| Literature DB >> 26252767 |
Ken Hashimoto1, Concepción Zúniga2, Eduardo Romero3, Zoraida Morales4, James H Maguire5.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Central American countries face a major challenge in the control of Triatoma dimidiata, a widespread vector of Chagas disease that cannot be eliminated. The key to maintaining the risk of transmission of Trypanosoma cruzi at lowest levels is to sustain surveillance throughout endemic areas. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras integrated community-based vector surveillance into local health systems. Community participation was effective in detection of the vector, but some health services had difficulty sustaining their response to reports of vectors from the population. To date, no research has investigated how best to maintain and reinforce health service responsiveness, especially in resource-limited settings. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPALEntities:
Mesh:
Year: 2015 PMID: 26252767 PMCID: PMC4529194 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pntd.0003974
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS Negl Trop Dis ISSN: 1935-2727
Fig 1Location of the 12 study areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
Demography, geography, and human resources in the 12 study areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
| Guatemala | El Salvador | Honduras | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Santa Rosa | El Progreso | Jutiapa | Jalapa | Santa Ana | Ahuachapán | Usulután | Sonsonate | Ocotepeque | Copán | Intibucá | Lempira |
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| Nueva Santa Rosa | Morazán | Comapa | San Pedro Pinula | Masahuat | Atiquizaya | Ozatlán | Acajutla | Nueva Ocotepeque | Copán Ruinas | Dolores | Santa Cruz |
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| Ojo de Agua | Morazán | Comapa | San Pedro Pinula | Masahuat | Atiquizaya | Ozatlán | Metalio | San José de la Reunión | Rincón del Buey | Dolores | Santa Cruz |
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| 2,384 | 12,228 | 28,991 | 43,092 | 5,499 | 33,579 | 12,733 | 13,326 | 1,160 | 5,053 | 5,600 | 6,857 |
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| 749 | 3,018 | 4,934 | 9,132 | 1,480 | 8,699 | 3,999 | 4,338 | 140 | 865 | 1,100 | 1,245 |
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| total | 1 | 80 | 62 | 21 | 23 | 106 | 41 | 36 | 6 | 13 | 19 | 33 |
| with history of | 1 | 35 | 62 | 21 | 20 | 75 | 17 | 36 | 6 | 11 | 19 | 12 |
| with history of | 0 | 0 | 4 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| with vehicle access | 1 | 75 | 58 | 21 | 23 | 106 | 41 | 36 | 6 | 10 | 19 | 27 |
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| Area of jurisdiction (km2) | 6 | 31 | 132 | 85 | 71 | 40 | 50 | 66 | 14 | 34 | 82 | 150 |
| Distance from health center to departmental capital (km) | 22 | 31 | 40 | 20 | 42 | 12 | 12 | 20 | 17 | 123 | 50 | 65 |
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| Physicians | 1 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Nurses | 0 | 12 | 3 | 29 | 6 | 19 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Laboratory technicians | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vector control technicians | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other operational technicians | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 30 | 11 | 19 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Vector control & operational technicians (total) | 1 | 2 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 31 | 12 | 21 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 |
| Community health volunteers | 5 | 4 | 25 | 28 | 20 | 186 | 64 | 36 | 30 | 26 | 48 | 43 |
| Community sprayers | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 10 | 12 | 2 | 22 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 20 |
a Technicians assigned to another local health center covered the health centers in the study areas by regular visits.
b Technicians assigned to the departmental office covered the health centers in the study areas by regular visits.
c Technicians not directly assigned to the health centers (a and b) were counted as 0.5 persons.
Fig 2Actors involved in Chagas disease vector surveillance in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
Fig 3Five essential functions of Chagas disease community-based surveillance [9].
Results of community-based vector surveillance by country in the 12 study areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras from 2008 to 2012.
| Surveillance indicators | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Guatemala | 159 | 323 | 138 | 82 | 374 | 1,076 |
| El Salvador | 106 | 121 | 173 | 229 | 199 | 828 | |
| Honduras | 102 | 459 | 67 | 61 | 37 | 726 | |
| TOTAL | 367 | 903 | 378 | 372 | 610 | 2,630 | |
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| Guatemala | 79.2 | 78.9 | 55.1 | 74.4 | 75.9 | 74.5 |
| El Salvador | 92.5 | 87.6 | 80.3 | 97.4 | 86.4 | 89.1 | |
| Honduras | 26.5 | 77.1 | 68.7 | 83.6 | 62.2 | 69.0 | |
| MEAN | 68.4 | 79.2 | 69.0 | 90.1 | 78.5 | 77.6 | |
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| Guatemala | 18.3 | 22.0 | 76.3 | 52.5 | 35.2 | 33.5 |
| El Salvador | 87.8 | 99.1 | 96.4 | 97.3 | 95.8 | 95.8 | |
| Honduras | 100 | 96.3 | 47.8 | 52.9 | 17.4 | 84.0 | |
| MEAN | 54.2 | 70.2 | 82.0 | 82.4 | 56.2 | 68.4 |
See S1 Table for data by study area.
*(number of households sprayed / number of households responded) x 100
N = number of data sets; N was less than the maximum possible (60 = 12 study areas x 5 years) because of missing reports of bug notification in Ojo de Agua in Guatemala from 2008 to 2010 and in Rincón del Buey in Honduras in 2008.
Potential determinants of health services’ response rates for community-based vector surveillance in the 12 study areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras from 2008 to 2012.
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| 57 | 46.1 | 68.7 | 0 | 356 |
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| 60 | 37.8 | 14.0 | 12 | 123 |
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| 60 | 2.2 | 4.2 | 0.2 | 6.8 |
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| 60 | 40.5 | 14.2 | 0.6 | 257 |
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| 60 | 37 | 23 | ||
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| 60 | 9 | 51 | ||
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| 57 | 37 | 20 | ||
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| 57 | 29 | 16 | 12 |
a Remained constant throughout the five year period of 2008–2012.
Results of linear regression and mixed-effects multi-linear regression on potential determinants of health service responsiveness in community-based vector surveillance in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (N = 56).
| Linear Regression | Mixed Effects Multi-linear Regression Clustered by Health Center | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Potential determinants of institutional response coverage | Coefficient | Std. Error | t |
| 95% Confident Interval | Coefficient | Std. Error | t |
| 95% Confident Interval | ||
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| -0.0008 | 0.0004 | -1.72 | 0.092 | -0.0017 | 0.0001 | 0.0000 | 0.0005 | 0.04 | 0.972 | -0.0009 | 0.0010 |
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| -0.0022 | 0.0017 | -1.30 | 0.201 | -0.0056 | 0.0012 | -0.0018 | 0.0020 | -0.90 | 0.369 | -0.0058 | 0.0021 |
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| 0.0002 | 0.0169 | 0.01 | 0.990 | -0.0338 | 0.0342 | 0.0008 | 0.0282 | 0.03 | 0.977 | -0.0544 | 0.0560 |
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| -0.0003 | 0.0005 | -0.70 | 0.484 | -0.0012 | 0.0006 | -0.0002 | 0.0008 | -0.23 | 0.822 | -0.0017 | 0.0014 |
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| -0.0462 | 0.0531 | -0.87 | 0.389 | -0.1531 | 0.0606 | -0.0322 | 0.0573 | -0.56 | 0.574 | -0.1445 | 0.0801 |
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| -0.1178 | 0.1015 | -1.16 | 0.252 | -0.3220 | 0.0865 | -0.0958 | 0.1299 | -0.74 | 0.461 | -0.3503 | 0.1587 |
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| 0.1349 | 3.56 |
| 0.2088 | 0.7513 |
| 0.1141 | 4.83 |
| 0.3277 | 0.7750 |
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| 0.0579 | -2.21 |
| -0.2447 | -0.0117 |
| 0.0579 | -2.31 |
| -0.2468 | -0.0200 |
Summary of interviews with health center staff to explain different patterns of response rates in community-based vector surveillance between 2008 and 2012.
| 1. Mostly 100% | 2. Almost 100% to drop | 3. Fluctuate 50%-100% | 4. Fluctuate 0–100% |
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| A team of vector control technicians responded immediately from the departmental capital travelling on motorbike. | The departmental vector control coordinator regularly monitored surveillance by the health center, but he retired in 2011. | A municipal vector control technician visited endemic villages on foot bimonthly to collect bugs and respond, but was frequently overwhelmed by the volume of bug reports | Response of the vector control team travelling from the departmental office was limited at times by availability of vehicle and fuel. |
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| Departmental technicians trained and supervised sprayers recruited temporarily by the local municipality on a yearly basis. | A departmental technician, who monitored surveillance by the health center, left the position following a health system reform in 2010. | Operational technicians of the health center sprayed infested houses or trained community personnel to spray during monthly multipurpose visits, but were frequently overwhelmed by the volume of bug reports. | The departmental vector control team registered and responded to bug reports every few months, but after training a technician of the health center to consolidate bug report data, the response rate improved. |
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| A trained nursing assistant registered bug reports and organized the response with community health volunteers and an operational technician, who visited monthly. | The head of health center, along with a departmental technician and trained community sprayers, organized responses only every one to two years because of lack of local operational staff. | Response rate dropped when an unmotivated technician was assigned for a year. For the remaining time, an operational technician investigated infested houses and organized community-wide spraying approximately every two years. |
* Ojo de Agua in Guatemala was not included in the analysis due to lack of data on response rate from 2008–2010.
Participants and their roles in the community-based vector surveillance of Chagas disease in the 12 study areas in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
| Guatemala | El Salvador | Honduras | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| Santa Rosa | El Progreso | Jutiapa | Jalapa | Santa Ana | Ahuachapán | Usulután | Sonsonate | Ocotepeque | Copán | Intibucá | Lempira | |
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| Nueva Santa Rosa | Morazán | Comapa | San Pedro Pinula | Masahuat | Atiquizaya | Ozatlán | Acajutla | Nueva Ocotepeque | Copán Ruinas | Dolores | Santa Cruz | |
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| Ojo de Agua | Morazán | Comapa | San Pedro Pinula | Masahuat | Atiquizaya | Ozatlán | Metalio | San José de la Reunión | Rincón del Buey | Dolores | Santa Cruz | |
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| Clinical | NRS | NRS | PHS, NRS | PHS, NRS | NRS | PHS, NRS | PHS, NRS | PHS, NRS | ||||
| Operational | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | |||
| Community | CHV | CHV | CHV | CHV | CHV | ||||||||
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| Clinical | ||||||||||||
| Operational | |||||||||||||
| Community | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | |
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| Clinical | ||||||||||||
| Operational | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | OPT | ||||||||
| Community | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | CHV, POP | |
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| Clinical | NRS | LAB | NRS | NRS | PHY | PHY | ||||||
| Operational | OPT | OPT(D) | OPT | OPT(D) | OPT | OPT | OPT, OPT(D) | OPT, OPT(D) | OPT(D) | OPT | OPT(D) | ||
| Community | |||||||||||||
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| Clinical | ||||||||||||
| Operational | OPT | OPT(D) | OPT | OPT(D) | OPT | OPT | OPT(D) | OPT, OPT(D) | OPT | OPT | OPT(D) | ||
| Community | POP | POP | POP | POP | POP | CHV | CHV | CHV | CHV | ||||
PHS = Physician, NRS = Nurse, LBT = Laboratory technicians, OPT = Operational technician of health center, OPT(D) = Operational technician of departmental health office, CHV = Community Health Volunteer, POP = Population
Fig 4Number of clinical, operational, and community personnel in the community-based vector surveillance model with five essential functions in Table 6.