| Literature DB >> 28591148 |
Aitor Calo-Blanco1, Jaromír Kovářík2,3, Friederike Mengel4, José Gabriel Romero5.
Abstract
Do adversarial environmental conditions create social cohesion? We provide new answers to this question by exploiting spatial and temporal variation in exposure to earthquakes across Chile. Using a variety of methods and controlling for a number of socio-economic variables, we find that exposure to earthquakes has a positive effect on several indicators of social cohesion. Social cohesion increases after a big earthquake and slowly erodes in periods where environmental conditions are less adverse. Our results contribute to the current debate on whether and how environmental conditions shape formal and informal institutions.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2017 PMID: 28591148 PMCID: PMC5462365 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0176885
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Earthquakes in Chile.
Chile is administratively divided into 15 regions and 346 comunas. Left: temporal distribution of some major earthquakes in Chile between 1960–2010, measured in Ms (except for the 2010 Maule event for which only Mw is available). Center: a map of Chile with approximate epicenters of some of these earthquakes. Right: cross-comuna variation in exposure to the 2010 Maule earthquake (Mw8.8) for the three heavily affected central regions VI, VII and VIII (shaded in the map of Chile), according to the dummy EQ2010 (see Methods for a detailed description of this variable).
Variables.
Definitions, means, standard deviations and numbers of observations for key variables. See S1 Appendix for further details regarding these variables).
| Mean | SD | N | Years | Reg/Com | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| = 1 if affected by a major eq. in last 3y | 0.175 | 0.382 | 120 | 05-12 | Region | |
| = 1 if affected by the 2010 eq. | 0.217 | 0.412 | 960 | 09-11 | ||
| years (2 digits) to last major eq. | 20.86 | 13.13 | 120 | 05-12 | Region | |
| = 1 if | 0.333 | 0.472 | 960 | 09-11 | ||
| % people very satisfied or satisfied with life | 0.689 | 0.205 | 367 | 08-11 | ||
| % people expressing high level of trust | 0.162 | 0.209 | 367 | 08-11 | ||
| donation to Teleton (CLP per capita) | 700.98 | 241.10 | 75 | 07-12 | Region | |
| % population engaged in volunteering | 0.362 | 0.047 | 30 | 09,11 | Region | |
| % population engaged in volunteering | 0.387 | 0.096 | 640 | 09,11 | ||
| % participation in local elections | 0.381 | 0.064 | 30 | 08,12 | Region | |
| crimes per 100,000 inhabitants | 3175.86 | 599.76 | 105 | 05-11 | Region | |
| crimes per 100,000 inhabitants | 2770.84 | 1687.54 | 960 | 09-11 | ||
| % solicited for bribes by public servants | 0.006 | 0.010 | 114 | 05-12 | Region | |
| suicides per 100,000 inhabitants | 12.76 | 3.05 | 105 | 05-12 | Region | |
| suicides per 100,000 inhabitants | 14.80 | 12.03 | 960 | 09-11 |
eq.= earthquake, y = year, Reg = region, Com= comuna, CLP = Chilean peso,
*Not available for 2009 due to presidential elections.
**Chile was reorganized from 13 to 15 regions in 2007, leading to a loss of 6 observations.
Regional analysis.
Regional fixed effects regressions of the effect of earthquakes exposure on positive (columns (1-6)) and negative (columns (7-12)) indicators. Controls include lagged Gini coefficient, migration rate, (log of) income, poverty, gender ratio and year dummies and are explicitly reported in S1 Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the regional level. Significance level (***) 1%; (**) 5% and (*) 10%.
| Unit of observation: Chilean regions | ||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| 0.34** | 0.154 | 0.419* | ||||
| (0.132) | (0.243) | (0.232) | ||||
| −0.128** | −0.599*** | −0.185 | ||||
| (0.058) | (0.172) | (0.226) | ||||
| Observations | 56 | 71 | 28 | 30 | 28 | 28 |
| Regions | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| R-squared | 0.481 | 0.479 | 0.912 | 0.700 | 0.934 | 0.837 |
| Region Fixed Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Unit of observation: Chilean regions | ||||||
| (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| Variable | ||||||
| −0.452** | −0.099 | −0.258 | ||||
| (0.188) | (0.175) | (0.328) | ||||
| 0.146** | 0.009 | 0.261*** | ||||
| (0.063) | (0.072) | (0.084) | ||||
| Observations | 54 | 84 | 69 | 99 | 54 | 84 |
| Regions | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| R-squared | 0.543 | 0.658 | 0.139 | 0.091 | 0.165 | 0.157 |
| Region Fixed Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Comuna level difference in differences regressions on the effect of earthquakes exposure on life satisfaction, trust, volunteering, crime and suicides.
Controls include lagged Gini coefficient, migration rate, (log of) income, poverty, gender ratio and year dummies and are explicitly reported in S1 Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the province level (S1 Appendix). Significance level (***) 1%, (**) 5% and (*) 10%.
| Unit of observation: Chilean | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Variable | |||||
| −0.813*** | −0.157 | 0.465*** | 0.186* | 0.111 | |
| (0.245) | (0.221) | (0.101) | (0.109) | (0.096) | |
| −0.333 | −0.277 | −0.404** | 0.134 | −0.146* | |
| (0.251) | (0.272) | (0.155) | (0.098) | (0.075) | |
|
| 0.742*** | 0.110 | 0.265*** | −0.162** | −0.048 |
| (0.268) | (0.183) | (0.128) | (0.062) | (0.111) | |
| Observations | 227 | 227 | 640 | 960 | 960 |
| 98 | 98 | 320 | 320 | 320 | |
| R-squared | 0.204 | 0.04 | 0.350 | 0.484 | 0.076 |