df = 1.5, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.023, P-close = 1.00
M2 (controls added), N = 857: MLRx2 = 111.7, df = 61, x2/df = 1.8, CFI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.031, P-close = 1.00
Control variables: gender, migrant status, education, children at home, partner, previous unemployment, work experience (full-time and part-time), firm tenure, full-time vs. regular/marginal part-time, wage, region
Only significant effects (p ≤ 0.1) of control variables are displayed in M2
Job insecurity and life satisfaction disaggregated by education group
| Medium/low education (N = 728) | High education (N = 233) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Effect | SE | Effect | SE | |
| Intercept life satisfaction | 7.53*** | 0.14 | 8.00*** | 0.17 |
| Slope life satisfaction | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
|
| ||||
| Fixed-term contract | 0.83 | 0.55 | −0.31 | 0.31 |
| Worries about job security |
| 0.16 |
| 0.21 |
| Interaction | −0.97 | 0.60 | 0.13 | 0.42 |
Significant effects are highlighted in bold and discussed in the results section
The latent slope variance is constrained to zero for model fit purposes
(*) ≤0.1; * ≤0.05; ** ≤0.01; *** ≤0.001
MLRx2 = 93.1, df = 48, x2/df = 1.4, CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.044, P-close = 0.75