Henrik Lindholm1, Niklas Egels-Zandén2, Christina Rudén3. 1. a Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology , Royal Institute of Technology , Stockholm , Sweden. 2. b Department of Business Administration , School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg , Gothenburg , Sweden. 3. c Department of Environmental Science and Analytical Chemistry (ACES) , Stockholm University , Stockholm , Sweden.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: In managing chemical risks to the environment and human health in supply chains, voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures, such as auditing code of conduct compliance, play an important role. OBJECTIVES: To examine how well suppliers' chemical health and safety performance complies with buyers' CSR policies and whether audited factories improve their performance. METHODS: CSR audits (n = 288) of garment factories conducted by Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), an independent non-profit organization, were analyzed using descriptive statistics and statistical modeling. RESULTS: Forty-three per cent of factories did not comply with the FWF code of conduct, i.e. received remarks on chemical safety. Only among factories audited 10 or more times was there a significant increase in the number of factories receiving no remarks. CONCLUSIONS: Compliance with chemical safety requirements in garment supply chains is low and auditing is statistically correlated with improvements only at factories that have undergone numerous audits.
BACKGROUND: In managing chemical risks to the environment and human health in supply chains, voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures, such as auditing code of conduct compliance, play an important role. OBJECTIVES: To examine how well suppliers' chemical health and safety performance complies with buyers' CSR policies and whether audited factories improve their performance. METHODS: CSR audits (n = 288) of garment factories conducted by Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), an independent non-profit organization, were analyzed using descriptive statistics and statistical modeling. RESULTS: Forty-three per cent of factories did not comply with the FWF code of conduct, i.e. received remarks on chemical safety. Only among factories audited 10 or more times was there a significant increase in the number of factories receiving no remarks. CONCLUSIONS: Compliance with chemical safety requirements in garment supply chains is low and auditing is statistically correlated with improvements only at factories that have undergone numerous audits.
Entities:
Keywords:
Audit; CSR; Chemicals; Code of conduct; Health and safety; Solvents; Voluntary regulation