| Literature DB >> 28652335 |
Kevin Leyton-Brown1,2, Paul Milgrom3,4, Ilya Segal2,4.
Abstract
The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.Entities:
Keywords: algorithmic mechanism design; auction theory; dominant strategies; incentive auction; market design
Year: 2017 PMID: 28652335 PMCID: PMC5514724 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1701997114
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 11.205