| Literature DB >> 27736865 |
Michelangelo Puliga1,2, Andrea Flori1, Giuseppe Pappalardo1, Alessandro Chessa1,2, Fabio Pammolli1.
Abstract
The role of Network Theory in the study of the financial crisis has been widely spotted in the latest years. It has been shown how the network topology and the dynamics running on top of it can trigger the outbreak of large systemic crisis. Following this methodological perspective we introduce here the Accounting Network, i.e. the network we can extract through vector similarities techniques from companies' financial statements. We build the Accounting Network on a large database of worldwide banks in the period 2001-2013, covering the onset of the global financial crisis of mid-2007. After a careful data cleaning, we apply a quality check in the construction of the network, introducing a parameter (the Quality Ratio) capable of trading off the size of the sample (coverage) and the representativeness of the financial statements (accuracy). We compute several basic network statistics and check, with the Louvain community detection algorithm, for emerging communities of banks. Remarkably enough sensible regional aggregations show up with the Japanese and the US clusters dominating the community structure, although the presence of a geographically mixed community points to a gradual convergence of banks into similar supranational practices. Finally, a Principal Component Analysis procedure reveals the main economic components that influence communities' heterogeneity. Even using the most basic vector similarity hypotheses on the composition of the financial statements, the signature of the financial crisis clearly arises across the years around 2008. We finally discuss how the Accounting Networks can be improved to reflect the best practices in the financial statement analysis.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 27736865 PMCID: PMC5063398 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0162855
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Quality Ratio.
This picture shows the number of nodes and edges along the sample period for different QR values. It is clear to see how for small values of the Quality Ratio parameter the curves belong to a stricter range.
Fig 2Communities.
In the upper panels it is shown the Community Structure for the three periods. The impact of the financial down-turn of 2007-08 seems to be reflected more heavily after the crisis, with the emergence of many sub-region communities as a response against the deteriorated market conditions. In the lower panel the most important financial statements components by the PCA analysis.
Fig 3Correlations.
In these plots we present the correlations between banks’ Strength versus the Total Debts to Total Assets (Leverage) (plot on the top-left), Strength versus Total Assets (Size) (plot on the top-right) and Clustering Coefficient versus Return on Assets (Performance) (plot on the bottom part). The correlation is computed across the years 2001-13. It is clear the effect of the financial crisis across the outbreak of 2007-08. Red points stand for no-significant estimates at 5% level.
First Table shows the sets of top three contributors for each community, while the second Table shows the bottom three contributors.
Values represent the contributions of original measures to the explained variances. Rankings refer to averaged values along each sub-period: 2001-06, 2007-09 and 2010-13. Community C0 refers to the Mixed community, while C1, C2 and C3 stand for US, JP, and EU+US clusters, respectively.
| Community | Top Measures 2001-06 | Values 2001-06 | Top Measures 2007-09 | Values 2007-09 | Top Measures 2010-13 | Values 2010-13 |
| C0 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9695 | BS_TOT_LOAN | 0.9588 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9635 |
| C0 | BS_TOT_LOAN | 0.9257 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9529 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9620 |
| C0 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9228 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9492 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9537 |
| C1 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9955 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9964 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9968 |
| C1 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9951 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9957 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9954 |
| C1 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9917 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9933 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9953 |
| C2 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9935 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9927 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9943 |
| C2 | BS_TOT_LOAN | 0.9854 | NON_INT_EXP | 0.9886 | NON_INT_EXP | 0.9877 |
| C2 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9770 | IS_OPERATING_EXPN | 0.9883 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9876 |
| C3 | BS_TOT_ASSET | 0.9817 | INTEREST_INCOME | 0.9678 | NON_INT_EXP | 0.9671 |
| C3 | IS_COMM_AND_FEE_EARN_INC_REO | 0.9803 | NON_INT_EXP | 0.9670 | NET_INT_INC | 0.9621 |
| C3 | NON_INT_EXP | 0.9800 | IS_OPERATING_EXPN | 0.9624 | IS_OPERATING_EXPN | 0.9564 |
| Community | Bottom Measures 2001-06 | Values 2001-06 | Bottom Measures 2007-09 | Values 2007-09 | Bottom Measures 2010-13 | Values 2010-13 |
| C0 | BS_LT_BORROW | 0.7196 | BS_LT_BORROW | 0.6723 | BS_LT_BORROW | 0.7185 |
| C0 | BS_SH_CAP_AND_APIC | 0.7131 | BS_ST_BORROW | 0.6511 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.6659 |
| C0 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.4386 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.5360 | BS_ST_BORROW | 0.6537 |
| C1 | RETURN_ON_ASSET | 0.7006 | BS_LT_INVEST | 0.5799 | BS_SH_CAP_AND_APIC | 0.8151 |
| C1 | INTERBANKING_ASSETS | 0.4987 | INTERBANKING_ASSETS | 0.5724 | BS_LT_INVEST | 0.7075 |
| C1 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.4941 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.1366 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.1762 |
| C2 | INTERBANKING_ASSETS | 0.8878 | RETURN_ON_CAP | 0.7911 | BS_ST_BORROW | 0.8892 |
| C2 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.6980 | BS_SH_CAP_AND_APIC | 0.7245 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.7574 |
| C2 | BS_SH_CAP_AND_APIC | 0.5491 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.5702 | RETURN_ON_CAP | 0.7498 |
| C3 | BS_SH_CAP_AND_APIC | 0.8124 | BS_CASH_NEAR_CASH_ITEM | 0.8004 | BS_CASH_NEAR_CASH_ITEM | 0.7045 |
| C3 | RETURN_ON_ASSET | 0.8007 | BS_NON_PERFORM_ASSET | 0.7707 | IS_INT_EXPENSES | 0.6626 |
| C3 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.6345 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.5311 | TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET | 0.6519 |