Literature DB >> 28652335

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation.

Kevin Leyton-Brown1,2, Paul Milgrom3,4, Ilya Segal2,4.   

Abstract

The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

Entities:  

Keywords:  algorithmic mechanism design; auction theory; dominant strategies; incentive auction; market design

Year:  2017        PMID: 28652335      PMCID: PMC5514724          DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1701997114

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A        ISSN: 0027-8424            Impact factor:   11.205


  1 in total

Review 1.  Deep learning.

Authors:  Yann LeCun; Yoshua Bengio; Geoffrey Hinton
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2015-05-28       Impact factor: 49.962

  1 in total
  2 in total

1.  Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of resource rights.

Authors:  Martin Bichler; Vladimir Fux; Jacob K Goeree
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2018-12-31       Impact factor: 11.205

Review 2.  Blockchain for Modern Applications: A Survey.

Authors:  Moez Krichen; Meryem Ammi; Alaeddine Mihoub; Mutiq Almutiq
Journal:  Sensors (Basel)       Date:  2022-07-14       Impact factor: 3.847

  2 in total

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