| Literature DB >> 27783704 |
Gustav Tinghög1,2, David Andersson1, Caroline Bonn3, Magnus Johannesson4, Michael Kirchler5,6, Lina Koppel1,7, Daniel Västfjäll1,8,9.
Abstract
Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking-induced by time pressure and cognitive load-in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 27783704 PMCID: PMC5082681 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0164012
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Screenshot of the binary dictator game with charitable giving.
The Effect of Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Moral Judgment.
| Time Pressure | Time Delay | p-value | Cognitive Load | Control | p-value | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n | 543 | 559 | 143 | 168 | ||
| Female, n (%) | 286 (53%) | 307 (56%) | 0.328 | 60 (42%) | 70 (42%) | 0.959 |
| Age, mean | 34.0 | 34.6 | 0.459 | 23.1 | 23.2 | 0.573 |
| Utilitarian answers, n (%) | ||||||
| Switch Dilemma | 345 (66%) | 327 (59%) | 0.016 | 96 (67%) | 121 (72%) | 0.349 |
| Footbridge Dilemma | 132 (25%) | 85 (15%) | < .001 | 13 (9%) | 18 (11%) | 0.634 |
| Fumes Dilemma | 308 (59%) | 307 (55%) | 0.282 | 98 (69%) | 135 (80%) | 0.017 |
| Lifeboat1 Dilemma | 240 (46%) | 286 (51%) | 0.060 | 33 (73%) | 49 (70%) | 0.700 |
| Lifeboat2 Dilemma | NA | NA | 23 (23%) | 18 (18%) | 0.380 | |
| Pooled, mean rate | 0.486 | 0.453 | 0.103 | 0.460 | 0.507 | 0.110 |
Logistic and OLS regressions on utilitarian judgements in moral dilemmas in the time-pressure experiment, effects shown as marginal effects (ME) and betas.
| Switch | Footbridge | Fumes | Lifeboat | Pooled | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | Beta | p-value | |
| Treatment | ||||||||||
| Time Pressure | 0.067 | 0.022 | 0.095 | < .001 | 0.031 | 0.304 | -0.063 | 0.036 | 0.0303 | 0.131 |
| Time Delay | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Gender | ||||||||||
| Female | -0.096 | 0.002 | -0.103 | < .001 | -0.104 | 0.001 | -0.100 | 0.001 | -0.0992 | < .001 |
| Male | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Age | 0.002 | 0.120 | 0.001 | 0.417 | 0.001 | 0.385 | -0.001 | 0.537 | 0.0009 | 0.388 |
| Country | 0.146 | 0.033 | < .001 | < .001 | 0.010 | |||||
| Austria | -0.015 | 0.421 | -0.089 | 0.060 | -0.037 | < .001 | -0.081 | 0.001 | -0.0585 | 0.060 |
| Sweden | -0.091 | 0.049 | -0.065 | 0.524 | 0.179 | < .001 | 0.131 | < .001 | 0.0298 | 0.392 |
| USA | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
Logistic and OLS regressions on utilitarian judgements in moral dilemmas in the cognitive load experiment, effects shown as marginal effects (ME) and betas.
| Switch | Footbridge | Fumes | Lifeboat1 | Lifeboat2 | Pooled | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | Beta | p-value | |
| Treatment | ||||||||||||
| Cognitive Load | -0.064 | 0.213 | -0.019 | 0.583 | -0.113 | 0.023 | 0.035 | 0.680 | 0.054 | 0.344 | -0.037 | 0.209 |
| Control | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | ||||||
| Gender | ||||||||||||
| Female | -0.082 | 0.126 | -0.045 | 0.210 | 0.041 | 0.419 | -0.099 | 0.248 | -0.123 | 0.050 | -0.050 | 0.105 |
| Male | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | ||||||
| Age | 0.010 | 0.409 | 0.004 | 0.613 | -0.011 | 0.269 | 0.008 | 0.671 | 0.009 | 0.487 | 0.003 | 0.703 |
| Experiment | ||||||||||||
| First | -0.166 | 0.003 | -0.031 | 0.396 | 0.066 | 0.200 | NA | NA | 0.098 | 0.002 | ||
| Second | REF | REF | REF | NA | NA | REF | ||||||
The Effect of Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Altruistic Behavior.
| Time Pressure | Time Delay | p-value | Cognitive Load | Control | p-value | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n | 543 | 559 | 143 | 168 | ||
| Female, n (%) | 286 (53%) | 307 (56%) | 0.328 | 60 (42%) | 70 (42%) | 0.959 |
| Age, mean | 34.0 | 34.6 | 0.459 | 23.1 | 23.2 | 0.573 |
| Altruistic answers, n (%) | ||||||
| Save the Children | 261 (49%) | 276 (49%) | 0.776 | 86 (61%) | 103 (61%) | 0.955 |
| WWF | 212 (39%) | 235 (42%) | 0.348 | 75 (53%) | 95 (57%) | 0.555 |
| Doctors Without Borders | 254 (47%) | 269 (48%) | 0.676 | 94 (67%) | 114 (68%) | 0.824 |
| UNICEF | 227 (42%) | 256 (46%) | 0.200 | 92 (65%) | 112 (67%) | 0.793 |
| Pooled, mean rate | 0.441 | 0.463 | 0.366 | 0.615 | 0.631 | 0.734 |
Logistic and OLS regressions on altruistic behavior in the dictator game in the time-pressure experiment, effects shown as marginal effects (ME) and betas.
| Save the Children | WWF | Doctors Without Borders | UNICEF | Pooled | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | Beta | p-value | |
| Treatment | ||||||||||
| Time Pressure | -0.002 | 0.939 | -0.020 | 0.481 | -0.009 | 0.758 | -0.033 | 0.259 | -0.017 | 0.461 |
| Time Delay | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Gender | ||||||||||
| Female | 0.147 | < .001 | 0.158 | < .001 | 0.157 | < .001 | 0.133 | < .001 | 0.149 | < .001 |
| Male | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Age | -0.001 | 0.497 | -0.001 | 0.370 | 0.003 | 0.033 | -0.002 | 0.112 | -0.0002 | 0.883 |
| Country | < .001 | < .001 | < .001 | < .001 | < .001 | |||||
| Austria | -0.348 | < .001 | -0.318 | < .001 | -0.099 | < .001 | -0.272 | < .001 | -0.256 | < .001 |
| Sweden | 0.009 | < .001 | -0.016 | < .001 | 0.227 | < .001 | 0.075 | < .001 | 0.079 | 0.049 |
| USA | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
Logistic and OLS regressions on altruistic behavior in the dictator game in the cognitive load experiment, effects shown as marginal effects (ME) and betas.
| Save the Children | WWF | Doctors Without Borders | UNICEF | POOLED | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | ME | p-value | beta | p-value | |
| Treatment | ||||||||||
| Cognitive Load | -0.012 | 0.827 | -0.034 | 0.544 | -0.015 | 0.779 | -0.027 | 0.603 | -0.022 | 0.625 |
| Control | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Gender | ||||||||||
| Female | 0.172 | 0.003 | 0.240 | < .001 | 0.191 | < .001 | 0.267 | < .001 | 0.218 | < .001 |
| Male | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
| Age | -0.004 | 0.740 | 0.023 | 0.065 | 0.010 | 0.403 | -0.003 | 0.753 | 0.006 | 0.525 |
| Experiment | ||||||||||
| First | 0.072 | 0.213 | -0.007 | 0.904 | -0.024 | 0.662 | -0.111 | 0.046 | -0.053 | 0.259 |
| Second | REF | REF | REF | REF | REF | |||||
Fig 2Gender differences in (A) moral judgements and (B) altruistic behavior.