| Literature DB >> 29889871 |
Yin Liu1,2, Chao Fu1,2, Min Xue1,2, Wenjun Chang1,2, Shanlin Yang1,2.
Abstract
As an important way to help express the preference relation between alternatives, distributed preference relation (DPR) can represent the preferred, non-preferred, indifferent, and uncertain degrees of one alternative over another simultaneously. DPR, however, is unavailable in some situations where a decision maker cannot provide the precise degrees of one alternative over another due to lack of knowledge, experience, and data. In this paper, to address this issue, we propose interval-valued DPR (IDPR) and present its properties of validity and normalization. Through constructing two optimization models, an IDPR matrix is transformed into a score matrix to facilitate the comparison between any two alternatives. The properties of the score matrix are analyzed. To guarantee the rationality of the comparisons between alternatives derived from the score matrix, the additive consistency of the score matrix is developed. In terms of these, IDPR is applied to model and solve multiple criteria group decision making (MCGDM) problem. Particularly, the relationship between the parameters for the consistency of the score matrix associated with each decision maker and those for the consistency of the score matrix associated with the group of decision makers is analyzed. A manager selection problem is investigated to demonstrate the application of IDPRs to MCGDM problems.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 29889871 PMCID: PMC5995369 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0198393
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Process of generating a solution to the MCGDM problem with IDPRs.
Score intervals of the group IDPRs between neighboring candidates in the manager selection problem.
| Criteria | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [−0.5854, −0.2631] | [−0.5048, −0.2578] | [0.3328, 0.5984] | [−0.5692, −0.2930] | |
| [0.3697, 0.5865] | [0.1632, 0.3934] | [−0.4644, −0.2630] | [0.1361, 0.3649] | |
| [0.1482, 0.4263] | [−0.0106, 0.2235] | [−0.0848, 0.1577] | [−0.4205, −0.1908] | |
| [0.3613, 0.6760] | [0.1269, 0.3420] | [−0.4263, −0.1835] | [0.2796, 0.5577] | |
| [−0.5204, −0.2268] | [−0.4693, −0.2239] | [−0.5243, −0.2054] | [−0.5631, −0.3514] | |
| [0.0414, 0.4196] | [0.2360, 0.5350] | [0.2728, 0.5048] | [−0.5886, −0.3221] | |
| [−0.3124, 0.0553] | [−0.1638, 0.0340] | [0.2493, 0.4484] | [0.1545, 0.4546] | |
| [−0.3904, −0.1686] | [−0.5341, −0.2827] | [−0.4323, −0.2480] | [−0.6968, −0.4475] | |
| [−0.2628, −0.0280] | [0.2739, −0.4703] | [−0.6071, −0.3375] | [0.0122, 0.3364] | |
| [0.3212, 0.5170] | [−0.4596, 0.2093] | [0.0068, 0.2278] | [−0.3703, 0.1116] |
Aggregated IDPRs between neighboring candidates in the manager selection problem.
| Candidates | |
|---|---|
| {( | |
| {( | |
| {( | |
| {( |
Score intervals of the IDPRs between any two candidates in the manager selection problem.
| Candidates | |||||
| [0, 0] | [−0.1048, 0.224] | [−0.2512, 0.3869] | [−0.4782, 0.461] | [−0.7426, 0.2722] | |
| [−0.224, 0.1048] | [0, 0] | [−0.1357, 0.1485] | [−0.3651, 0.2241] | [−0.6657, 0.125] | |
| [−0.3869, 0.2512] | [−0.1485, 0.1357] | [0, 0] | [−0.2152, 0.0674] | [−0.5462, 0.0273] | |
| [−0.461, 0.4782] | [−0.2241, 0.3651] | [−0.0674, 0.2152] | [0, 0] | [−0.3269, −0.0237] | |
| [−0.2722, 0.7426] | [−0.125, 0.6657] | [−0.0273, 0.5462] | [0.0237, 0.3269] | [0, 0] |
Possibility matrix of the five candidates in the manager selection problem.
| Candidates | |||||||||||
| 0.5 | 0.7968 | 0.69 | 0.4819 | 0.1439 | |||||||
| 0.2032 | 0.5 | 0.544 | 0.2894 | 0.05 | |||||||
| 0.31 | 0.4273 | 0.5 | 0.1139 | 0.0045 | |||||||
| 0.5181 | 0.704 | 0.8861 | 0.5 | 0.00 | |||||||
| 0.8561 | 0.9500 | 0.9955 | 1 | 0.5 |
The six sets of functions for the least square method and their relevant optimization results.
| Functions | Results |
|---|---|
Fig 2The comparison of the combinations of a generated by using the four sets of functions for the manager selection problem.
Fig 3The comparison of the combinations of b generated by using the four sets of functions for the manager selection problem.