Hai-Feng Zhang1, Jia-Rong Xie2, Ming Tang3, Ying-Cheng Lai4. 1. School of Mathematical Science, Anhui University, Hefei 230039, China. 2. Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China. 3. Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. 4. School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA.
Abstract
The interplay between individual behaviors and epidemic dynamics in complex networks is a topic of recent interest. In particular, individuals can obtain different types of information about the disease and respond by altering their behaviors, and this can affect the spreading dynamics, possibly in a significant way. We propose a model where individuals' behavioral response is based on a generic type of local information, i.e., the number of neighbors that has been infected with the disease. Mathematically, the response can be characterized by a reduction in the transmission rate by a factor that depends on the number of infected neighbors. Utilizing the standard susceptible-infected-susceptible and susceptible-infected-recovery dynamical models for epidemic spreading, we derive a theoretical formula for the epidemic threshold and provide numerical verification. Our analysis lays on a solid quantitative footing the intuition that individual behavioral response can in general suppress epidemic spreading. Furthermore, we find that the hub nodes play the role of "double-edged sword" in that they can either suppress or promote outbreak, depending on their responses to the epidemic, providing additional support for the idea that these nodes are key to controlling epidemic spreading in complex networks.
The interplay between individual behaviors and epidemic dynamics in complex networks is a topic of recent interest. In particular, individuals can obtain different types of information about the disease and respond by altering their behaviors, and this can affect the spreading dynamics, possibly in a significant way. We propose a model where individuals' behavioral response is based on a generic type of local information, i.e., the number of neighbors that has been infected with the disease. Mathematically, the response can be characterized by a reduction in the transmission rate by a factor that depends on the number of infected neighbors. Utilizing the standard susceptible-infected-susceptible and susceptible-infected-recovery dynamical models for epidemic spreading, we derive a theoretical formula for the epidemic threshold and provide numerical verification. Our analysis lays on a solid quantitative footing the intuition that individual behavioral response can in general suppress epidemic spreading. Furthermore, we find that the hub nodes play the role of "double-edged sword" in that they can either suppress or promote outbreak, depending on their responses to the epidemic, providing additional support for the idea that these nodes are key to controlling epidemic spreading in complex networks.
Outbreaks of epidemics can trigger spontaneous behavioral
responses of individuals to take preventive measures, which in turn can alter the epidemic
dynamics and affect the disease transmission process. To study the interplay between
behavioral response and epidemic spreading has attracted recent attention. In spite of the
efforts, a quantitative picture taking into consideration physical reality of the epidemic
dynamical process is needed. Here, we propose a model in which individuals' behavioral
responses are based on a generic type of local information, i.e., the number of neighbors that
have been infected with the disease. This should be contrasted with existing works in which
the responses are based on the density of infection among the local neighborhood or on global
information. Utilizing the standard SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) and SIR
(susceptible-infected-refractory) dynamical processes for modeling epidemic spreading, we
derive theoretical formulas for the epidemic thresholds and provide numerical verification.
Our main finding is that individual behavioral response can in general augment significantly
the epidemic threshold, thereby suppressing the prevalence of epidemic effectively, regardless
of type of the dynamics. Especially, the hub nodes in the network can adaptively and actively
generate cautious responses to protect themselves and hence many other nodes in the network.
The hub nodes thus play the role of “double-edged sword” in epidemic dynamics as they can
either suppress or promote outbreak. Our work reinforces the idea that hub nodes are key to
controlling epidemic dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
Epidemic spreading in complex networks often occurs in an extremely interactive manner.
Consider, for example, the spread of a virus. When individuals become aware of the potential
disease, they would take preventive measures (e.g., using better hygiene, wearing protective
masks, or avoiding congested public places) to protect themselves and those around them. In
this sense, individuals in the network cannot be treated as “passive” nodes awaiting to be
infected but they can in fact be quite “reactive” to the spreading dynamics. Such human
behavioral responses can have significant effects on the epidemic dynamics, a topic of great recent
interest.The individual reactions to an epidemic often rely on detailed information about the
disease. Broadly, there are two types of information: local or global. For example, news obtained from the social neighborhood of
an individual is local, but information from the mass media or from the public health
authorities can be regarded as global. The influences of local or global information based behavioral responses, or
awareness, on the epidemic dynamics can in general be quite different, and there is also
recent work on the effects of combined local and global information based awareness. Quantitatively, the impact
of different types of information-based awareness can be characterized by how they modify
the epidemic threshold and the final epidemic size (or epidemic prevalence). For example,
Bagnoli et al. assumed
that individuals' risk perception of epidemic is an exponential function of local and global
information, and they showed that a nonlinear increase in the perception risk can lead to
extinction of the disease. Funk et al. studied the impacts of awareness spread on both epidemic threshold
and prevalence and found that, in a well-mixed population, spread of awareness can reduce
the outbreak size but does not tend to affect the epidemic threshold. This result, however,
does not appear to hold for social networks for which the mixed-population assumption is not
valid. In particular, Wu et al. compared the roles of the three forms of information-based
awareness, i.e., local, global, and contact awareness, in the epidemic threshold, and
concluded that global awareness cannot alter the epidemic threshold, while both local and
contact awareness can. Sahneh et al. proved that local information-based response can enhance the
epidemic threshold and reduce the prevalence, given that the probability of susceptible
individuals to alter their state is proportional to the number of the infected
neighbors.Our work is motivated by the following two considerations. First, a general result from
previous works is that the local information-based responses can enhance the epidemic
threshold and reduce its prevalence, but global information-based awareness, although being
capable of altering the epidemic size, has little effect on the threshold. In these works on the interplay
between epidemic spreading in complex networks and human behavioral responses, a tacit
hypothesis is that
local information-based behavioral response is a function of the density of infection among
the local neighborhood, denoted as s/k, where
s is the number of infected neighbors among a total of k
neighbors. However, simple situations can be conceived where this assumption does not hold.
For example, consider two nodes in a complex network, i and
j, which have 10 and 100 neighbors, respectively. Assume that in their
respective neighborhoods, there are 5 and 50 infected nodes. The hypothesis would then
assign the two nodes with the same value of s/k, or
identical risk perception. However, common sense stipulates that node j,
because of the much larger number of infected neighbors, should have stronger awareness
about the epidemic than node i. A real-world example is some popular
websites or important network routers that have a large probability of being attacked by
virus. As a result, for various reasons they tend to be much better protected.The second motivation of our work is that most recent works addressing the roles of
individual behavioral response tend to focus on one type of epidemic process, e.g., either
SIS or SIR dynamics. A key difference between SIS and SIR dynamics is that the former is
reversible while the latter is irreversible. Another difference is that, for SIS dynamics, the system can
only reach a dynamically steady state since the propagation process always
occurs once the transmission rate exceeds the epidemic threshold. However, for the SIR
process, propagation will terminate once there are no longer infected nodes in the network.
These differences can lead to different interplay between the epidemic dynamics and
behavioral response, demanding a systematic comparison study.In this paper, we introduce a realistic local information-based behavioral response
mechanism into both SIS and SIR dynamics. In particular, we assume that individuals generate
behavioral responses by reducing their contact rates, depending on the actual number
of infected neighbors (not the density of such neighbors), and study how the
epidemic thresholds and prevalence for both types of epidemic dynamics are altered. We find
that the mechanism generates similar effects on the SIS and SIR epidemic thresholds but lead
to different epidemic sizes for the two types of dynamics. An important consequence of our
realistic behavioral response mechanism is that, for both SIS and SIR dynamics, the
infection densities can be maximized for some intermediate values of the node degree. This
implies that both small- and large-degree nodes are relatively more resilient to infection,
in sharp contrast to the monotonic increase of the infection density with the node degree as
in situations where no behavioral response is taken into account.In Sec. II, we describe our model of epidemic
spreading with local information based behavioral response. In Sec. III, we develop theoretical analyses with numerical support to understand
the effects of such response on the spreading dynamics in terms of the two fundamental
quantities: epidemic threshold and prevalence. Due to the intrinsic difference between SIS
and SIR processes, we shall treat them using different theoretical methods. In Sec. IV, we present conclusion and discussions.
MODELING BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
Epidemic spreading is a fundamental type of network dynamical process that has been studied
extensively due to the development of complex networks. In a network, a node represents an
individual and an edge between a pair of nodes specifies a contact through which the
epidemic can diffuse or propagate. In the absence of any behavioral response, for an unweighted
network the contact rate of every pair of nodes can be conveniently set to be unity. A
reasonable assumption is that an individual would become more cautious and therefore take
more effective preventive measure if many of the neighbors have been infected. The
behavioral response can then be modeled quantitatively by introducing the reduction factor
(1 – α) in the contact rate of a susceptible
node, where s is the number of infected neighbors and
0 ≤ α < 1 is a parameter characterizing the response strength of the
individuals to the epidemic. The larger the value of α, the more cautious
the individual becomes, resulting a more substantial reduction in the contact rate. In a
real situation, the value of α would vary across all the individuals in the
network. Here, for simplicity and for gaining insights into the epidemic dynamics subject to
behavioral response, we assume identical value of α for all nodes in the
network. For the trivial case of α = 1.0, the contact rate will
immediately become zero once a neighbor is infected, ruling out any
epidemic outbreak. Let λ be the original transmission rate along each edge.
The new transmission rate in our model is .Our goal is to investigate, quantitatively, the effect of reduced contact rates due to the
individual behavioral response on the epidemic dynamics in terms of the two basic
quantities: epidemic threshold and prevalence. In the following, we will treat the SIS and
SIR processes separately.
EFFECT OF BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE ON EPIDEMICS: THEORY AND NUMERICAL VALIDATION
SIS dynamics
We first consider the standard SIS epidemic model on a network with general degree
distribution P(k). At any time, each node in the network
can be in one of the two states: susceptible (S) or infected (I). The transmission
probability along each SI edge is .
With probability μ, an infected individual recovers and returns to the
susceptible state. For convenience, we
set μ = 1.0.We use the standard degree-based approximation (heterogeneous mean-field
approximation) to
analyze the epidemic dynamics, in which all nodes of the same degree are assumed to have
the same probability of infection at any given time. In particular, letting
Θ(t) be the probability that a randomly selected edge points to an
infected individual at time t, we have where
ρ(t) is the probability that a node with
degree k is infected and
is the excess degree distribution in the absence of degree-to-degree correlation. The probability that a node with degree
k has exactly s infected neighbors is then given
by
For a susceptible node with k
neighbors, among which s are infected, in a sufficiently small time
interval [t, t + Δt]
(Δt → 0) the probability of infection is The average probability that a susceptible node with
k neighbors is infected is According to Eq. (4), the discrete-time epidemic process can be described as In the limit Δt → 0, Eq. (5) can be written as a continuous-time equation
For α = 0, Eq. (6) reduces to the standard mean-field equation
for the SIS model.Imposing the steady-state condition
dρ(t)/dt = 0 on Eq. (6), we obtain Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (1), we obtain the
following self-consistent equation: A nonzero steady infection size is obtained when the
following inequality holds: which gives the epidemic threshold as where
is the epidemic threshold for the classical SIS model in heterogeneous networks and is the second moment of the
degree distribution.To validate our analysis, we consider networks generated from the standard configuration
model with degree distribution
P(k) ∼ k−3. The size of
all networks studied is N = 10 000, the minimal and maximal degrees are
k = 3 and ,
respectively. The results presented below are insensitive to network structural and/or
parameter changes.Figure 1 illustrates how the transmission rate
λ and the behavioral-response strength α affect the
epidemic prevalence and threshold. In particular, from Fig. 1(a), we see that the epidemic threshold increases with α but
the final epidemic size (prevalence) rapidly decreases to a low value. Figure 1(b) shows the numerically calculated contours of the
values of epidemic prevalence in the parameter plane (λ –
α), with the theoretically predicted curve (white line) for the
epidemic threshold (corresponding to zero prevalence). We observe a good agreement between
theory and numerics. For relatively large values of α, the lowest line in
Fig. 1(b) deviates somewhat from the theoretical
value with small oscillations. The reason lies in the difficulty to numerically
distinguish the two cases where the epidemic is suppressed or prevalent for the large
α regime.
FIG. 1.
Effect of behavioral response strength α on the epidemic threshold and
prevalence for SIS model: (a) final epidemic size ρ versus the
transmission rate λ for different values of α; (b)
contour of ρ in the (λ – α) parameter
plane, where the white line denotes the theoretically predicted curve associated with the
epidemic threshold [Eq. (10)], and the
light gray region divided by the dash pink line corresponds to the zero prevalence. The
number of the initial infected seeds is I0 = 5. Each point is
the statistical average of 20 random network configurations and 50 independent initial
conditions for each network realization.
To further reveal the impact of behavioral response on the epidemic process, we show in
Fig. 2 the dependence of the epidemic prevalence
ρ on α for different values of λ,
where we observe a rapid decrease (faster than linear) in ρ as
α is increased. This indicates that proper behavioral response can
greatly suppress epidemic outbreak. For example, for α ≈ 0.8, epidemic is
nearly eliminated.
FIG. 2.
For the same parameter setting as in Fig. 1,
simulation shows the dependence of the epidemic prevalence ρ on
α.
For the classical SIS dynamics on heterogeneous networks, it has been established that
the degree-specific infection density ρ increases with
k, implying that hub nodes should have a higher probability of being
infected. However, when
behavioral response is taken into account, the situation becomes somewhat complicated. For
example, a hub node would possibly have many infected neighbors, making it better informed
about the epidemic and consequently generating a stronger protective response. Figure
3 shows how ρ depends
on the degree for different values of α. For α = 0 (the
standard SIS model without any behavioral response), ρ
increases with degree k. However, for α > 0, e.g.,
α = 0.2 and α = 0.5, we obtain a non-monotonic
dependence: ρ first increases with k,
reaches a maximal value, and then begins to decrease with k and approach
zero for very large values of k. This case can be quantitatively
explained using Eq. (7) where, for a fix
value of Θ, the value of (1 – αΘ) converges
to zero in the numerator. As a result, we have ρ = 0 for
sufficiently large values of k. The increasing phase can be understood by
noting that nodes with small degree have lower probabilities to reduce their contact rate
because they are typically unaware of the disease as their neighbors are few and the
infected neighbors are even fewer. As k is increased from some low value,
the probability of infection is increased (as for the standard SIS dynamics without
behavioral response).
FIG. 3.
For SIS dynamics on scale-free networks, degree-dependent steady-state infection density
ρ for different values of α. The
original transmission rate is λ = 0.5 and other parameters are the same
as for Fig. 1.
We thus see that, in our model, the hub nodes are capable of inhibiting epidemic
spreading, providing an effective way to control the dynamics. This should be contrasted
to the traditional models that do not take into account individuals' behavioral responses
in which the role of the hub nodes is generally understood as enhancing epidemic
spreading.In general, there are two competing factors determining the epidemic size: probability of
infection and information from the neighbors. In the small-degree regime, the former has a
stronger effect, leading to an increase in the epidemic prevalence with the degree. In the
intermediate degree regime, the effects of the two factors are approximately balanced, so
the final epidemic size reaches a maximum. Finally, in the large degree regime, the effect
of awareness and hence behavioral response exceeds that of the infection, leading to a
significant reduction in the transmission rate and consequently a continuous decrease in
the epidemic prevalence with the degree. The same mechanism explains the rapid decrease in
the epidemic prevalence with α.
SIR dynamics
In SIR dynamics, infected nodes can enter a recovery state (R) to become immune to the
disease. The underlying epidemic process is then an irreversible process, as a result, we
should provide a modification in the way to characterize behavioral response for this
case. Specifically, we assume that susceptible nodes adjust the transmission rate based
not only on the number of infected nodes but also on the number of
recovered nodes. This is reasonable as any recovered neighbor of a node
has already gone through the infection stage and therefore is able to inform the node
about the disease. To analyze the resulting SIR dynamics, we find the generating function
method and cavity theory
suitable for calculating the critical epidemic threshold.We first define “externally infected neighbor” (EIN) for any node. For node i, if a neighbor is an EIN, it
is infected by its neighbors other than i. We then define
u to be the probability that i's neighbor
j is an EIN of i, i.e., the probability that node
j is infected even when i is removed from the network
(the basic assumption of the cavity theory in statistical physics). The probability that a node with degree
k has m EINs is then Let be the
conditional probability of infection if one node i has m
EINs. The EINs typically appear in a sequential order, so we need to calculate in a
time-ordered fashion. In particular, when the first EIN appears, the probability of node
i not being infected is 1 – T1, where
T1 ≡ λ(1 – α) is the
probability that i is infected after the first EIN appears in its
neighborhood. In general, the probability that node i has not been
infected after mth EINs appear in its neighborhood is 1 –
T, where
T = λ(1 –
α). We thus have In general, it is difficult to simplify the expression
of . However, if we
focus on the epidemic threshold, the probability T will be
small since the corresponding value of λ [or (1 – α)] is
small. In this case, Eq. (12) can be
approximated as For a randomly selected node i, the
probability of having m EINs is For a randomly selected neighbor j,
the probability that it has exactly m EINs (excluding i)
is where
is the excess degree distribution. The
generating function associated with the excess-degree distribution is Combining Eqs. (11), (15), and (16), we obtain the generating function for the
probability q(m) as From the definition of the probability
u, we have which is a self-consistent equation for
u. There is a trivial solution u = 0. In order to have
a non-trivial solution, the following condition must be met: which implies where is the epidemic
threshold of SIR dynamics on heterogeneous networks in the absence of any behavioral
response.Figure 4 shows the dependence of the SIR epidemic
prevalence [panel (a)] and threshold [panel (b)] on λ and
α. Fig. 4(a) indicates that the
epidemic prevalence R decreases with α but
the critical threshold increases
with α. Figure 4(b) presents the
theoretical prediction from Eq. (20) (white
line) in comparison with the simulation result for near-zero
R value. We observe a good agreement.
FIG. 4.
For SIR dynamics, effect of local behavioral response on epidemic prevalence and
threshold: (a) epidemic prevalence R as a function of
transmission rate λ for different values of α; (b)
contour of R with respect to λ and
α, where the white line is the prediction of Eq. (20). The gray region under the pink dash link
indicates the epidemic prevalence .
Since the number of the initial infected seeds is I0 = 5, we
have
for the steady state. Other parameters are the same as for Fig. 1.
Figure 5 shows the dependence of
R on λ for different values of
α. Comparing Fig. 2 with Fig.
5, we can see that, for SIR dynamics with local
behavioral response, the epidemic prevalence also rapidly decreases with
α, demonstrating that such a response can be effective to suppress
epidemic spreading, as for the case of SIS dynamics. Since, for an SIS process, the system
can sustain a dynamically steady state in which the infected individuals are more likely
to have their contact rates reduced after becoming susceptible again, one might intuitively expect the effect of behavioral
response to be somewhat different. In particular, the intrinsically irreversible SIR
dynamics can cause the system to quickly converge to a steady state. As a result, the hub
nodes are infected relatively soon and they have no chance to make any behavioral
responses, limiting their role in suppressing the spreading. However, we note that the
susceptible nodes can adjust their transmission rates based not only on the number of
infected nodes but also on the number of recovered nodes, so as to greatly enhance the
awareness of hub nodes and effectively reducing the probability of their being infected.
Support for this heuristic reasoning can be found in Fig. 6, where the final recovery density
as a function of degree k for the SIR model is shown. We see that, even
though the hub nodes cannot be completely protected from the epidemic,
reduces to a low level and decreases as α is increased. Consequently,
local behavioral response associated with SIR dynamics can also be effective in
suppressing epidemic spreading.
FIG. 5.
For SIR dynamics, simulation shows the epidemic prevalence R
versus α for different values of λ. Other parameters are
the same as for Fig. 1.
FIG. 6.
For SIR dynamics, final recovery density
versus degree k for different values of α, for
λ = 0.5. Other parameters are the same as for Fig. 1.
CONCLUSIONS
Recognizing that individuals in a social network have the natural tendency to respond to
potential disease spreading by taking preventive measures, we investigated to what extent
behavioral responses based on local information can affect typical epidemic
dynamics. Using two standard types of processes in epidemiology, SIS and SIR, as
prototypical dynamical model, we developed theoretical analysis to understand how the two
fundamental characterizing quantities, the epidemic threshold and prevalence, are shaped by
local-information based behavioral response. We found that such response can in general
augment significantly the epidemic threshold, regardless of SIS or SIR dynamics, and we
obtained an explicit expression for the augmentation factor. This means that individual
behavioral responses can make the whole network much more resilient to epidemic outbreak. In
the case where outbreak has occurred, the final epidemic size, or epidemic prevalence, can
be reduced.A unique feature of our work is the assumption that individual response is determined by
the local information, which in turn is proportional to the number of infected neighbors.
Our findings complement the previous results in the absence of any individual response that
epidemic can prevail in heterogeneous networks due to the existence of hub nodes.
Particularly, when individuals are able to receive information about the disease and are
capable of taking preventive measures, it is the hub nodes that can adaptively and actively
generate responses to protect themselves and hence many other nodes in the network. The hub
nodes thus play the role of “double-edged sword” in epidemic dynamics as they can either
suppress or promote outbreak, depending on how they respond to epidemic. Our work reinforces
the idea that hub nodes are key to controlling epidemic dynamics.We focused on an epidemic response model where the individuals respond to the epidemic
according to the number of infected neighbors. There are real world situations where this is
meaningful. For example, a node with potentially a large number of infected neighboring
nodes would have stronger awareness about the epidemic. Our model thus complements the
previous model in which the local information-based behavioral response is assumed to be a
function of the density of infected nodes in the local neighborhood.