| Literature DB >> 27195954 |
Lawrence O Gostin1, Oyewale Tomori2, Suwit Wibulpolprasert3, Ashish K Jha4, Julio Frenk5, Suerie Moon6, Joy Phumaphi7, Peter Piot8, Barbara Stocking9, Victor J Dzau10, Gabriel M Leung11.
Abstract
Lawrence Gostin and colleagues offer a set of priorities for global health preparedness and response for future infectious disease threats.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 27195954 PMCID: PMC4873000 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS Med ISSN: 1549-1277 Impact factor: 11.069
Fig 1IHR Core Capacities.
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Core Capacity Compliance.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| By mid-2017, all countries should develop and publish plans to achieve and maintain their IHR core capacities. (Rec. B.6) | The global community must agree on a clear plan for national governments to invest domestically in building IHR core capacities. (Rec. 1) | No recommendation. | WHO should create a costed and prioritized plan for all countries to develop IHR core capacities. Financing should be provided in partnership with the World Bank. (Rec. 1) |
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| By the end of 2016, WHO should devise a regular, independent, transparent, and objective assessment mechanism for evaluating IHR core capacities. (Rec. B.2) All countries should consent to external assessment. (Rec. B.3) WHO and its member states should agree on precise benchmarks for evaluating core capacities that go beyond standard implementation checklists. (Rec. B.1) | All countries must agree to regular, independent, external assessment of their IHR core capacities. (Rec. 1) | WHO should strengthen its periodic review of compliance with IHR core capacity requirements to ensure that all member states are subject to an independent, field-based assessment at least once every four years on a rotating basis. After an assessment is completed, WHO’s Secretariat should follow up within 3 months with a costed action plan to address any deficiencies. (Rec. 6) | Assessment of IHR core capacities must be based on independently assessed information, validated through some form of peer review or other external assessment. (Rec. 1) |
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| By 2020, all countries should be fully compliant with IHR core capacity requirements. (Rec. B.6) | No recommendation. | By 2020, all state parties to the IHR should be in full compliance with the core capacities requirements. (Rec. 1) | No recommendation. |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Core Capacity Financing and Incentives.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| WHO should provide technical support to countries to fill gaps in IHR core capacities. WHO’s Centre for Health Emergency Preparedness & Response support should coordinate this support. (Rec. B.7) The World Bank should convene its development partners to provide financial assistance to lower-middle and low-income countries. (Rec. B.9) | Adequate external support should be provided to supplement efforts to build IHR core capacities in poorer countries. (Rec. 1) | The WHO Director-General (DG) should lead efforts to mobilize both financial and technical support to build IHR core capacities, in partnership with the World Bank, donors, foundations, and the private sector. (Rec. 17) | No recommendation. |
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| The World Bank, bilateral donors, and multilateral donors should make funding of health systems contingent on the participation of the recipient in the external assessment process. (Rec. B.4) The IMF should include pandemic preparedness in its assessments of individual countries. (Rec. B.5) | No recommendation. | No recommendation. | No recommendation. |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Key Components.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| No recommendation. | No recommendation. | Governments should increase spending on training health professionals, particularly community health workers, who are most familiar with the local culture. (Rec. 2) | No recommendation. |
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| Governments and WHO should increase engagement with non-state actors, including community leaders, civil society organizations, the private sector, and the media. (Rec. C.6) | No recommendation. | Governments and responders must streamline their community engagement to promote local ownership and trust. (Rec. 3) | WHO and its partners must ensure that appropriate community engagement is a core function when managing a health emergency. (Rec. 15) |
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| No recommendation. | No recommendation. | Efforts to improve outbreak preparedness and response must include women at all levels of planning and operations and must take women’s needs into account, as they most often act as primary care-givers. (Rec. 4) | No recommendation. |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—International Coordination.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| By the end of 2016, the World Bank should establish a Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility as a rapidly deployable source of funds to support pandemic response. (Rec. C.9) | No recommendation. | The World Bank should expeditiously operationalize its Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. (Rec. 21) | No recommendation. |
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| No recommendation. | No recommendation. | The WTO and WHO should convene a joint commission to ensure that their respective legal frameworks apply consistent standards with respect to trade restrictions imposed for public health reasons. (Rec. 24) | No recommendation. |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—WHO Emergency Operations and Response Reform.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| WHO should create a Centre for Health Emergency Preparedness & Response (CHEPR), governed by an independent Technical Governing Board, to coordinate global outbreak preparedness and response. (Rec. C.1) | WHO should create a unified Centre for Emergency Preparedness & Response with clear responsibility, adequate capacity, and strong lines of accountability. (Rec. 3) | WHO’s Program for Outbreaks & Emergency Management should be converted into a Centre for Emergency Preparedness & Response (CEPR) with unified command and control authority. (Rec. 7) | WHO should establish a Centre for Emergency Preparedness & Response that integrates its outbreak control and humanitarian functions. (Rec. 11) An independent board should oversee the Centre and provide an annual global health security report to the WHA and UN GA. (Rec. 12) |
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| By the end of 2016, WHO should create a sustainable contingency fund of US$100 million to support rapid deployment of emergency response capabilities. (Rec. C.3) | No recommendation. | WHO should establish a contingency fund for emergency response, managed by the CEPR. Member States should provide at least US$300 million in financing. (Rec. 20) | Member States and partners should contribute to a contingency fund in support of outbreak response, with a minimum target capitalization of US$100 million. (Rec. 8) |
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| WHO should generate a high-priority “watch list” of outbreaks, released daily to national focal points and weekly to the public. (Rec. C.7) | Responsibility for declaring a PHEIC should be delegated to a transparent and politically protected WHO standing committee. (Rec. 4) | WHO must re-establish itself as the authoritative body for health emergencies, capable of rapidly and accurately informing governments and the public about the severity and extent of an outbreak. (Rec. 14) | The IHR Review Committee should consider the creation of an intermediate level of emergency to alert the international community at an earlier stage of a health crisis before it becomes a global threat. (Rec. 5) |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—Ongoing WHO Reform.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| In May 2016, the WHA should agree to appropriately increase WHO Member States’ core contributions in order to provide sustainable financing for the CHEPR. (Rec. C.2) | No recommendation. | Member States should increase contributions to the WHO budget by at least 10 percent. Ten percent of all voluntary contributions to the WHO budget should be earmarked to support the CEPR. (Rec. 18 & 19) | At the 2016 WHA meeting, Member States should consider moving from zero nominal growth in assessed contributions to an increase of 5 percent. (Rec. 7) |
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| No recommendation. | WHO should focus on its core functions and implement good governance reforms. (Rec. 9 & 10) | No recommendation. | WHO must develop an organizational culture for emergency preparedness and response. (Rec. 10) |
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| WHO should strengthen its linkages with regional and sub-regional networks to enhance mutual support and trust, to promote sharing of information and laboratory resources, and facilitate joint outbreak investigations among neighboring countries. (Rec. C.5) | No recommendation. | WHO should support the efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations to develop and strengthen their standing capacities to monitor, prevent, and respond to health crises. (Rec. 5) | No recommendation. |
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| WHO should work with the UN Secretary-General (SG) and other UN bodies to develop strategies for sustaining health system capabilities and infrastructure in failed states and in war zones. (Rec. B.10) | No recommendation. | No recommendation. | WHO must take local circumstances into account when staffing its country offices. WHO representatives must have the full support of regional directors and the WHO DG if challenged by national governments. (Rec. 13) |
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| No recommendation. | No recommendation. | WHO member states should re-negotiate the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework to include other novel pathogens and make it legally binding. (Rec. 15) | No recommendation. |
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| The WHA should agree on new mechanisms for holding national governments publicly accountable for their performance under the IHR, including protocols to prevent delays in reporting and protocols for avoiding unnecessary restrictions on travel and trade. (Rec. C.8) | WHO should publicly commend countries that rapidly share information and publish lists of countries that delay reporting. Funders should create incentives for early reporting by disbursing emergency assistance rapidly. WHO must confront governments that implement travel and trade restrictions without justification. (Rec. 2) | The IHR Review Committee should develop mechanisms to rapidly address unilateral action by member states in contravention of temporary recommendations issued by WHO as part of a PHEIC announcement. (Rec. 23) | The IHR Review Committee should consider financial incentives for early reporting, including insurance to mitigate adverse economic effects. The Committee also should consider financial disincentives to discourage countries from restricting trade and travel beyond measures recommended by WHO. (Rec. 3 & 4) |
Recommendations of the WHO Advisory Group.
| RECOMMENDATIONS | Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies |
|---|---|
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| WHO should establish a centrally-managed global Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies to integrate the functions of units at all three organizational levels (country, regional, and headquarters) that work on risk analysis and assessment and on preparedness and response. The Programme should have one budget and a single workforce reporting to the WHO DG. (Rec. 2) |
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| The Programme should be headed by an Executive Director reporting to the WHO DG, who will remain ultimately accountable for incident management. When WHO declares a global health emergency, the Executive Director should appoint an Incident Manager to coordinate WHO’s response. Incident Managers, heads of Country Offices, and Regional Directors should establish good working relationships and be held accountable. To maintain flexibility, lines of authority for incident management should shift from their default positions, depending on the severity of the outbreak or emergency. (Rec. 3) |
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| As a standard component of its operational planning, WHO should undertake a stakeholder analysis at the national level to identify potential health partners. This analysis should look beyond traditional government ministry partners to include private sector actors, civil society organizations, and faith-based groups. WHO should review the appropriate partners for co-leadership of Health Clusters at the national level and work with partners to build a dedicated capacity for coordination, planning, information management, and communications. WHO should integrate the capacities of its Health Cluster partners in its emergency preparedness and planning. (Rec. 4) |
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| WHO must urgently develop new business processes governing procurement and logistics, as well as the rapid deployment of human and financial resources, during outbreaks and emergencies. These processes should be tailored to support the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies and should not be the same as those used for WHO’s ordinary business operations. Benchmarks should be established to assess whether these new processes are timely and effectively implemented. (Rec. 5) |
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| WHO should make a clear distinction between the resources necessary to support the baseline capacity of the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies and funding needed to support specific emergency operations. Predictable and reliable financing streams, including assessed contributions from member states, should fund the baseline capacity of the Programme. Member states must be willing to provide the resources for the Programme to meet expectations. (Rec. 6(a), (b)) |
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| For programmatic funding to support emergency operations, WHO should maximize its use of existing funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund managed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator on behalf of the UN SG, and actively seek the full capitalization (US $100 million) of the new Contingency Fund for Rapid Response. (Rec. 6(c)) |
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| WHO should exercise transparency in resource management by showing how existing resources can be used more efficiently, by clearly articulating the linkages between resources and specific outcomes, by identifying benchmarks to assess progress on deliverable outcomes, and by rigorously tracking its expenditures. WHO should communicate a broader vision of its role that explains how investing in the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies will be cost-effective. WHO also should more narrowly tailor its political engagement, soliciting input from donors and stakeholders. (Rec. 7) |
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| The WHO DG should establish an external, independent oversight body to monitor the performance of the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies using benchmarks established for this purpose. Members of the oversight body should have technical expertise in areas relevant to the operation of the Programme. The membership should be multi-sectoral and may be drawn from member states, donors, NGOs, civil society, the private sector, and the UN system. (Rec. 8) |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—Ongoing UN Reform.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| The UN and WHO should establish clear mechanisms for coordination and escalation in health crises, including those that become part of broader humanitarian crises that require the mobilization of the entire UN system. (Rec. C.4) | The UN SC should establish a Global Health Committee to elevate the level of attention paid to public health issues and to mobilize political leadership. (Rec. 8) | In the event of a Grade 2 or Grade 3 outbreak not already classified as a humanitarian emergency, a clear line of command should be activated throughout the UN system. (Rec. 8) The SG should integrate the UN’s health and humanitarian crisis trigger systems. (Rec. 9) | WHO should coordinate its emergency grades and its criteria for declaring a PHEIC with the emergency levels applied in the broader humanitarian system to facilitate better inter-agency cooperation. (Rec. 18) |
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| No recommendation. | An independent UN Accountability Commission, reporting to WHA and the UN SC, should be established to perform system-wide assessments of worldwide responses to disease outbreaks. (Rec. 5) | The UN GA should create a High-Level Council on Global Public Health Crises to track the implementation of reforms and to monitor political and other non-health issues that may affect prevention and preparedness. (Rec. 26) | The UN should put global health issues at the top of its security agenda and refer significant threats to the SC. (Rec. 6) When a crisis escalates, the UN SG should consider the appointment of Special Representative or Special Envoy. (Rec. 21) |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Research and Development—R&D Acceleration.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| WHO should establish an independent Pandemic Product Development Committee (PPDC), accountable to the Technical Governing Board, to spearhead its efforts to galvanize and prioritize R&D. (Rec. D.1) | No recommendation. | WHO should coordinate the prioritization of R&D efforts to combat neglected diseases that pose the greatest risk of turning into global health crises. (Rec. 13) | WHO should play a central convening role in R&D efforts during future emergencies, including efforts to accelerate the development of appropriate diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and information technology. (Rec. 16) |
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| By the end of 2016, the PPDC should convene national regulators, industry stakeholders, and research organizations to accelerate R&D by promoting regulatory convergence; the pre-approval of clinical trial designs; mechanisms to manage intellectual property, data sharing, and product liability; and efforts to expedite vaccine manufacture, stockpiling, and distribution. (Rec. D.3) | Governments, researchers, private industry, and non-governmental organizations must develop a framework of norms and rules operating during and between outbreaks to enable and accelerate research, govern the conduct of research, and ensure access to the benefits of research. (Rec. 6) | No recommendation. | No recommendation. |
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| No recommendation. | No recommendation. | WHO should lead efforts to assist developing countries in building research and manufacturing capacities for vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics, including through South-South cooperation. (Rec. 16) | No recommendation. |
Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Research and Development—Financing.
| CGHRF | Harvard/LSHTM | UN Panel | WHO Interim Assessment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| The PPDC should work with global R&D stakeholders to catalyze the commitment of US$1 billion per annum to fund a portfolio of projects to develop drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, protective equipment, and medical devices to combat communicable diseases. (Rec. D.2) | The UN SG and WHO DG should convene a summit of public, private, and non-profit research funders to establish a global financing facility for the development of outbreak-relevant drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, and supplies for which commercial incentives are insufficient. (Rec. 7) | WHO should oversee an international fund of at least US$1 billion per annum to support R&D of vaccines, therapeutics, and rapid diagnostics for communicable diseases neglected by the commercial market. (Rec. 22) | No recommendation. |
Fig 2Accountability frameworks proposed by the four commissions during inter-emergencies period.
(A) Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, (B) Harvard-London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, (C) United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, (D) World Health Organization Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. * denotes individual/body with responsibility for declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). CEPR = Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, DG = Director-General, ED = Executive Director, PPDC = Pandemic Product Development Committee, SG = Secretary-General, UN = United Nations, WHA = World Health Assembly, WHO = World Health Organization.
Fig 3Changes to the accountability frameworks during a PHEIC that has turned into a humanitarian crisis.
(A) Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, (B) Harvard-London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, (C) United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, (D) World Health Organization Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. CEPR = Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, DG = Director-General, ED = Executive Director, ERC = Emergency Response Coordinator, OCHA = Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, SG = Secretary-General, UN = United Nations, WHO = World Health Organization.