| Literature DB >> 27881893 |
Abstract
Using four waves of data from Secondary 1 to Secondary 4 (N = 3328 students at Wave 1), this study examined the development of delinquent behavior and its relationships with economic disadvantage, family non-intactness, family quality of life (i.e., family functioning) and personal well-being (i.e., positive youth development) among Hong Kong adolescents. Individual growth curve models revealed that delinquent behavior increased during this period, and adolescents living in non-intact families (vs. intact families) reported higher initial levels of delinquent behavior while those living in poor families (vs. non-poor families) showed a greater increase in delinquent behavior. In addition, with the demographic factors controlled, the initial levels of family quality of life and personal well-being were negatively associated with the initial level of delinquent behavior, but positively associated with the growth rate of delinquent behavior. Regression analyses showed that family quality of life and personal well-being were related to the overall delinquent behavior concurrently at Wave 4. However, Wave 1 family quality of life and personal well-being did not predict Wave 4 delinquent behavior with the initial level of delinquent behavior controlled. Lastly, we discussed the role of economic disadvantage and family non-intactness as risk factors and family functioning and positive youth development as protective well-being factors in the development of adolescent well-being indexed by delinquent behavior.Entities:
Keywords: Chinese adolescents; Delinquent behavior; Economic disadvantage; Family functioning; Family intactness; Positive youth development
Year: 2015 PMID: 27881893 PMCID: PMC5097104 DOI: 10.1007/s11205-015-1170-8
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Soc Indic Res ISSN: 0303-8300
Data profile across four waves
| Wave 1 | % | Wave 2 | % | Wave 2a | % | Wave 3 | % | Wave 3a | % | Wave 4 | % | Wave 4a | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| 3328 | 3638 | 2905 | 4106 | 2858 | 3973 | 2682 | |||||||
| Gender | ||||||||||||||
| Male | 1719 | 51.7 | 1716 | 47.2 | 1445 | 49.7 | 1885 | 45.9 | 1433 | 50.1 | 1875 | 47.2 | 1335 | 49.8 |
| Female | 1572 | 47.2 | 1864 | 51.2 | 1419 | 48.8 | 2185 | 53.2 | 1405 | 49.2 | 2086 | 52.5 | 1337 | 49.9 |
| Economic disadvantage | ||||||||||||||
| NOT receiving CSSA | 2606 | 78.3 | 2932 | 80.6 | 2377 | 81.8 | 3308 | 80.6 | 2339 | 81.8 | 3302 | 83.1 | 2267 | 84.5 |
| Receiving CSSA | 225 | 6.8 | 208 | 5.7 | 160 | 5.5 | 212 | 5.2 | 147 | 5.1 | 200 | 5.0 | 132 | 4.9 |
| Family intactness | ||||||||||||||
| Intact families | 2781 | 83.6 | 2985 | 82.1 | 2415 | 83.1 | 3372 | 82.1 | 2396 | 83.8 | 3210 | 80.8 | 2211 | 82.4 |
| Non-intact families | 515 | 15.5 | 624 | 17.2 | 469 | 16.1 | 715 | 17.4 | 454 | 15.9 | 749 | 18.9 | 466 | 17.4 |
| Divorced but not remarried | 209 | 6.3 | 256 | 7.0 | 199 | 6.9 | 345 | 8.4 | 207 | 7.2 | 350 | 8.8 | 206 | 7.7 |
| Separated but not remarried | 73 | 2.2 | 78 | 2.1 | 62 | 2.1 | 95 | 2.3 | 67 | 2.3 | 96 | 2.4 | 68 | 2.5 |
| Remarried | 129 | 3.9 | 168 | 4.6 | 116 | 4.0 | 189 | 4.6 | 122 | 4.3 | 205 | 5.2 | 125 | 4.7 |
| Others | 104 | 3.1 | 122 | 3.4 | 9.2 | 3.2 | 86 | 2.1 | 5.8 | 2.0 | 98 | 2.5 | 67 | 2.5 |
aThe numbers were based on the participants who ever participated in Wave 1 assessment as only those joining Wave 1 assessment were included in LMM. The numbers of the students who did not report the corresponding information were not presented
Descriptive statistics of key variables and internal consistency coefficients of scales (Waves 1–4)
| Mean (SD) | Reliability | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wave 1 | Wave 2 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | Wave 1 | Wave 2 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | |
| Family functioning | 3.73 (.81) | 3.65 (.81) | 3.65 (.79) | 3.66 (.77) | .90 | .90 | .90 | .91 |
| Positive youth development | 4.51 (.70) | 4.43 (.69) | 4.44 (.65) | 4.45 (.62) | .96 | .96 | .96 | .96 |
| Delinquent behavior | ||||||||
| Overall | .39 (.47) | .47 (.58) | .46 (.55) | .48 (.54) | .70 | .76 | .72 | .69 |
| Male | .43 (.51) | .52 (.60) | .52 (.60) | .55 (.60) | – | – | – | – |
| Female | .35 (.42) | .43 (.55) | .39 (.46) | .39 (.46) | – | – | – | – |
| NOT receiving CSSA | .39 (.46) | .47 (.56) | .46 (.51) | .47 (.52) | – | – | – | – |
| Receiving CSSA | .41 (.42) | .53 (.63) | .50 (.63) | .56 (.61) | – | – | – | – |
| Intact families | .37 (.46) | .45 (.57) | .43 (.48) | .46 (.54) | – | – | – | – |
| Non-intact families | .48 (.52) | .56 (.60) | .60 (.78) | .52 (.56) | – | – | – | – |
| Divorced but not remarried | .44 (.47) | .57 (.66) | .50 (.50) | .47 (.48) | – | – | – | – |
| Separated but not remarried | .44 (.37) | .54 (.50) | .60 (.73) | .51 (.45) | – | – | – | – |
| Remarried | .51 (.52) | .51 (.42) | .53 (.47) | .51 (.47) | – | – | – | – |
| Others | .53 (.66) | .57 (.54) | .54 (.44) | .63 (.60) | – | – | – | – |
Percentages of participants engaging in different types of delinquent behavior across four waves
| Never | Attempted 1–6 times | Attempted more than 6 times | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wave 1 | Wave 2 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | Wave 1 | Wave 2 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | Wave 1 | Wave 2 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | |
| 1. Stealing | 2980 (89.6) | 3273 (90.0) | 3662 (89.2) | 3614 (91.0) | 318 (9.6) | 318 (8.7) | 284 (6.9) | 200 (5.0) | 16 (0.5) | 41 (1.1) | 27 (0.7) | 22 (0.6) |
| 2. Cheating | 1298 (39.0) | 1378 (37.9) | 1644 (40.0) | 1615 (40.6) | 1602 (48.2) | 1678 (46.1) | 1625 (39.6) | 1496 (37.7) | 410 (12.3) | 565 (15.5) | 690 (16.8) | 722 (18.2) |
| 3. Truancy | 3205 (96.4) | 3438 (94.5) | 3731 (90.9) | 3602 (90.7) | 96 (2.9) | 164 (4.5) | 210 (5.1) | 197 (5.0) | 13 (0.4) | 30 (0.8) | 28 (0.7) | 37 (0.9) |
| 4. Running away from home | 3182 (95.7) | 3455 (95.0) | 3784 (92.2) | 3715 (93.5) | 127 (3.8) | 161 (4.4) | 174 (4.2) | 113 (2.8) | 5 (0.2) | 11 (0.3) | 13 (0.3) | 10 (0.3) |
| 5. Damaging others’ properties | 2861 (86.0) | 3164 (87.0) | 3593 (87.5) | 3513 (88.4) | 417 (12.5) | 419 (11.5) | 337 (8.2) | 280 (7.0) | 27 (0.8) | 46 (1.3) | 38 (0.9) | 41 (1.0) |
| 6. Assault | 2922 (87.9) | 3226 (88.7) | 3633 (88.5) | 3605 (90.7) | 342 (10.3) | 341 (9.4) | 276 (6.7) | 178 (4.5) | 46 (1.4) | 60 (1.6) | 58 (1.4) | 46 (1.2) |
| 7. Sexual intercourse | 3290 (98.9) | 3572 (98.2) | 3903 (95.1) | 3742 (94.2) | 20 (0.6) | 37 (1.0) | 40 (1.0) | 55 (1.4) | 2 (0.1) | 17 (0.5) | 29 (0.7) | 39 (1.0) |
| 8. Gang fighting | 3182 (95.7) | 3477 (95.6) | 3841 (93.5) | 3724 (93.7) | 96 (2.9) | 103 (2.8) | 88 (2.1) | 66 (1.7) | 14 (0.4) | 30 (0.8) | 26 (0.6) | 32 (0.8) |
| 9. Speaking foul language | 1000 (30.1) | 1041 (28.6) | 1259 (30.7) | 1196 (30.1) | 1458 (43.8) | 1335 (36.7) | 1234 (30.1) | 1074 (27.0) | 802 (24.1) | 1244 (34.2) | 1459 (35.5) | 1550 (39.0) |
| 10. Staying outside overnight without parents’ consent | 3177 (95.5) | 3462 (95.2) | 3772 (91.9) | 3628 (91.3) | 80 (2.4) | 124 (3.4) | 142 (3.5) | 145 (3.6) | 19 (0.6) | 34 (0.9) | 42 (1.0) | 43 (1.1) |
| 11. Strong arming others | 2762 (83.1) | 3082 (84.7) | 3545 (86.3) | 3480 (87.6) | 436 (13.1) | 435 (12.0) | 319 (7.8) | 263 (6.6) | 77 (2.3) | 111 (3.1) | 102 (2.5) | 91 (2.4) |
| 12. Trespasses | 3139 (94.4) | 3501 (96.2) | 3853 (93.8) | 3738 (94.1) | 112 (3.4) | 102 (2.8) | 87 (2.1) | 72 (1.8) | 11 (0.3) | 19 (0.5) | 29 (0.7) | 25 (0.6) |
0 = never, 1–3 = attempted 1–6 times, 4–6 = attempted more than 6 times
Results of individual growth curve of delinquent behavior for all models
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Estimate | SE | Estimate | SE | Estimate | SE | Estimate | SE | ||
|
| |||||||||
|
|
| ||||||||
| Initial status |
| .322*** | .004 | .298*** | .005 | .324*** | .010 | .302*** | .010 |
| Age |
| .022** | .007 | .015* | .008 | ||||
| Gendera |
| .018** | .005 | .016* | .005 | ||||
| Economicb disadvantage |
| −.002 | .011 | −.008 | .011 | ||||
| Family intactnessc |
| −.032*** | .008 | −.007 | .008 | ||||
| Family functioning |
| −.082*** | .008 | ||||||
| Positive youth development |
| −.086*** | .009 | ||||||
|
|
| ||||||||
| Initial status |
| .018*** | .002 | .026*** | .004 | .029*** | .004 | ||
| Age |
| −.006* | .003 | −.008* | .003 | ||||
| Gendera |
| .012*** | .002 | .013*** | .002 | ||||
| Economicb disadvantage |
| .009* | .004 | .009 | .005 | ||||
| Family intactnessc |
| .003 | .003 | −.002 | .003 | ||||
| Family functioning |
| .013*** | .003 | ||||||
| Positive youth development |
| .008* | .004 | ||||||
|
| |||||||||
| Level 1 (within) | |||||||||
| Residual |
| .0370*** | .001 | .0316*** | .001 | .0314*** | .0314 | .0313*** | .001 |
| Level 2 (between) | |||||||||
| Intercept |
| .0493*** | .002 | .0504*** | .002 | .0489*** | .0489 | .0356*** | .002 |
| Time |
| .0029*** | .000 | .0028*** | .0028 | .0024*** | .0003 | ||
|
| |||||||||
| Deviance | 400.247 | 137.567 | −51.541 | −551.983 | |||||
| AIC | 406.247 | 149.567 | −23.541 | −515.983 | |||||
| BIC | 428.206 | 193.486 | 76.482 | −391.387 | |||||
| df | 3 | 6 | 14 | 18 | |||||
Model 1 = unconditional mean model; Model 2 = unconditional growth model; Model 3 = conditional model
aMale = 1, Female = −1; b Receiving CSSA = 1, Not receiving CSSA = −1; c Intact = 1, Non-Intact = −1
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Fig. 1Effect of economic disadvantage on the slope of delinquent behavior. Note: the plot was based on the results of Model 3
Fig. 2Effect of family functioning on the slope of delinquent behavior. Note: the plot was based on the results of Model 4
Fig. 3Effect of positive youth development on the slope of delinquent behavior. Note: the plot was based on the results of Model 4
Multiple regression analyses on delinquent behavior at Wave 4
| Predictors | Beta | R2 change |
|---|---|---|
| Step 1 | .033*** | |
| Gendera | .169*** | |
| Economic disadvantageb | .034 | |
| Family intactnessc | −.009 | |
| Step 2 | .085*** | |
| Family functioning | −.157*** | |
| Positive youth development | −.188*** |
*** p < .001
aMale = 1, female = 0; b receiving CSSA = 1, not receiving CSSA = 0; c intact = 1, non-intact = 0
Wave 1 variables predict Wave 4 delinquent behavior
| Predictors | Beta | R2 change |
|---|---|---|
| Step 1 | .213*** | |
| Initial delinquent behavior | .439*** | |
| Step 2 | .029*** | |
| Gendera | .162*** | |
| Economic disadvantageb | .024 | |
| Family intactnessc | −.030 | |
| Step 3 | .001 | |
| Family functioning | .010 | |
| Positive youth development | −.035 |
aMale = 1, female = 0; b receiving CSSA = 1, not receiving CSSA = 0; c intact = 1, non-intact = 0
*** p < .001