| Literature DB >> 28376752 |
Corinna Klingler1, Diego Steven Silva2,3, Christopher Schuermann3, Andreas Alois Reis4, Abha Saxena4, Daniel Strech3.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Public health surveillance is not ethically neutral and yet, ethics guidance and training for surveillance programmes is sparse. Development of ethics guidance should be based on comprehensive and transparently derived overviews of ethical issues and arguments. However, existing overviews on surveillance ethics are limited in scope and in how transparently they derived their results. Our objective was accordingly to provide an overview of ethical issues in public health surveillance; in addition, to list the arguments put forward with regards to arguably the most contested issue in surveillance, that is whether to obtain informed consent.Entities:
Keywords: Ethics; Informed consent; Public health surveillance; Qualitative evidence synthesis; Systematic review
Mesh:
Year: 2017 PMID: 28376752 PMCID: PMC5381137 DOI: 10.1186/s12889-017-4200-4
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Public Health ISSN: 1471-2458 Impact factor: 3.295
Search strategy in PubMed
| Ethics | 1 | ethics [Mesh Terms] OR morals [Mesh Terms] OR ethic* [Title/Abstract] |
| 2 | human rights [Mesh Terms] OR “human rights” [Title/Abstract] | |
| 3 | government regulation [Mesh Terms] OR regulation [Title/Abstract] OR governance [Title/Abstract] | |
| 4 | 1 OR 2 OR 3 | |
| Specific ethical issues | 5 | informed consent [Mesh Terms] OR consent [Title/Abstract] |
| 6 | “no treatment” [Title/Abstract] OR untreatable [Title/Abstract] OR incurable [Title/Abstract] | |
| 7 | “follow-up care” [Title/Abstract] OR “level of care” [Title/Abstract] or “standard of care” [Title/Abstract] | |
| 8 | (4 OR 5 OR 6 OR 7) | |
| Public health surveillance | 9 | public health surveillance [Mesh Terms] OR “public health |
| 10 | biosurveillance [Mesh Terms] OR health information systems [Mesh Terms] OR biosurveillance [Title/Abstract] OR “disease surveillance” [Title/Abstract] OR “health information system” [Title/Abstract] OR “epidemiological surveillance” [Title/Abstract] | |
| 11 | sentinel surveillance [Mesh Terms] OR “case-based surveillance” [Title/Abstract] OR “event-based surveillance” [Title/Abstract] OR “syndromic surveillance” [Title/Abstract] OR “sentinel surveillance” [Title/Abstract] OR “epidemic intelligence” [Title/Abstract] | |
| 12 | (9 OR 10 OR 11) | |
| 13 | 8 AND 12 |
Fig. 1Flow diagram of literature screening process
Ethical issues in public health surveillance
| Stage in the process | THEMES (highest abstraction level) | |
|---|---|---|
| Code | Subcode (lowest abstraction level) | |
| Background issues | ISSUES RELATED TO CHOICE OF FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE | |
| Risk of misguided judgement due to lacking ethical framework | Lacking ethical framework for using online data sources | |
| Lacking ethical framework for how to treat data of the deceased | ||
| Risk of misguided judgement due to using inappropriate ethical framework | Using research ethics framework (because criteria for differentiating research and surveillance are missing) | |
| Employing the research vs. practice paradigm that lacks moral salience | ||
| Using clinical ethics framework | ||
| Using health security framework | ||
| Issues related to scientific standards for evidence generation | Conflict between different knowledge systems | |
| Risk of choosing framework for evidence generation that hinders production and use of relevant data | ||
| RISK OF NOT FULFILLING PRECONDITONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE | ||
| Risk of barriers hindering development of technology to improve effectiveness and efficiency of surveillance | Lacking funding for technology development | |
| Lacking necessary multidisciplinary collaboration for technology development | ||
| Risk of not producing sufficiently robust evidence on effective surveillance methods | ||
| Issues in system design and implementation | ISSUES OF DECIDING WHICH PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANC SYSTEM SHOULD BE REALIZED | |
| Conflicts of priority setting between different public health programs | Prioritizing between different public health surveillance systems | |
| Prioritizing between surveillance activity and other public health activities | ||
| Prioritizing potential emerging threats or sustained health issues | ||
| Risk of wasting resources by prioritizing surveillance systems | Prioritizing disease areas important for developed nations instead of areas of high need | |
| Prioritizing surveillance systems where other investments would serve public health better | ||
| ISSUES OF ADEQUATELY DESIGNING A PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM | ||
| Conflicts of priority setting within the design of a surveillance program | Prioritizing comprehensiveness and accuracy of data or efficiency of surveillance system | |
| Prioritizing efficiency by minimizing costs or security of data protection when employing digital technology | ||
| Prioritizing early detection of events or efficiency trough reduction of false-positive alarms | ||
| Prioritizing maximizing amount and utility of data or security of private information by limiting data collected | ||
| Prioritizing harmonization of methods to improve sharing arrangements or tailoring to specific purpose | ||
| Risk of making poor choices in design of the surveillance system | Not adequately considering equity issues in surveillance system | |
| Not adequately tailored to the purpose and context of surveillance | ||
| Not employing health information technology and other promising tools for improvement of surveillance activity | ||
| Not adequately coordinating and integrating surveillance initiatives with other services – especially in developing countries | ||
| Not involving communities in development and implementation of surveillance systems | ||
| Commissioning actors that work ineffectively, inefficiently or unethically with running of surveillance system | ||
| Setting up surveillance systems that are inherently unsustainable, unreliable or insensitive (without adequate safeguards in place) | ||
| RISKS INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING AND RUNNING A PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM | ||
| Risk of inadequate legal regulation and governance structures for surveillance project | Inconsistent or overly complex legal guidance complicating effective and ethical implementation – especially for projects implemented across jurisdictions | |
| No ethical review mechanism ensuring ethical obligations are followed – especially for projects involving online data sources | ||
| Ethics committees making inconsistent and delayed decisions (across jurisdictions) | ||
| Risk of barriers hindering successful implementation or running of surveillance system | Lacking professionals adequately trained in health information technology | |
| Lack of security in areas of conflict | ||
| Lacking necessary infrastructural capacity (financial, technical,governance, human resources) - especially in developing countries | ||
| Lacking political, societal or institutional commitment | ||
| Risk that burdens and benefits of surveillance systems are unfairly distributed | Developing countries disproportionately burdened by international surveillance effort | |
| FURTHER ISSUES RELATED TO SPECIFIC KINDS OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS | ||
| Risks of surveillance systems relying on genetic profiles | Surveillance activity focusing too much on genes and not enough on other potential risk factors | |
| Surveillance focusing on genetic profiles instead of other risk factors plays part in shifting (too much) responsibility to the individual | ||
| Risks of real-time surveillance systems | Surveillance system influences negatively the usability of electronic medical records system other practitioners rely on | |
| Conflicts in running vaccine safety surveillance systems during pandemics | Conflict of prioritizing early detection of adverse events or other effectiveness-related goals in distribution of vaccines | |
| Issues in data collection, analysis and storage | ISSUES OF PROTECTING AUTONOMY/THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY | |
| Risk of people not being adequately informed about usage of their data and drop-out options – especially where data from online sources is involved | ||
| Risk of intentional breaches of privacy/confidentiality | Illegitimate authorities requesting data beyond what is ethically justifiable | |
| Individuals involved in data processing releasing data without authorisation – especially where community members are involved in verbal autopsy | ||
| Risk of unintentional breaches of privacy/confidentiality | Unauthorised access through inappropriate storage and transfer of data – especially where digital technology is used | |
| Conflicts between obtaining informed consent (reflecting the values of confidentiality/ privacy/ respect for autonomy) and realizing public health benefit – especially in name- or personal-identifier-based reporting | ||
| RISK OF PRODUCING INADEQUATE INFORMATION TO GUIDE PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVITIES | ||
| Risk of collecting data that is not sufficiently accurate or complete | Collecting incorrect/fake data from user-supplied (online) data sources | |
| Inadequate use of electronic collection system by professionals tainting data validity | ||
| Software errors or manipulations of electronic collection system reducing data validity | ||
| Collecting unrepresentative data only from parts of the population | ||
| Risks of health professionals not passing on data for analysis | Health professionals mistrusting legitimacy, usefulness and privacy of surveillance system | |
| Health professionals unwilling to carry administrative costs of surveillance system (without compensation) | ||
| Risk of inadequate analysis and interpretation of data | Gaps in evidence about subject hinder adequate interpretation | |
| Questionable reliability of methods used for data mining and meta-analysis | ||
| Meticulous analysis leads to harmful delays in times of emergency | ||
| RISK OF INADEQUATELY CONSIDERING (VULNERABLE) SUBGROUPS IN DATA COLLECTION | ||
| Risk of needs of (vulnerable) subgroups not becoming visible by inadequate data collection strategy | Surveillance based on online data sources excludes those without internet access | |
| Needs of (undocumented) migrants neglected | ||
| Needs of the poorest neglected | ||
| Needs of people of colour neglected | ||
| Risk of stigmatizing subgroups by data collection strategies that target only those subgroups | Strategies particularly targeting migrants | |
| RISKS RELATED TO SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES | ||
| Risks related to using verbal autopsy for data collection | Causing emotional distress in interviewees | |
| Data produced from interviews not reliable | ||
| Risks related to using anonymous unlinked blood testing for surveillance | Foregoing the possibility to inform people about disease and treatment opportunities | |
| Issues in data reporting, sharing and using for action | ISSUES OF ADEQUATELY PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY IN DATA REPORTING AND SHARING | |
| Risk of intentional breaches of privacy/confidentiality | Sharing data with commercial actors for their private benefit | |
| Risk of unintentional breaches of privacy/confidentiality | People publishing data are not adequately trained in data protection | |
| Publicly disclosing data ensembles that allow indirect identification of individual | ||
| Publicly quoting social media streams | ||
| Publicly releasing data that can be linked with other sources to identify individual | ||
| Conflicts between protection of privacy/confidentiality and realizing public benefit in sharing data with actors outside the surveillance system | ||
| ISSUES OF INFLICTING HARM OR RESTRICTING FREEDOM WHEN LABELLING INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES AS SUFFERING FROM HEALTH ISSUES | ||
| Risk of inflicting physical, social or emotional harm | Individuals experiencing psychological adverse effects | |
| Individuals/communities experiencing economic repercussion | ||
| Individuals/communities experiencing stigmatization and discrimination | ||
| Physicians rejecting difficult patients to reduce problematic situations | ||
| Individuals not accessing the care they need to protect their privacy | ||
| Conflicts between protection from psychosocial harm and realizing public health benefits | Protecting communities from stigmatization or benefiting them through additional resource | |
| Risk of restricting freedom of choice | Individuals/communities facing coercive interventions or forms of punishment | |
| Conflicts between not limiting individual freedom and realizing public health benefit | Implementing coercive interventions that benefit the targeted individual | |
| Implementing coercive interventions that benefit other individuals | ||
| ISSUES OF FORGOING PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS BY NOT ADEQUATELY PUTTING DATA TO USE | ||
| Risk of not using data (in time) for public health action | Lacking necessary resources to act upon data | |
| Other political interests given priority over public health goals | ||
| Risk of not sharing data with other actors | National protection hinders inter-governmental sharing of data | |
| Political interest in own visibility hinders sharing across institutions | ||
| Insufficient resources invested in data sharing arrangement | ||
| Incompatible processes for handling data hinder data sharing | ||
| Risk of not adequately communicating health risks to public | Unintentionally not providing all relevant information for action | |
| Deliberately communicating misleading messages for political reasons | ||
| Not finding the right level of alarm to induce adequate public reaction | ||
Conditions that make foregoing informed consent procedures (more) acceptable
| Justificatory conditions | Code (can be interpreted as specification of justificatory conditions) |
|---|---|
| Effectiveness | Surveillance data is really put to use for public health purpose |
| Necessity | Informed consent procedures reduce data validity by introducing bias |
| Less intrusive alternatives for collecting information not available | |
| Implementation of informed consent procedures not feasible | |
| Least infringement | Opt-out option is provided instead |
| Taking data against the will of the patient is preceded by attempt of convincing to give voluntarily (last resort) | |
| Minimum amount of (preferably anonymized) data necessary for surveillance purpose is collected | |
| All relevant information about surveillance system is supplied to people affected | |
| Data are maintained securely to minimize further risks | |
| Proportionality | Benefit to be realized/harm averted through surveillance activity considerable in probability and magnitude |
| Minimal Risks involved in data collection | |
| Implementation of informed consent procedures would demand excessive resources | |
| No particularly sensitive information (e.g. mental or sexual health) is collected | |
| Potential public health benefits outweigh considerations of privacy protection | |
| Implementing informed consent would set harmful standards for other surveillance programs | |
| Public justification/engagement | The community/the public/those affected were engaged in decision. |
| Vulnerabilitya | Data is collected to protect the health of children (who need special protection) |
| No data from children is collected (because their privacy rights need special protection) | |
| Legitimacya | Only legitimate entities trusted by the public collect surveillance data |
| Harm principles/unreasonable exercise requirementa | Surveillance activity supposed to prevent harm to other individuals, not (only) same people being surveilled |
aNot contained in Childress et al.’s original list