| Literature DB >> 25945172 |
Valerie J M Watzlaf1, Sohrab Moeini1, Patti Firouzan1.
Abstract
Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems such as Adobe ConnectNow, Skype, ooVoo, etc. may include the use of software applications for telerehabilitation (TR) therapy that can provide voice and video teleconferencing between patients and therapists. Privacy and security applications as well as HIPAA compliance within these protocols have been questioned by information technologists, providers of care and other health care entities. This paper develops a privacy and security checklist that can be used within a VoIP system to determine if it meets privacy and security procedures and whether it is HIPAA compliant. Based on this analysis, specific HIPAA criteria that therapists and health care facilities should follow are outlined and discussed, and therapists must weigh the risks and benefits when deciding to use VoIP software for TR.Entities:
Keywords: HIPAA; Risk analysis; Voice over the Internet Protocol (VOIP); privacy; security; telerehabilitation
Year: 2010 PMID: 25945172 PMCID: PMC4296791 DOI: 10.5195/ijt.2010.6056
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Telerehabil ISSN: 1945-2020
HIPAA Compliance Checklist for VoIP (Videoconferencing) between Patients and Therapists
| Yes | No | Not included in policy | |
|---|---|---|---|
| • Will video-therapy content of sessions between the therapist and patient be accessible to individuals within (employees) and outside of the software organization (other users/consumers)? | |||
| • Will video-therapy content be shared further to protect the company’s legal requirements, interests, enforce policies or to protect anyone’s rights, property or safety? | |||
| • Will video-therapy content be shared with distributors of the software or with analytical services or banking organizations etc.? | |||
| • Will the VoIP software company provide the user 30–60 days to comply with a new privacy policy, if it has changed? | |||
| • Will the user be able to amend personal information within a reasonable period of time and upon verification of their identity? | |||
| • Can a user’s contact see that they are online and choose to send them an email during a video conferencing session? | |||
| • Are video conferencing sessions for TR therapy services recorded? | |||
| • Will video conferencing TR therapy sessions be retained and for how long? | |||
| • How long will other personal information be retained and what will this include? | |||
| • If a patient requests that past information be deleted, does the privacy policy state how this will occur? | |||
| • Is the level of access (management) of the TR videoconferencing recording up to the user? | |||
| • Does the user get the option of archiving their records offline on storage network devices? | |||
| • If a third party service provider is used to convert and analyze the voicemail, is the background and training of the third party provided? | |||
| • Does the background include training related to privacy and confidentiality issues related to HIPAA and other privacy statutes? | |||
| • Is information on the educational backgrounds and experience of employees working at the VoIP software company who will decipher these requests provided? | |||
| • Is information on the educational backgrounds and experience of employees working at the VoIP software company who will decipher these requests provided? | |||
| • Will a qualified individual who is a Registered Health Information Administrator (RHIA) with privacy, confidentiality, and HIPAA compliance experience analyze these requests? | |||
| • Will a complete and accurate consent to patient disclosure be made? | |||
| • Will appropriate processing of the personal data that is necessary to meet a valid request be made? | |||
| • Will a subpoena or court order be requested from law enforcement and government officials requesting personal information? | |||
| • Will an accounting of disclosures be made and provided to the user? | |||
| • Are patients able to request a restriction of uses and disclosures? | |||
| • Will the use of any VoIP products automatically consent to the transfer of personal information outside of your country? | |||
| • Since privacy and confidentiality regulations change across different countries, how will different countries maintain personal health related data and video? | |||
| • Will other countries who may not abide by the HIPAA requirements, have the opportunity to release personal information more easily and without regard for legal requirements? | |||
| • Should personal information that is acquired during video conferencing be transferred to a third party that the software company may buy or sell as part of its business agreements? | |||
| • Should the patient have the right to consent to this transfer of personal information? | |||
| • If the patient consents, with how many different countries will their personal information be shared, when participating in TR video conferencing therapy? | |||
| • Does the VoIP software company accept responsibility or liability for these other websites? | |||
| • Is the VoIP considered a business associate with the tele-therapy site being the covered entity? | |||
| • Will the covered entity need to have business associate agreements with each of the other websites in which personal information may travel? | |||
| • Will the other websites need to comply with privacy and security (HIPAA) requirements on their own? | |||
| • How will the VoIP software company handle privacy and security protections under the HITECH amendment of HIPAA rules? | |||
| • Does the encryption protect video TR therapy sessions from potential eavesdropping by third parties during transmission? | |||
| • Does the encryption implementation contain specific information to explain what it entails? | |||
| • Can third parties be able to decode a recorded VoIP video and voice conversation by accessing encryption keys? | |||
| • How secure are videoconferencing TR sessions and how much personal health information may be transmitted to other authorities? | |||
| • Are patients informed of the security issues and is this included in their informed consent? | |||
| • Is the user | |||
| • If the public profile information be seen by other users can the user determine which information can be seen by whom? | |||
| • Is the public profile separated into the following three categories?
Information that Information for Information for | |||
| • Is the user’s email address encrypted so | |||
| • Are there instructions on how users can update and change the profile information? | |||
| • Are contacts easily removed by the user? | |||
| • Can the user remove or revoke authorization by blocking the user on each computer that is used? | |||
| • Does the VoIP software system provide instructions on how to block a user? | |||
| • Do the logs also provide an audit trail to track who had access to TR videoconferencing sessions and which functions were enabled or disabled for the session? | |||
| • Does the security evaluation include authentication, password management, data management etc. and verifies that the software system implements proper security measures? |
As per Skype Privacy Policy, http://wwwsnype.com retrieved August 15, 2010
| Retention of personal data and information as well as eavesdropping on conversations. | High (increases in VoIP because of the many nodes in a packet network) | Change default passwords; disable remote access to graphical user interface; use authentication mechanisms. | |
| System vulnerabilities: viruses, worms, Trojans | High | Implement VLAN with stand alone workstation, separate from user workstation. Separate “softphone” applications from regular software applications. | |
| IP (Internet Protocol) Packet Transmission | High | Outside of the network environment, proper encryption protocols such as IPsec should be incorporated when transmitting data. IPSec uses proper authentication and encryption protocols when communicating and transmitting data. | |
| Wiretap vulnerability/intercept voice traffic | High (attaching a packet capture tool to the VOIP network segment increases changes to intercept voice traffic) | Establish a good physical security policy; develop an alarm system to notify administrator when an IP phone is disconnected; use authentication mechanisms. Preferably use a wired network over WiFi alternatives. | |
| Web server interfaces used to gain confidential information | High | Use the more secure web server if it is necessary to use it for remote administration. | |
| IP address extension leads to other attacks of confidential information | High | Disable the IP phone; it is very simple to turn it back on once an attack is prevented. | |
| Legitimate user may perform incorrect or unauthorized function which may be due to a level of access given to the user that is higher than needed. | High | Provide the user with a level of access that is appropriate to their need. (For example, do not provide users to gain access to personal health information if it is not necessary for their level of work.) | |
| Intruder acting like a legitimate user | High | Use IP phone instruments that can download signed binary files by users. | |
| Insecure state of the switch (switch is a small hardware device that joins multiple computers together within one local area network) | High | Firewalls, change default passwords, disable graphical user interface. Disable port mirroring and port forwarding and implement VoIP aware firewalls. | |
| Flooding the link with bogus messages causing severe deterioration or denial of service or functionality | High (VOIP may have additional vulnerabilities with Internet connection) | Deploy a firewall that eliminates connections from unnecessary or unknown networks; change default passwords and disable graphical interface; check software updates; limit login attempts until account becomes locked out. |