Palliative sedation, foregoing life-sustaining treatment, and aid-in-dying: what is the difference?

After a review of terminology, I identify-in addition to Margaret Battin's list of five primary arguments for and against aid-in-dying-the argument from functional equivalence as another primary argument. I introduce a novel way to approach this argument based on Bernard Lonergan's generalized empirical method (GEM). Then I proceed on the basis of GEM to distinguish palliative sedation, palliative sedation to unconsciousness when prognosis is less than two weeks, and foregoing life-sustaining treatment from aid-in-dying. I conclude (1) that aid-in-dying must be justified on its own merits and not on the basis of these well-established palliative care practices; and (2) that societies must decide, in weighing the merits of aid-in-dying, whether or not to make the judgment that no life is better than life-like-this (however this is specified) part of their operative value structure.