| Literature DB >> 29492180 |
Olena Oleksiyenko1, Danuta Życzyńska-Ciołek1.
Abstract
In this paper, we aim to analyse selected structural determinants of workforce participation after retirement in Poland. By structural determinants we mean characteristics of one's socio-economic position that (a) result from the interplay of social conditions (mechanisms of power, differentiated access to resources) and individual agency, and (b) restrict or facilitate individuals' choices. We conceptualise workforce participation as engaging in either part- or full-time paid employment despite receiving the old-age pension. Our general hypothesis is that working in older age is not only a matter of motivation or psychological traits but also a complex interplay of structural characteristics, accumulated by individuals during their life course. In the paper, we test a number of hypotheses about the role of specific components of socio-economic status (SES), i.e. occupational prestige, education, and wealth, for workforce participation among retirees. We argue that, in case of retirees, the prestige of the last job before retirement is a more reliable measure of the social position than education. Hence, we conduct a more detailed analysis of the role of occupational prestige for the chances of being employed after retirement. The analysis was based on data gathered in the years 2013-2014 within the sixth wave of the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN (www.polpan.org). We extracted a subsample of retirees from this dataset and used logistic regression to test the hypotheses described above. We found that both occupational prestige of the last job before retirement and educational attainments are strong predictors of being in paid work after retirement, however the impact of occupational prestige varies across the groups with the lowest and higher level of retirement pension. We also found that there are horizontal differences in the occupational structure of the chances for workforce participation after retirement and additionally found that being a farm owner increases the propensity to engage in economic activity after retirement. The paper contributes to the field of studies on the relationship between SES and workforce participation after retirement in line with the cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory and shows that resources that individuals have accumulated during the life course can determine their chances of working after retirement just as individual motivations or organisational characteristics do.Entities:
Keywords: Cumulative advantage/disadvantage approach; Retirement; Socio-economic status; Structural determinants; Workforce participation
Year: 2017 PMID: 29492180 PMCID: PMC5813080 DOI: 10.1007/s12062-017-9213-3
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Popul Ageing ISSN: 1874-7876
Basic socio-demographic characteristics of respondents
| Basic socio-demographic characteristics of respondents | Frequencies/descriptive statistics |
|---|---|
| Age in years | Min = 49 |
| Max = 91 | |
| Mean = 70.4 | |
| Median = 69.0 | |
| Standard deviation = 7.9 | |
| Male | Male – 37.9% |
| Female – 62.1% | |
| Education | Secondary or higher – 48.4% |
| Elementary or basic vocational – 51.5% | |
| Marital status | Married or cohabiting – 67.2% |
| Other situation – 32.8% | |
| Farmer | Yes – 13.7% |
| No – 86.3% |
Source: POLPAN 2013
Results of multiple logistic regression. Dependent variable: being in paid employment after retirement. Comparison of Model 1 and Model 2
| Model 1 | Model 2 | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | B | S.E. | OR | B | S.E. | OR |
| Education (secondary and above) | 0.534* | 0.273 | 1.706 | – | – | – |
| Occupational prestige of the last job | – | – | – | 0.017** | 0.006 | 1.017 |
| Low retirement benefits | 0.665 | 0.348 | 1.944 | 0.842* | 0.358 | 2.320 |
| Male | 0.284 | 0.279 | 1.329 | 0.244 | 0.277 | 1.276 |
| Age in years | −0.119*** | 0.022 | 0.889 | −0.112*** | 0.022 | 0.894 |
| Married or cohabiting | −0.130 | 0.300 | 0.878 | −0.839 | 0.305 | 0.920 |
| Poor physical ability NHP | −0.013 | 0.008 | 0.987 | −0.015* | 0.008 | 0.985 |
| Self-assessment of health | 0.649* | 0.275 | 1.914 | 0.623* | 0.275 | 1.864 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1411 | 0.1370 | ||||
| Sample size | n = 723 | n = 712 | ||||
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: POLPAN 2013
Results of multiple logistic regression. Dependent variable: being in paid employment after retirement. Model 3
| Model 3 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | B | S.E. | OR |
| Occupational prestige of the last job | 0.020** | 0.007 | 1.020 |
| Low retirement benefits | 1.407* | 0.595 | 4.082 |
| Interaction term prestige x low retirement benefits | −0.021 | 0.018 | 0.979 |
| Male | 0.239 | 0.277 | 1.270 |
| Age in years (2013) | −0.114*** | 0.022 | 0.893 |
| Married or cohabiting | −0.044 | 0.307 | 0.957 |
| Poor physical ability NHP | −0.016* | 0.008 | 0.984 |
| Self-assessment of health | 0.617* | 0.276 | 1.854 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1398 | ||
| Sample size | N = 712 | ||
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source:POLPAN 2013
Fig. 1Predicted probability of being in paid employment after retirement for the respondents in the bottom quintile of the retirement benefits (“lowest 20%”) and respondents in higher quintiles (“other”). Source: POLPAN 2013
Results of the multiple logistic regression. Dependent variable: being in paid employment after retirement. Model 4 with Farmer as a control variable
| Model 4 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | B | S.E. | OR |
| Occupational prestige of the last job | 0.022** | 0.007 | 1.022 |
| Low retirement benefits | 0.428 | 0.403 | 1.534 |
| Male | 0.217 | 0.277 | 1.243 |
| Age in years | −0.118*** | 0.022 | 0.889 |
| Married or cohabiting | −0.035 | 0.309 | 0.966 |
| Poor physical ability NHP | −0.015* | 0.008 | 0.985 |
| Self-assessment of health | 0.662* | 0.278 | 1.939 |
| Farmer | 1.189** | 0.460 | 3.282 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0,1495 | ||
| Sample size |
| ||
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Source: POLPAN 2013
Matrix of correlations
| Working after retirement | Education (secondary and above) | Occupational prestige of the last job | Low retirement benefits | Male | Age in years | Married or cohabiting | Poor physical ability NHP | Self-assessment of health | Farmer | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working after retirement | Person’s | 1 | 0.100** | 0.131** | 0.023 | 0.044 | −0.223** | 0.070 | −0.163** | 0.126** | 0.013 |
| N | 787 | 786 | 773 | 753 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 755 | 772 | |
| Education (secondary and above) | Pearson’s | 0.100** | 1 | 0.710** | −0.271** | −0.026 | −0.099** | 0.114** | −0.208** | 0.167** | −0.293** |
| N | 786 | 786 | 772 | 752 | 786 | 786 | 786 | 786 | 754 | 771 | |
| Occupational prestige of the last job | Pearson’s | 0.131** | 0.710** | 1 | −0.310** | 0.055 | −0.089* | 0.130** | −0.229** | 0.165** | −0.356** |
| N | 773 | 772 | 773 | 740 | 773 | 773 | 773 | 773 | 743 | 772 | |
| Low retirement benefits | Pearson’s | 0.023 | −0.271** | −0.310** | 1 | −0.178** | −0.069 | −0.003 | 0.147** | −0.201** | 0.453** |
| N | 753 | 752 | 740 | 753 | 753 | 753 | 753 | 753 | 723 | 739 | |
| Male | Pearson’s | 0.044 | −0.026 | 0.055 | −0.178** | 1 | 0.030 | 0.300** | −0.200** | 0.093* | −0.071* |
| N | 787 | 786 | 773 | 753 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 755 | 772 | |
| Age in years | Pearson’s | −0.223** | −.099** | −0.089* | −0.069 | 0.030 | 1 | −0.269 | 0.352** | 0.034 | 0.120** |
| N | 787 | 786 | 773 | 753 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 755 | 772 | |
| Married or cohabiting | Pearson’s | 0.070 | 0.114** | 0.130** | −0.003 | 0.300** | −0.269** | 1 | −0.202** | 0.023 | −0.098** |
| N | 787 | 786 | 773 | 753 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 755 | 772 | |
| Poor physical ability NHP | Pearson’s | −0.163** | −0.208** | −0.229** | 0.147** | −0.200** | 0.352** | −0.202** | 1 | −0.305** | 0.161** |
| N | 787 | 786 | 773 | 753 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 787 | 755 | 772 | |
| Self-assessment of health | Pearson’s | 0.126** | 0.167** | 0.165** | −0.201** | 0.093* | 0.034 | 0.023 | −0.305** | 1 | −0.152** |
| N | 755 | 754 | 743 | 723 | 755 | 755 | 755 | 755 | 755 | 742 | |
| Farmer | Pearson’s | 0.013 | −0.293** | −0.356** | 0.453** | −0.071* | 0.120** | −0.098** | 0.161** | −0.152** | 1 |
| N | 772 | 771 | 772 | 739 | 772 | 772 | 772 | 772 | 742 | 772 |
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Source: POLPAN 2013