| Literature DB >> 29339524 |
Alessandra Casella1,2, Navin Kartik3, Luis Sanchez3, Sébastien Turban3.
Abstract
How much do people lie, and how much do people trust communication when lying is possible? An important step toward answering these questions is understanding how communication is interpreted. This paper establishes in a canonical experiment that competition can alter the shared communication code: the commonly understood meaning of messages. We study a sender-receiver game in which the sender dictates how to share $10 with the receiver, if the receiver participates. The receiver has an outside option and decides whether to participate after receiving a nonbinding offer from the sender. Competition for play between senders leads to higher offers but has no effect on actual transfers, expected transfers, or receivers' willingness to play. The higher offers signal that sharing will be equitable without the expectation that they should be followed literally: Under competition "6 is the new 5."Entities:
Keywords: bargaining; cheap talk; dictator game; lying; trust game
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 29339524 PMCID: PMC5798344 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1714171115
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 11.205