| Literature DB >> 29151058 |
Abstract
Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person's behaviour without (substantively) restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires that a physician tells her patient the truth about her options and argue that nudging is incompatible with truth-telling. Instead, nudging satisfies Harry Frankfurt's account of bullshit. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.Entities:
Keywords: decision-making; informed consent; truth disclosure
Mesh:
Year: 2017 PMID: 29151058 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104480
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Med Ethics ISSN: 0306-6800 Impact factor: 2.903