| Literature DB >> 27489273 |
Matthew L Turnbull1, Helen M Wise1, Marlynne Q Nicol1, Nikki Smith1, Rebecca L Dunfee2, Philippa M Beard1, Brett W Jagger3, Yvonne Ligertwood1, Gareth R Hardisty1, Haixia Xiao4, Donald J Benton4, Alice M Coburn5, Joao A Paulo6, Steven P Gygi6, John W McCauley4, Jeffery K Taubenberger2, Samantha J Lycett1, Michael P Weekes7, Bernadette M Dutia1, Paul Digard8.
Abstract
UNLABELLED: Two alleles of segment 8 (NS) circulate in nonchiropteran influenza A viruses. The A allele is found in avian and mammalian viruses, but the B allele is viewed as being almost exclusively found in avian viruses. This might reflect the fact that one or both of its encoded proteins (NS1 and NEP) are maladapted for replication in mammalian hosts. To test this, a number of clade A and B avian virus-derived NS segments were introduced into human H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. In no case was the peak virus titer substantially reduced following infection of various mammalian cell types. Exemplar reassortant viruses also replicated to similar titers in mice, although mice infected with viruses with the avian virus-derived segment 8s had reduced weight loss compared to that achieved in mice infected with the A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 (H1N1) parent. In vitro, the viruses coped similarly with type I interferons. Temporal proteomics analysis of cellular responses to infection showed that the avian virus-derived NS segments provoked lower levels of expression of interferon-stimulated genes in cells than wild type-derived NS segments. Thus, neither the A nor the B allele of avian virus-derived NS segments necessarily attenuates virus replication in a mammalian host, although the alleles can attenuate disease. Phylogenetic analyses identified 32 independent incursions of an avian virus-derived A allele into mammals, whereas 6 introductions of a B allele were identified. However, A-allele isolates from birds outnumbered B-allele isolates, and the relative rates of Aves-to-Mammalia transmission were not significantly different. We conclude that while the introduction of an avian virus segment 8 into mammals is a relatively rare event, the dogma of the B allele being especially restricted is misleading, with implications in the assessment of the pandemic potential of avian influenza viruses. IMPORTANCE: Influenza A virus (IAV) can adapt to poultry and mammalian species, inflicting a great socioeconomic burden on farming and health care sectors. Host adaptation likely involves multiple viral factors. Here, we investigated the role of IAV segment 8. Segment 8 has evolved into two distinct clades: the A and B alleles. The B-allele genes have previously been suggested to be restricted to avian virus species. We introduced a selection of avian virus A- and B-allele segment 8s into human H1N1 and H3N2 virus backgrounds and found that these reassortant viruses were fully competent in mammalian host systems. We also analyzed the currently available public data on the segment 8 gene distribution and found surprisingly little evidence for specific avian host restriction of the B-clade segment. We conclude that B-allele segment 8 genes are, in fact, capable of supporting infection in mammals and that they should be considered during the assessment of the pandemic risk of zoonotic influenza A viruses.Entities:
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Year: 2016 PMID: 27489273 PMCID: PMC5044859 DOI: 10.1128/JVI.01205-16
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Virol ISSN: 0022-538X Impact factor: 5.103
Virus strains
| Virus name | Strain from which NS segment was isolated | Allele | GenBank accession no. (NS segment) |
|---|---|---|---|
| PR8 | A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 (H1N1) | A | |
| Cal7 | A/California/7/2009 (H1N1) | A | Unpublished |
| Udorn72 | A/Udorn/72 (H3N2) | A | |
| O175A | A/green-winged teal/Ohio/175/1986 (H2N1) | A | |
| O173A | A/mallard/Ohio/173/1990 (H11N9) | A | |
| O340A | A/green-winged teal/Ohio/340/1987 (H11N9) | A | |
| M1124A | A/mallard/Maryland/1124/2005 (H11N9) | A | |
| O265B | A/Mallard/Ohio/265/1987 (H1N9) | B | |
| O430B | A/green-winged teal/Ohio/430/1987 (H1N1) | B | |
| O264B | A/mallard/Ohio/264/1986 (H3N8) | B | |
| O339B | A/pintail/Ohio/339/1987 (H3N8) | B | |
| O668B | A/mallard/Ohio/668/2002 (H4N6) | B | |
| O671B | A/mallard/Ohio/671/2002 (H4N6) | B | |
| O35B | A/northern shoveler/Ohio/35/1986 (H3N8) | B | |
| O246B | A/bufflehead/Ohio/246/1986 (H11N2) | B | |
| Alb88B | A/mallard/Alberta/88/1976 (H6N8) | B | |
| NY6750A | A/mallard/New York/6750/1978 (H2N2) | A | |
| Sw418B | A/mallard/Sweden/S90418/2005 (H6N8) | B | |
| NY107B | A/New York/107/2003 (H7N8) | B | |
| J89B | A/equine/Jilin/1/1989 (H3N8) | B |
Used as representative consensus A- and B-allele genes for specific experiments.
Residues 1 to 15 and 855 to 890 from ALB/221/1978 (H7N2) (GenBank accession no. CY005035.1). The G242A mutation was introduced to remove the BsmBI site.
Residues 1 to 16 and 855 to 890 from A/mallard/New York/6750/1978 (H2N2) (GenBank accession no. M80945.1).
Residues 1 to 26 and 882 to 890 from A/tufted duck/Mongolia/1409/2010 (H1N1) (GenBank accession no. KC871435.1). The A696C mutation was introduced to remove the BsmBI site.
Residues 1 to 15 and 871 to 890 from A/guinea fowl/New York/20221-11/1995 (H2N2) (GenBank accession no. CY014833.1).
Independent introductions of avian virus B-allele NS segments into mammalian hosts
| Strain | Host | Transmission | Notes (reference) | GenBank accession no. (NS segment) | Avian source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A/equine/Jilin/1/1989 (H3N8) | Equine | Epidemic | Major equine influenza epidemic ( | Domestic | |
| A/muskrat/Buryatiya/1944/2000 (H4N6) | Muskrat | Single isolate | Closely related to an H4N6 avian influenza virus circulating in Russia at a similar time point ( | Wild | |
| A/swine/KU/16/2001 (H7N2) | Swine | Likely single isolate | Isolated from 1 pig (of 532 tested) from a slaughterhouse; apparent reassortment between avian H7N2 and H5N3 viruses ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Saskatchewan/18789/02 (H1N1) | Swine | Likely transmissible in pigs | Isolated from a 1,200-sow pig farm where influenza-like symptoms affected pigs of all ages; fully avian virus ( | Wild | |
| A/New York/107/2003 (H7N2) | Human | Single isolate | Apparent individual infection of a 48-year-old immunocompromised man from the Caribbean with fever and flu-like symptoms; no apparent transmission to family ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Korea/C13/2008 (H5N2) | Swine | Apparent transmission | Serological evidence of transmission within pigs (maybe asymptomatic?) ( | Wild |
Independent introductions of avian virus A-allele NS segments into mammalian hosts
| Prototypic strain | Host | Transmission | Notes | GenBank accession no. (NS segment) | Avian source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 (H1N1) | Human | Pandemic | Persists through classical swine, human H2N2, H3N2, and pdm2009 virus lineages | Undetermined | |
| A/equine/Prague/2/1956 (H7N7) | Equine | Transmissible | Likely to be extinct | Undetermined | |
| A/equine/Miami/1/1963 (H3N8) | Equine | Transmissible | Major circulating equine influenza A virus; also endemic in U.S. domestic dogs (canine H3N8 virus) | Wild | |
| A/swine/China/8/1978 (H3N2) | Swine | Circulating in pigs | Kawaoka et al. suggest that this belongs in an Eurasian avian virus lineage that is circulating in European pigs ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Belgium/WVL1/1979 (H1N1) | Swine | Transmissible | Representative isolate of Eurasian swine flu virus | Domestic | |
| A/seal/Massachusetts/1/1980 (H7N7) | Seal | Epidemic in seals | Epidemic in seals with approx 600 fatalities ( | Wild | |
| A/seal/Massachusetts/133/1982 (H4N5) | Seal | Epidemic in seals | Responsible for a 1983 outbreak in which 60 seals were reported dead; 39 were positive for an H4N5 virus indistinguishable from the prototype virus ( | Wild | |
| A/mink/Sweden/3900/1984 (H10N4) | Mink | Outbreak in mink | One of the first identified cases of avian influenza virus able to transmit readily in mammalian host ( | Domestic | |
| A/whale/Maine/328B/1984 (H13N2) | Whale | Single isolate | Isolated from one sick pilot whale; no evidence of a transmission chain ( | Wild | |
| A/seal/Massachusetts/3911/1992 (H3N3) | Seal | Likely transmissible | Two closely related H3N3 viruses were detected in three seals following an increase in the number of stranded seals in Cape Cod in 1992 ( | Wild | |
| A/swine/Hong Kong/644/1993 (H1N1) | Swine | Possible transmission. | Three independent H1N1 virus isolates from pigs with closely related NS segments; transmission information was not disclosed in the publication ( | Domestic | |
| A/England/AV877/1996 (H7N7) | Human | Likely single isolate | Isolated from a 43-year-old duck farmer with mild one-sided conjunctivitis ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Eire/89/1996 (H1N1) | Swine | Single isolate | No other closely related isolates of the same subtype, host, and year ( | Domestic | |
| A/Hong Kong/482/97 (H5N1) | Human | Individuals only | Includes related H9N2 human and swine virus isolates in China 1997–2010 | Domestic | |
| A/Swine/Ontario/01911-1/99 (H4N6) | Swine | Likely transmission | Responsible for an outbreak in pigs with pneumonia in Canada ( | Wild | |
| A/swine/KU/2/2001 (H11N6) | Swine | Possible transmission | No published information available; four independent pig H11N6 virus isolates from the same year and location suggest ability to transmit within pigs | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Ontario/K01477/01 (H3N3) | Swine | Likely transmission | The same H3N3 virus was isolated from more than one pig in a sick group (exact numbers were not disclosed) ( | Wild | |
| A/Caspian seal/Russia/1884/2002 (H4N6) | Seal | Possible transmission? | Two H4N6 virus isolates with very closely related NS segments were recovered from Caspian seals in Russia 10 yr apart; nothing was published for these strains | Wild | |
| A/Netherlands/033/03 (H7N7) | Human | Poorly transmissible between humans | Mostly independent transmission events from birds to humans; H7N7 virus was epidemic in poultry in the Netherlands in 2003 ( | Domestic | |
| A/Beijing/01/2003 (H5N1 | Human | Not transmissible in humans? | Responsible for H5N1 bird flu; human-to-human transmission is rare or nonexistent | Domestic | |
| A/Canada/rv504/2004 (H7N3) | Human | Likely single isolates | Infection of two poultry workers on different farms during H7N3 poultry outbreak in British Columbia, Canada ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Korea/S452/2004 (H9N2) | Swine | Likely single isolates | Two independent isolates of swine H9N2 viruses with very similar NS genes in 2004; the nature of infections was not specified in the literature ( | Domestic | |
| A/canine/Guangdong/1/2006 (H3N2) | Canine | Transmissible | Avian H3N2 virus adapted to canine host and transmits well in population | Wild | |
| A/swine/Hubei/10/2008 (H10N5) | Swine | Transmissible in pigs | Wholly avian virus closely related to Eurasian swine IAV ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/Jilin/37/2008 (H3N2) | Swine | Likely single isolate | Authors sampled 279 sick pigs, and this was isolated from only 1 pig; has M and NS genes from H10 avian influenza virus ( | Wild | |
| A/swine/Yangzhou/080/2009 (H6N6) | Swine | Likely transmissible in pigs | Detected from clinical samples coinfected with porcine circovirus type 2 in six pigs ( | Domestic | |
| A/swine/HuBei/06/2009 (H4N1) | Swine | Single isolate | Apparent direct avian-to-pig infection without chain of transmission; the first H4 avian virus detected in pigs ( | Wild | |
| A/swine/Guangdong/K4/2011 (H4N8) | Swine | Possibly transmissible in pigs | Isolated from a pig in a group displaying respiratory symptoms (H4N8 and H3N2) ( | Domestic | |
| A/harbor seal/Massachusetts/1/2011 (H3N8) | Seal | Probable transmission | 126 seals died from an outbreak caused by this virus ( | Wild | |
| A/Mexico/InDRE7218/2012 (H7N3) | Human | Likely single isolates | High-pathogenicity H7N3 virus isolated from Mexican poultry workers with conjunctivitis in 2012 ( | Domestic | |
| A/Jiangxi/IPB13/2013 (H10N8) | Human | Likely single isolates | Human cases of H10N8 virus infection likely from live poultry markets in China ( | Domestic | |
| A/Nanjing/1/2013 (H7N9) | Human | Poorly transmissible in humans | From 2013 and onwards, source of H7N9 virus zoonotic episodes in China | Domestic |
FIG 1Protein synthesis by NS segment reassortant viruses in mammalian cell culture. MDCK cells were infected at an MOI of 3, and cell lysates were prepared at 8 h p.i. To detect viral NP, NS1, M1, and M2 polypeptides as well as cellular tubulin, lysates were subjected to SDS-PAGE and immunoblotted with the appropriate antisera. To detect NEP, cells were infected at an MOI of 10 and metabolically labeled with a 35S protein labeling mix between 6 h and 8 h p.i. The lysates were then immunoprecipitated with anti-NEP antiserum, and precipitates were analyzed by SDS-PAGE and autoradiography. Data are representative of those from more than one independent experiment.
FIG 2A- and B-allele reassortant viruses replicate efficiently in mammalian cell culture. (A, B) MDCK cells were infected at an MOI of 0.001 with PR8-based viruses, and the supernatants were titrated by plaque assay after 48 h (A) or at the plotted time points (B). Data in panel A are the mean ± SD (n = 5), while panel B presents the results of a single experiment. (C) A549 cells were infected with the indicated viruses at an MOI of 0.001, and endpoint titers were determined after 48 h. Data are the mean ± range (n = 2). (D) The replication kinetics of PR8 NS segment reassortants in A549 cells were determined as described in the legend to panel B. Data are the mean ± SD (n = 3). (E) Primary human CD14+ MDM cells were infected with PR8-based viruses at an MOI of 3, and the titers in the supernatant were determined after 24 h. Data are the mean ± range (n = 2). A duplicate sample of PR8-infected cells was taken immediately after the virus adsorption period (postwash), and titers were determined to confirm that the virus in samples collected at later times reflected true virus replication and not carryover of the virus inoculum. (F) Results of assays performed as described in the legends to panels A and B. Data represent the mean ± range (n = 2). (G) MDCK-SIAT cells were infected with Cal7-based viruses at an MOI of 0.01, and the supernatant was titrated at the plotted time points. Data are the mean ± range (n = 2). (H) MDCK cells were infected with Udorn72-based viruses as described in the legend to panel B. Data represent the mean ± range (n = 2). Dotted lines indicate the limit of detection.
FIG 3A B-allele reassortant is not deficient in controlling the host IFN response in mammalian cell culture. (A, B) Ability of viruses to replicate despite established antiviral conditions. A549 cells were pretreated with various concentrations of human recombinant IFN-β for 24 h prior to infection with the indicated PR8 viruses at an MOI of 0.01. (A) Virus in the supernatant was titrated by plaque assay at 24 to 48 h p.i. Data are the mean titers from 24-h and 48-h multicycle infections. (B) Cell lysates were prepared at 48 h p.i., subjected to SDS-PAGE, and immunoblotted for cellular IFN-inducible Mx-1, viral NP, and tubulin. (C to E) Induction of host cell type I IFN response during infection with reassortant viruses. (C) Human lung A549 cells were infected for 24 h at various multiplicities, and active type I IFN in the supernatant was quantified using the HEK-Blue reporter cell line. (D, E) Results of assay performed as described in the legend to panel C but at an MOI of 3.
FIG 4Induction of host innate immune response during infection with reassortant viruses. (A) Human CD14+ MDMs were infected at an MOI of 1 for 24 h, and the levels of various cytokines and chemokines in the supernatant were determined using an immunospot blot array. Values represent those from a heat map of the mean fold change in the level of expression with respect to the level in a mock-infected sample (Mock). sTREM-1, serum soluble triggering receptor expressed on myeloid cells-1; sICAM-1, soluble intercellular adhesion molecule-1; CSF2 and CSF3, colony-stimulating factors 2 and 3, respectively. (B, C) A549 cells were infected at an MOI of 5, cell lysates were generated at the indicated times, and the polypeptide composition was determined by TMT-based quantitative mass spectrometry. (B) Values represent those from a heat map of the mean fold change with respect to the value for mock-infected samples. The zoomed portion shows a subcluster of heavily upregulated antiviral proteins. (C) The quantitative temporal expression of specific antiviral restriction factors Mx-1, IFIT2, OASL, IFIT3, IFIT1, and IFIH1 is plotted.
FIG 5Relative fitness of PR8 reassortant viruses. (A) Establishment of a strain-specific RT-PCR assay for A- and B-allele viruses. Viral RNA was extracted following plaque purification of either O175A, O265B, or (as examples) 2 unidentified viruses obtained from coinfection with both and analyzed by RT-PCR with primers specific for the NS segment of either O175A or O265B. (B) MDCK cells were coinfected with the indicated mixtures of viruses at an MOI of 0.001 (each), and at 48 h p.i., the supernatant was analyzed by plaque assay. Twenty-five plaques were scored for the proportion of progeny, and a further portion of the original supernatant was passaged further at an MOI of 0.001. (C) MDCK cells were infected with each virus at an MOI of 3, and the proportion of each virus in the supernatant was assessed after 16 h (values are means + SEMs for avian virus with the A allele versus avian virus with the B allele [A v B]; n = 3). (D) Five BALB/c mice were coinfected with 250 PFU each of O175A and O265B. At day 6 p.i., the left lung of each mouse was harvested, and the proportion of each virus in the lung homogenate was determined by plaque purification of 12 plaques and RT-PCR.
FIG 6Pathogenicity of PR8 reassortant viruses in BALB/c mice. (A) Five BALB/c mice per group were nasally inoculated with 500 PFU of virus or mock infected with medium, and their weight was measured every 24 h. Data represent the mean ± SD. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at day 6 postinfection, when all animals were euthanized. (B) The left lung of each mouse was harvested at either day 2 or day 6 p.i., and virus in the homogenate was titrated by plaque assay. (C) Intracellular NP staining in infected mouse lung. Lung sections from mice at day 2 p.i. were stained for viral NP (red) and DNA (blue) and imaged using confocal and differential interference contrast (DIC) microscopy. P values were determined by unpaired t tests. *, P < 0.05; **, P < 0.01; ***, P < 0.005.
FIG 7Host responses to A- and B-allele segment 8 reassortant viruses. (A) At day 6 p.i., the right lung lobes of inoculated mice were collected, fixed, processed, and stained with hematoxylin and eosin. Mock-infected mice showed no significant changes, whereas infected mice showed degeneration and necrosis of epithelial cells lining the airways with peribronchiolar and perivascular inflammation and interstitial inflammation sometimes accompanied by necrosis and fibrin accumulation. The inflammatory infiltrate was predominately lymphocytes and macrophages with variable numbers of neutrophils. Bars, 50 μm. (B) The severity of the pathology in the lung was assessed in a blind manner, and an overall pathology score out of 3 was assigned. (C) RNA was extracted from the lungs of infected mice at day 4 p.i., and the levels of various cytokines, chemokines, and antiviral gene expression were quantified using RT-qPCR. Data are plotted as the mean (20 − dC) ± SD. The values for all infected samples were significantly different from the value for the mock-infected sample, unless the bar is labeled with NS, which indicates no significant difference by the unpaired t test. *, P < 0.05; **, P < 0.01. (D) The levels of various cytokines and chemokines in pooled lung homogenates from groups of 5 mice culled at day 4 p.i. were determined using an immunoblot spot array. Values are represented by those from a heat map of the fold change with respect to the level of expression for the mock-infected samples.
FIG 8Major lineages of influenza A virus segment 8. A phylogenetic tree of a subsample of all influenza A virus segment 8 sequences is shown, with the major lineages being highlighted in color.
FIG 9Mammalian virus B-allele segment 8 sequences. A phylogenetic tree of all avian virus B-allele lineage segment 8 sequences is shown, and the non-avian virus sequences are highlighted.
Expected number of avian B-allele introductions
| Data | A allele | B allele | Fisher test | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. of avian virus strains | No. of independent introductions | Introduction rate | No. of avian virus strains | No. of independent introductions | Introduction rate | Expected no. of B-allele introductions | ||
| All avian viruses | 9,617 | 32 | 0.0033 | 2,717 | 6 | 0.0022 | 0.436 | 9.04 (4–15) |
| Transmissible viruses | 9,617 | 19 | 0.0020 | 2,717 | 3 | 0.0011 | 0.446 | 5.37 (0–10) |
| Single isolates or viruses with poor transmission | 9,617 | 13 | 0.0014 | 2,717 | 3 | 0.0011 | 1.000 | 3.67 (0–8) |
| Viruses from domestic birds only | 4,391 | 18 | 0.0041 | 648 | 3 | 0.0046 | 0.756 | 2.66 (0–6) |
| Viruses from wild birds only | 5,168 | 12 | 0.0023 | 2,053 | 3 | 0.0015 | 0.578 | 4.77 (1–9) |
Calculated using data from A alleles, assuming a binomial distribution.
Data in parentheses represent the range of the number of episodes that would still be statistically nonsignificant (P ≥ 0.1).
FIG 10Distribution of avian virus segment 8 sequences. The host distribution and location of isolation are represented for all avian virus A- and B-allele segment 8 sequences.