| Literature DB >> 27562292 |
Robert B Raffa1, Robert Taylor2, Joseph V Pergolizzi2,3, Srinivas Nalamachu4, Eric S Edwards5, Evan T Edwards6.
Abstract
The increased use of opioids for chronic treatment of pain and the resulting epidemic of opioid overdoses have created a major public health challenge. Parenteral naloxone has been used since the 1970's to treat opioid overdose. Recently, a novel naloxone auto-injector device (EVZIO, kaleo, Inc., Richmond, VA) was approved by the Food and Drug Administration. In this article, we review the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) process used in the development and testing of this novel naloxone auto-injector currently used in nonmedical settings for the emergency treatment of known or suspected opioid overdose. HFE methods were employed throughout the product development process for the naloxone auto-injector including formative and summative studies in order to optimize the auto-injector's user interface, mitigate use-related hazards and increase reliability during an opioid emergency use scenario. HFE was also used to optimize the product's design and user interface in order to reduce or prevent user confusion and misuse. The naloxone auto-injector went through a rigorous HFE process that included perceptual, cognitive, and physical action analysis; formative usability evaluations; use error analysis and summative design validation studies. Applying HFE resulted in the development of a product that is safe, fast, easy and predictably reliable to deliver a potentially life-saving dose of naloxone during an opioid overdose emergency. The naloxone auto-injector may be considered as a universal precaution option for at-risk patients prescribed opioids or those who are at increased risk for an opioid overdose emergency.Entities:
Keywords: Auto-injector; Human factors engineering; Naloxone; Opioid overdose; Opioid-induced respiratory depression
Mesh:
Substances:
Year: 2017 PMID: 27562292 PMCID: PMC5222905 DOI: 10.1007/s13346-016-0323-x
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Drug Deliv Transl Res ISSN: 2190-393X Impact factor: 4.617
The naloxone auto-injector’s verification and validation test plan included testing associated and in compliance with FDA Guidance as well as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO): ISO 11608–1:2012, ISO 11608–2:2012, and ISO 11608–3:2012; other standard bodies such as UL, ASTM, and ISTA. In addition, tests were selected based on risk analyses. The following table provides a brief description of each test as well as its associated reference(s). This listing of tests is not a comprehensive list of all testing conducted for the naloxone auto-injector
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| ISO 11608–1 |
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| ISO 11608–1 |
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| ISO 11608–1 |
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| ISO 11608–1 (Section 10 and 11) |
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| ISO 11608–2 (Section 11) |
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| ISO 11608–3, Section 5.5. |
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| ISO 11608–3 |
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| FDA Draft Guidance on Injectors |
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| User FMEA |
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| FDA Draft Guidance on Injectors |
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| DFMEA |
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| User FMEA |
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| User FMEA |
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| ISO 11608, Medical Plastics and Biomaterials, July/August 1998. Pp. 16–23 |
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| ISTA Guidelines ASTM D4169–08 |
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| ISO 10993 |
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| FDA Draft Guidance on Injectors |
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| ISO 11608 |
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| User FMEA |
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| IEC 60529 |
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| DFMEA |
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| ISO 11608–1 |
user fmea: user failure mode and effects analysis, dfmea: design failure mode and effects analysis
Fig. 1EVZIO (naloxone hydrochloride injection) Auto-injector Human Factors Development Plan
Fig. 2The naloxone auto-injector is provided in a removable outer case. To increase performance success and decrease cognitive demand, the motion to slide off the outer case is in the same direction as the motion needed to pull off the safety guard. Once the outer case is removed, a removable red plastic safety guard shields the needle. A tactile design allows the safety guard to be gripped and pulled off when needed during an emergency. The outer case and the auto-injector have a viewing window to inspect the naloxone and to assess if the auto-injector has been used. The auto-injector also includes an electronic prompt system that provides voice instructions from a speaker and visual cues from LEDs to assist in guiding the user through the injection
Potential use errors for the naloxone auto-injector identified as a part of Human Factors Engineering and risk analyses
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| User could misplace instructions, trainer device, or forget key steps |
| User drops device before or while removing the outer case | |
| User does not understand how to open the package or has difficulty removing the packaging | |
| User fails to hold the injector in place for the full five seconds | |
| User ignores the instructional leaflet and uses the device anyway (untrained user) | |
| User ignores the instructions on the device itself (untrained user) | |
| User removes the safety guard prematurely and then tries to replace it | |
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| User moves device during the injection, leading to possibility of ineffective dose |
| User misplaces the device or cannot find it readily | |
| User has difficulty pulling off the safety guard | |
| User does not apply sufficient force initially to activate the injection then eventually determines force required | |
| User has difficulty removing the device from the outer case | |
| User attempts to disassemble the device, causing the possibility of premature activation which might result in unintentional self-injection | |
| User removes the safety guard and then drops the device, causing the potential for premature activation | |
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| User employs the device but the drug is expired or degraded |
| User attempts to use a previously used device | |
| User does not remove the red safety guard | |
| User pulls the device away from the outer thigh prematurely or fails to hold the injector in place for at least 0.5 s | |
| User decides not to give the injection | |
| User places the device in the wrong location (not on the outer thigh or an appropriate muscle) | |
| User does not place the base on the outer thigh or appropriate alternate location | |
| User never applies sufficient force to activate the injection | |
| User puts hand over the wrong end, possibly resulting in accidental self-injection | |
| User pushes the base with fingers causing premature activation | |
| User uses the training device on the patient instead of the actual device containing drug |