Literature DB >> 29671144

Examining unpriced risk heterogeneity in the Dutch health insurance market.

A A Withagen-Koster1, R C van Kleef2, F Eijkenaar2.   

Abstract

A major challenge in regulated health insurance markets is to mitigate risk selection potential. Risk selection can occur in the presence of unpriced risk heterogeneity, which refers to predictable variation in health care spending not reflected in either premiums by insurers or risk equalization payments. This paper examines unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups distinguished by the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization model of 2016. Our strategy is to combine the administrative dataset used for estimation of the risk equalization model (n = 16.9 million) with information derived from a large health survey (n = 387k). The survey information allows for explaining and predicting residual spending of the risk equalization model. Based on the predicted residual spending, two metrics are used to indicate unpriced risk heterogeneity at the individual level and at the level of certain (risk) groups: the correlation coefficient between residual spending and predicted residual spending, and the mean absolute value of predicted residual spending. The analyses yield three main findings: (1) the health survey information is able to explain some residual spending of the risk equalization model, (2) unpriced risk heterogeneity exists both in morbidity and in non-morbidity groups, and (3) unpriced risk heterogeneity increases with predicted spending by the risk equalization model. These findings imply that the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization model does not completely remove unpriced risk heterogeneity. Further improvement of the model should focus on broadening and refining the current set of morbidity-based risk adjusters.

Keywords:  Health insurance; Risk equalization; Risk selection; Survey data

Mesh:

Year:  2018        PMID: 29671144     DOI: 10.1007/s10198-018-0979-x

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Eur J Health Econ        ISSN: 1618-7598


  20 in total

1.  The HHS-HCC risk adjustment model for individual and small group markets under the Affordable Care Act.

Authors:  John Kautter; Gregory C Pope; Melvin Ingber; Sara Freeman; Lindsey Patterson; Michael Cohen; Patricia Keenan
Journal:  Medicare Medicaid Res Rev       Date:  2014-05-09

2.  Regression Trees Identify Relevant Interactions: Can This Improve the Predictive Performance of Risk Adjustment?

Authors:  Florian Buchner; Jürgen Wasem; Sonja Schillo
Journal:  Health Econ       Date:  2015-10-26       Impact factor: 3.046

Review 3.  Risk selection in a regulated health insurance market: a review of the concept, possibilities and effects.

Authors:  Richard C van Kleef; Wynand P M M van de Ven; René C J A van Vliet
Journal:  Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res       Date:  2013-12       Impact factor: 2.217

4.  Risk adjustment and risk equalization: what needs to be done?

Authors:  Wynand P M M Van de Ven
Journal:  Health Econ Policy Law       Date:  2011-01

5.  Assessing incentives for service-level selection in private health insurance exchanges.

Authors:  Thomas G McGuire; Joseph P Newhouse; Sharon-Lise Normand; Julie Shi; Samuel Zuvekas
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2014-02-17       Impact factor: 3.883

6.  How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program.

Authors:  Jason Brown; Mark Duggan; Ilyana Kuziemko; William Woolston
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2014-10

7.  New risk-adjustment system was associated with reduced favorable selection in medicare advantage.

Authors:  J Michael McWilliams; John Hsu; Joseph P Newhouse
Journal:  Health Aff (Millwood)       Date:  2012-12       Impact factor: 6.301

8.  Steps to reduce favorable risk selection in medicare advantage largely succeeded, boding well for health insurance exchanges.

Authors:  Joseph P Newhouse; Mary Price; Jie Huang; J Michael McWilliams; John Hsu
Journal:  Health Aff (Millwood)       Date:  2012-12       Impact factor: 6.301

9.  Improving risk equalization with constrained regression.

Authors:  Richard C van Kleef; Thomas G McGuire; René C J A van Vliet; Wynand P P M van de Ven
Journal:  Eur J Health Econ       Date:  2016-12-10

10.  How can the regulator show evidence of (no) risk selection in health insurance markets? Conceptual framework and empirical evidence.

Authors:  Wynand P M M van de Ven; René C J A van Vliet; Richard C van Kleef
Journal:  Eur J Health Econ       Date:  2016-02-02
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  2 in total

1.  Risk equalization in competitive health insurance markets: Identifying healthy individuals on the basis of multiple-year low spending.

Authors:  Frank Eijkenaar; René C J A van Vliet; Richard C van Kleef
Journal:  Health Serv Res       Date:  2018-10-16       Impact factor: 3.402

2.  Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.

Authors:  A A Withagen-Koster; R C van Kleef; F Eijkenaar
Journal:  Eur J Health Econ       Date:  2020-01-08
  2 in total

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