| Literature DB >> 27252662 |
Talya Porat1, Tal Oron-Gilad2, Michal Rottem-Hovev3, Jacob Silbiger4.
Abstract
Proliferation in the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in civil and military operations has presented a multitude of human factors challenges; from how to bridge the gap between demand and availability of trained operators, to how to organize and present data in meaningful ways. Utilizing the Design Research Methodology (DRM), a series of closely related studies with subject matter experts (SMEs) demonstrate how the focus of research gradually shifted from "how many systems can a single operator control" to "how to distribute missions among operators and systems in an efficient way". The first set of studies aimed to explore the modal number, i.e., how many systems can a single operator supervise and control. It was found that an experienced operator can supervise up to 15 UASs efficiently using moderate levels of automation, and control (mission and payload management) up to three systems. Once this limit was reached, a single operator's performance was compared to a team controlling the same number of systems. In general, teams led to better performances. Hence, shifting design efforts toward developing tools that support teamwork environments of multiple operators with multiple UASs (MOMU). In MOMU settings, when the tasks are similar or when areas of interest overlap, one operator seems to have an advantage over a team who needs to collaborate and coordinate. However, in all other cases, a team was advantageous over a single operator. Other findings and implications, as well as future directions for research are discussed.Entities:
Keywords: DSS; UAV; automation; control ratio; decision support systems; human factors; macrocognition; unmanned aerial systems
Year: 2016 PMID: 27252662 PMCID: PMC4878290 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00568
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Figure 1Reasoning in the Design Research Cycle (cf. Kuechler and Vaishnavi, .
Figure 2The simulated environment. In the configuration shown here three operators are collaboratively operating three UASs at the same time.
Figure 3Study 1 illustration. Left: the original health data form; Mid: The modified health data form with two-step (orange and red) fault indicators (condition B); Right: Graphic presentation of a trend in the zoom-in view of one health parameter (condition C).
Figure 4Twin UAV operation screen configuration and operational device (mouse).
Figure 5Comparison of lock-on time (i.e., the proportion of time during which the target was visible and locked by at least one UAV) with “Twin UAV” setup and with a single UAV, by participant.
Figure 6Tri-UAV display, the screen is divided into four areas: video feeds of the three UAVs marked with a colored frame for identification (upper left, lower left, and lower right windows), and a command and control map (upper right window). Note that all three UAVs are shown on the map.
Summary of studies 1 and 2.
| Initial state | Supervise 13 health indices using a paper-based checklist. | 1:5 | Health monitoring-I | Operators indicated that the task was difficult, exhaustive, and caused high workload. |
| A | Two design additions: 1. For each data item an intact indication was added | 1:5 | Health monitoring -III | Improved performance from the Initial State. |
| A+ | Display was the same as in condition A. However, five additional UAVs were added to the monitoring task. | 1:10 | Health monitoring -III | Similar results to condition A. |
| B | 12 health indices were grouped into four meaningful groups. For each UAV, only the group indications were displayed on the form. For each group, three intact indications were displayed (intact, warning, and fault). The operator could open the full form by clicking on the indication group. | 1:20 | Health monitoring -III | Similar results to condition A. Operators reported high workload and a feeling of losing control after the 17th UAV was added. |
| B+ | The group indications used in Condition B for each UAV were replaced with one intact indication (icon) placed on the command and control map. The operator could click on the icon and view the details. In addition, an alert was added for location deviation. | 1:20 | Health monitoring -III | Similar results to condition A, except for the time to detect deviation from route which was shortened. Operators succeeded in supervising 15–17 UAVs. |
| C | For each indicator, a graph displaying its measured values and intact indications was added. | 1:20 | Health monitoring-III | Similar results to condition A, except for the time to detect the fault source, which was shortened. Operators succeeded in supervising up to 10 UAVs. |
| A | Tracking a vehicle once with one UAV and once with a Twin UAV. Target lock-on could be used. | 1:1 vs.1:2 | Navigation—V | Performance was significantly better using two UAVs. |
| B | The operator had to guard a building with several entrances, track a suspected vehicle (target lock-on could be used), and scan the beach line. 2 UAVs were required for supervising the building while one UAV was required for surveillance. | 1:3 | Navigation—V Mission Management-II | Operators demonstrated difficulties in processing information from three separate sources. |
See Table .
Levels of Automation (LOA) (cf Cummings et al., .
| 1 | I | The computer offers no assistance; human must take all decisions and actions. |
| 2 | II | The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives. |
| 3 | III | The computer offers a selection of decisions/actions. |
| 4/5 | IV | The computer suggests one alternative and executes that suggestion if the human approves (management by consent). |
| 6 | V | The computer suggests one alternative and allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution (management by exception). |
| 7/8/9/10 | VI | The human is not involved in the decision making process; the computer decides and executes autonomously. |
SV—The 10-level scale originally proposed by Sheridan and Verplank (.
C—The combined categories of Cummings et al. (.
Performance measures—Team of 2 vs. one operator controlling two UAVs.
| Misses of vehicle exits | 2% | 2% | 3% |
| Misses of vehicle entrances | 3% | 4% | 3% |
| Misses of a suspect vehicles | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.5% |
| Multiple reporting of the same vehicle | 15% | 5% | 5% |
| Mission stabilization time | 10 min (SD 2.5) | 6 min (SD 1.75) | 2 min (SD 0.8) |
Performance measures—Team of 3 vs. one operator controlling 3 UAVs.
| Misses of vehicle exits | 1% | 3% |
| Misses of vehicle entrances | 1% | 3% |
| Misses of a suspect vehicles | 0% | 0.5% |
| Multiple reporting of the same vehicle | 25% | 8% |
| Mission stabilization time | 13 min (SD 3) | 3.5 min (SD 1.2) |
Figure 7Observing camera (above) and navigating camera (below)—Condition A.
Performance measures of the initial state.
| Time to identify an obstacle | 4 s (SD 1.5) |
| Missing an obstacle | 3% |
| Time to identify a hazard on the fence | 3 s (SD 1.5) |
| Missing a hazard on the fence | 2% |
All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
Performance measures—initial state vs. condition A.
| Time to identify an obstacle | 4 s (SD 1.5) | 7 s (SD 2.3) |
| Missing an obstacle | 3% | 6% |
| Time to identify a hazard on the fence | 3 s (SD 1.5) | 9 s (SD 3) |
| Missing a hazard on the fence | 2% | 5% |
All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
Performance measures—initial state vs. condition B.
| Time to identify an obstacle | 4 s (SD 1.5) | 5 s (SD 3) |
| Missing an obstacle | 3% | 4% |
| Time to identify a hazard on the fence | 3 s (SD 1.5) | 4.5 s (SD 2.5) |
| Missing a hazard on the fence | 2% | 3% |
All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
Figure 8Display of the navigation cameras with additional supporting tools and displays.
Summary of studies 3 and 4 (MOMU).
| A | The operator had to observe a building and report of vehicles entering and exiting the building. Vehicles exiting the building that had specific characteristics had to be further processed. The single operator could use a toolkit containing decision-making tools. | 1:2 vs. 2:2 | Team: Mission Management- I | Teams of two operators described the mission as calm (and even boring). The single operators reported that the mission was challenging but not overloading. |
| B | The same scenarios as in Condition A. The single operator could use a toolkit and the team of operators could not. | 1:3 vs.3:3 | Team: Mission Management-I | The team performed better than the single operator. However, the team had more double reporting. |
| B+ | The same scenarios as in Condition A. The single operator could use a toolkit and the team of operators could not. | 1:4 vs. 4:4 | Team: Mission Management-I | This setup could not be examined since the tasks were too complex. |
| Initial | One operator performed the navigation task and one performed the observation task. | 2:1 | Navigator: Navigation-I | Performance was satisfactory. Synchronization problems between the two operators were apparent. |
| A | One operator performed the navigation and the observation tasks. | 1:1 | Navigation-I | It was too complicated for one operator to perform both observation and navigation tasks. |
| B | One operator observed five UGVs. | 1:5 | Mission Management-I | Performance was good and similar to the initial condition. |
See Table .
Figure 9Left—operator capacity as a function of mission constrains (cf Cummings et al., . Right—Impact of UAS Number from an OR study conducted in parallel to our studies (Shaferman and Shima, 2009).