Literature DB >> 29135211

Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences.

Alvin E Roth1,2, Tayfun Sönmez3, Utku Ünver4.   

Abstract

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

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Year:  2007        PMID： 29135211     DOI： 10.1257/aer.97.3.828

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Am Econ Rev        ISSN： 0002-8282


  13 in total

1.  Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences.

Authors:  Robert Bredereck; Jiehua Chen; Ugo Paavo Finnendahl; Rolf Niedermeier
Journal:  Auton Agent Multi Agent Syst       Date:  2020-09-11       Impact factor: 2.475

2.  Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem.

Authors:  Ross Anderson; Itai Ashlagi; David Gamarnik; Alvin E Roth
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2015-01-05       Impact factor: 12.779

3.  Historical Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation: The 7-Year Evolution of a Web-Based Virtual Matching System.

Authors:  D E Fumo; V Kapoor; L J Reece; S M Stepkowski; J E Kopke; S E Rees; C Smith; A E Roth; A B Leichtman; M A Rees
Journal:  Am J Transplant       Date:  2015-05-26       Impact factor: 9.369

4.  Higher Quality and Lower Cost from Improving Hospital Discharge Decision Making.

Authors:  James C Cox; Vjollca Sadiraj; Kurt E Schnier; John F Sweeney
Journal:  J Econ Behav Organ       Date:  2015-04-03

5.  Optimal Decisions for Organ Exchanges in a Kidney Paired Donation Program.

Authors:  Yijiang Li; Peter X-K Song; Yan Zhou; Alan B Leichtman; Michael A Rees; John D Kalbfleisch
Journal:  Stat Biosci       Date:  2014-05-01

6.  An efficient algorithm to enumerate sets with fallbacks in a kidney paired donation program.

Authors:  Wen Wang; Mathieu Bray; Peter X K Song; John D Kalbfleisch
Journal:  Oper Res Health Care       Date:  2018-10-22

7.  Equilibrium Allocations under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys Kidneys.

Authors:  Nikhil Agarwal; Itai Ashlagi; Michael Rees; Paulo Somaini; Daniel Waldinger
Journal:  Econometrica       Date:  2021-01-15       Impact factor: 6.383

8.  Decision Making in Kidney Paired Donation Programs with Altruistic Donors.

Authors:  Yijiang Li; Peter X-K Song; Alan B Leichtman; Michael A Rees; John D Kalbfleisch
Journal:  Sort (Barc)       Date:  2014-01       Impact factor: 1.759

9.  KPDGUI: An interactive application for optimization and management of a virtual kidney paired donation program.

Authors:  Mathieu Bray; Wen Wang; Michael A Rees; Peter X-K Song; Alan B Leichtman; Valarie B Ashby; John D Kalbfleisch
Journal:  Comput Biol Med       Date:  2019-03-16       Impact factor: 6.698

10.  Valuing Sets of Potential Transplants in a Kidney Paired Donation Network.

Authors:  Mathieu Bray; Wen Wang; Peter X-K Song; John D Kalbfleisch
Journal:  Stat Biosci       Date:  2018-03-01
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