| Literature DB >> 27480784 |
Simon W Townsend1,2, Sonja E Koski3,4, Richard W Byrne5, Katie E Slocombe6, Balthasar Bickel7, Markus Boeckle8, Ines Braga Goncalves1, Judith M Burkart3, Tom Flower9, Florence Gaunet10, Hans Johann Glock11, Thibaud Gruber12, David A W A M Jansen1, Katja Liebal13, Angelika Linke14, Ádám Miklósi15, Richard Moore16, Carel P van Schaik3, Sabine Stoll7, Alex Vail17, Bridget M Waller18, Markus Wild19, Klaus Zuberbühler5,20, Marta B Manser1.
Abstract
Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans.Entities:
Keywords: communication; gesture; intentionality; language evolution; vocalisation
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 27480784 DOI: 10.1111/brv.12289
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc ISSN: 0006-3231