| Literature DB >> 27643788 |
Lucy Waruguru Mburu1, Marco Helbich2.
Abstract
Urban authorities are continuously drawing up policies to promote cycling among commuters. However, these initiatives are counterproductive for the targeted objectives because they increase opportunities for bicycle theft. This paper explores Inner London as a case study to address place-specific risk factors for bicycle theft at the street-segment level while controlling for seasonal variation. The presence of certain public amenities (e.g., bicycle stands, railway stations, pawnshops) was evaluated against locations of bicycle theft between 2013 and 2016 and risk effects were estimated using negative binomial regression models. Results showed that a greater level of risk stemmed from land-use facilities than from area-based socioeconomic status. The presence of facilities such as train stations, vacant houses, pawnbrokers and payday lenders increased bicycle theft, but no evidence was found that linked police stations with crime levels. The findings have significant implications for urban crime prevention with respect to non-residential land use.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 27643788 PMCID: PMC5028062 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0163354
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Cycle superhighways in the study area of Inner London.
Fig 2Flowchart of the experimental design to identify risk indicators for regression modeling of bicycle theft.
Fig 3Seasonal bicycle theft statistics for Inner London from May 2013 to April 2016 (n = 36,987 events).
The distribution of risk indicators over Inner London’s street segments (n = 51,216 segments).
| Variable | Buffer Distance | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 160 meters | 320 meters | 480 meters | 640 meters | |||||||||||||
| Min. | Mean | Max. | SD | Min. | Mean | Max. | SD | Min. | Mean | Max. | SD | Min. | Mean | Max. | SD | |
| Bars | 0 | 0.033 | 4.346 | 0.176 | 0 | 0.107 | 5.418 | 0.383 | 0 | 0.228 | 7.865 | 0.690 | 0 | 0.396 | 10.741 | 1.109 |
| Bike rentals | 0 | 0.058 | 2.409 | 0.195 | 0 | 0.188 | 4.208 | 0.402 | 0 | 0.401 | 5.866 | 0.742 | 0 | 0.699 | 8.582 | 1.231 |
| Cycle stands | 0 | 0.278 | 12.971 | 0.715 | 0 | 0.852 | 17.724 | 1.589 | 0 | 1.743 | 22.287 | 2.743 | 0 | 2.957 | 32.427 | 4.197 |
| Cycle repair | 0 | 0.002 | 1.693 | 0.037 | 0 | 0.007 | 1.846 | 0.066 | 0 | 0.016 | 1.966 | 0.099 | 0 | 0.027 | 2.224 | 0.134 |
| Pawnbrokers | 0 | 0.036 | 1.928 | 0.157 | 0 | 0.127 | 2.295 | 0.276 | 0 | 0.277 | 2.775 | 0.381 | 0 | 0.491 | 3.081 | 0.429 |
| Police stations | 0 | 0.018 | 2.663 | 0.115 | 0 | 0.061 | 4.918 | 0.244 | 0 | 0.132 | 6.894 | 0.413 | 0 | 0.231 | 8.596 | 0.625 |
| Trees | 0 | 3.731 | 547.093 | 11.853 | 0 | 11.808 | 653.044 | 32.035 | 0 | 24.951 | 702.235 | 62.787 | 0 | 43.566 | 960.109 | 104.870 |
| Universities | 0 | 0.011 | 5.121 | 0.109 | 0 | 0.032 | 6.060 | 0.218 | 0 | 0.072 | 6.679 | 0.340 | 0 | 0.128 | 7.259 | 0.469 |
| Train stations | 0 | 0.019 | 1.193 | 0.104 | 0 | 0.057 | 1.597 | 0.175 | 0 | 0.199 | 2.003 | 0.248 | 0 | 0.199 | 2.502 | 0.329 |
| Vacant houses | 0 | 0.009 | 4.844 | 0.111 | 0 | 0.029 | 5.922 | 0.203 | 0 | 0.060 | 6.826 | 0.308 | 0 | 0.103 | 7.913 | 0.427 |
| Ethnic heterogeneity | 0.121 | 0.717 | 0.888 | 0.110 | 0.196 | 0.725 | 0.891 | 0.104 | 0.205 | 0.731 | 0.893 | 0.100 | 0.208 | 0.736 | 0.895 | 0.096 |
| Deprivation | 0 | 0.067 | 0.248 | 0.038 | 0 | 0.072 | 0.250 | 0.037 | 0 | 0.075 | 0.252 | 0.036 | 0.001 | 0.077 | 0.256 | 0.035 |
| Affluence | -2.795 | 0.111 | 4.051 | 1.209 | -2.599 | 0.122 | 4.234 | 1.284 | -2.413 | 0.131 | 4.561 | 1.362 | -2.408 | 0.141 | 5.074 | 1.464 |
Fig 4Incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% confidence intervals of negative binomial models.
Estimates correspond to effects of risky and risk-mitigating amenities and socioeconomic factors on bicycle theft. Effects are measured using bicycle theft counts (May 2013 to April 2016) for 51,216 street segments. Models account for the seasonal effects shown in Table 2 and assess risk exposure over four threshold distances: (a) 160 m—Model 1; (b) 320m -Model 2; (c) 480m—Model 3; and (d) 640m—Model 4. The commuter-adjusted population is modeled as an offset variable.
Effect estimates of negative binomial bicycle theft models for the seasonal variables at four threshold distances of risk exposure measurement (models are adjusted for risk factors).
| Model 1 (160 m) | Model 2 (320 m) | Model 3 (480 m) | Model 4 (640 m) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | IRR | 95% C.I. lower | 95% C.I. upper | IRR | 95% C.I. lower | 95% C.I. upper | IRR | 95% C.I. lower | 95% C.I. upper | IRR | 95% C.I. lower | 95% C.I. upper |
| Intercept | 0.013 | 0.012 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.018 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.011 |
| Winter | 0.802 | 0.791 | 0.812 | 0.779 | 0.767 | 0.790 | 0.736 | 0.725 | 0.746 | 0.668 | 0.658 | 0.678 |
| Summer | 1.804 | 1.791 | 1.818 | 1.856 | 1.841 | 1.872 | 1.929 | 1.912 | 1.947 | 1.744 | 1.729 | 1.759 |
| Autumn | 1.063 | 1.050 | 1.077 | 1.376 | 1.335 | 1.418 | 1.136 | 1.120 | 1.152 | 0.975 | 0.962 | 0.989 |
| Dispersion | 14.560 | 15.57 | 19.786 | 16.412 | ||||||||
| Nagelkerke | 0.410 | 0.653 | 0.691 | 0.803 | ||||||||
| AIC | 92,349 | 79,582 | 71,240 | 52,842 | ||||||||
Notes:
*** p < 0.001.
a Models incorporate seasonality using three dummy variables.
b Regression models control for predictor variables listed in Table 1 and employ the commuter-adjusted population as offset.
c The parameter, theta indicates the amount of adjustment for over-dispersion in the Poisson model.