Literature DB >> 25404868

Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations.

Chad Brubaker1, Suman Jana2, Baishakhi Ray3, Sarfraz Khurshid2, Vitaly Shmatikov2.   

Abstract

Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a certificate while another rejects the same certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version 1 certificate can act as a rogue certificate authority and issue fake certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, self-signed certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the certificate has expired-a low-risk, often ignored error-but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencerts is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

Entities:  

Year:  2014        PMID: 25404868      PMCID: PMC4232952     

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  IEEE Secur Priv        ISSN: 1540-7993            Impact factor:   3.573


  5 in total

1.  Metamorphic Testing for Cybersecurity.

Authors:  Tsong Yueh Chen; Fei-Ching Kuo; Wenjuan Ma; Willy Susilo; Dave Towey; Jeffrey Voas; Zhi Quan Zhou
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2.  Client-Focused Security Assessment of mHealth Apps and Recommended Practices to Prevent or Mitigate Transport Security Issues.

Authors:  Jannis Müthing; Thomas Jäschke; Christoph M Friedrich
Journal:  JMIR Mhealth Uhealth       Date:  2017-10-18       Impact factor: 4.773

3.  Coverage-guided differential testing of TLS implementations based on syntax mutation.

Authors:  Yan Pan; Wei Lin; Yubo He; Yuefei Zhu
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2022-01-24       Impact factor: 3.240

4.  Development and Usability Evaluation of a Telemedicine System for Management and Monitoring of Patients with Diabetic Foot.

Authors:  Kambiz Bahaadinbeigy; Abbas Sheikhtaheri; Farhad Fatehi; Khadijeh Moulaei
Journal:  Healthc Inform Res       Date:  2022-01-31

5.  Medication Event Monitoring System for Infectious Tuberculosis Treatment in Morocco: A Retrospective Cohort Study.

Authors:  Seup Park; Ilham Sentissi; Seung Jae Gil; Won-Seok Park; ByungKwon Oh; Ah Reum Son; Young Ju Kong; Sol Park; Eunseong Paek; Yong Joon Park; Seung Heon Lee
Journal:  Int J Environ Res Public Health       Date:  2019-01-31       Impact factor: 3.390

  5 in total

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