| Literature DB >> 27746725 |
Sven Fischer1, Kristoffel Grechenig2, Nicolas Meier3.
Abstract
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.Entities:
Keywords: anti-social punishment; centralized punishment; cooperation; imperfect information; perverse punishment; public good
Year: 2016 PMID: 27746725 PMCID: PMC5040719 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Behav Neurosci ISSN: 1662-5153 Impact factor: 3.558