Stephen Napier1. 1. Philosophy Department, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA.
Abstract
Defenders of human, embryonic, destructive stem-cell research and early abortion typically argue for their position by showing that you and I do not come into existence at conception but rather at some point after. Eugene Mills has provided an ingenious argument that you and I could not have come into existence at conception. I argue against Mills's argument on two counts: first, his argument depends upon a cursory limning of human conception, and when fuller details are considered, a premise in his argument is undercut. Second, Mills's argument invites us to ask questions about how to identify individual organisms. Given a fuller description of human conception and some plausible metaphysical principles, I argue that Mills should hold instead that you and I do in fact come into being at conception. SUMMARY: One way to argue that early abortions are permissible is to argue against the view that you and I come into existence at conception. Most abortion rights defenders argue for this conclusion by noting that in order for you and I to exist, there must be developed psychological capacities. Eugene Mills takes a different route and argues that you and I could not come into existence at conception because that would mean being identical to an egg - which he rightly notes we cannot be. I argue against Mills in this article.
Defenders of human, embryonic, destructive stem-cell research and early abortion typically argue for their position by showing that you and I do not come into existence at conception but rather at some point after. Eugene Mills has provided an ingenious argument that you and I could not have come into existence at conception. I argue against Mills's argument on two counts: first, his argument depends upon a cursory limning of human conception, and when fuller details are considered, a premise in his argument is undercut. Second, Mills's argument invites us to ask questions about how to identify individual organisms. Given a fuller description of human conception and some plausible metaphysical principles, I argue that Mills should hold instead that you and I do in fact come into being at conception. SUMMARY: One way to argue that early abortions are permissible is to argue against the view that you and I come into existence at conception. Most abortion rights defenders argue for this conclusion by noting that in order for you and I to exist, there must be developed psychological capacities. Eugene Mills takes a different route and argues that you and I could not come into existence at conception because that would mean being identical to an egg - which he rightly notes we cannot be. I argue against Mills in this article.