| Literature DB >> 25352182 |
Marie-Pierre Gagnon1, Marie Desmartis, Thomas Poder, William Witteman.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Health technology assessment (HTA) is increasingly performed at the local or hospital level where the costs, impacts, and benefits of health technologies can be directly assessed. Although local/hospital-based HTA has been implemented for more than two decades in some jurisdictions, little is known about its effects and impact on hospital budget, clinical practices, and patient outcomes. We conducted a mixed-methods systematic review that aimed to synthesize current evidence regarding the effects and impact of local/hospital-based HTA.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2014 PMID: 25352182 PMCID: PMC4218945 DOI: 10.1186/2046-4053-3-129
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Syst Rev ISSN: 2046-4053
Reported effects and impact—HTA committees
| Cram et al. 1997 USA
[ | Survey/33 clinical engineering departments throughout the USA | Not specified | |
| 23/27 committees doing HTA are multidisciplinary | • Several respondents used HTA to cut costs and provide more standardization. | ||
| • The HTA process was seen by some respondents as allowing broader input into decision-making processes. | |||
| • 20/25 (80%) who used an HTA system felt it was a useful tool. | |||
| • Main problems perceived in HTA processes: internal politics; lack of understanding that could lead committees to make poor decisions | |||
| Luce and Brown 1995 USA
[ | Interviews/48 participants from 30 organizations (hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and third-party payers) | Not specified | |
| For hospitals: multidisciplinary committees; formulary committees; department chiefs | • Hospital decision makers used HTA almost exclusively for making purchasing decisions and as a means of controlling expenditures. | ||
| • Decisions were based on financial assessment with little or no formal evaluation of changes in patient outcomes or medical practice patterns. | |||
| • Purchase or non-purchase recommendations were rarely contravened by management and were distributed to relevant departments throughout the organization. | |||
| • New technologies priced over a predetermined threshold (US $100,000 or $250,000) were all assessed prior to purchase. | |||
| Menon and Marshall 1990 Canada
[ | Survey/50 (59.5%) teaching hospitals across Canada | Structured: 23/50 | |
| • 34/43 hospitals practicing HTA stated that information produced was used in making decisions about new technology acquisition. | |||
| • 76% of respondents thought that a formal management structure for HTA should exist in teaching hospitals. | |||
| Patail and Aranha 1995 USA
[ | Case study/1 major teaching hospital | Structured | |
| • Of 16 technologies formally approved in 1988–1993, 13 were implemented. | |||
| • HTA allowed engineers and decision makers not to take the information provided by manufacturers and vendors for granted. | |||
| • Technologies over $500,000 were assessed. | |||
| Poulin et al. 2012 Canada
[ | Case study of HTA program outcomes | Structured | |
| • Of the 68 technologies for which a HTA was requested, 15 were incomplete and dropped, 12 were approved, 3 were approved on an urgent/emergent basis, 21 were approved for “clinical audit” on a restricted basis, 14 were approved for research use only, and 3 were referred to additional review bodies. | |||
| • Decisions based on local HTA program recommendations were rarely “yes” or “no”. Many technologies were given restricted approval, with full approval contingent on satisfying certain conditions such as clinical outcomes review, training protocol development, or funding. | |||
| • Cost was the first reason to reject a technology, followed by health gain. | |||
| Rosenstein et al. 2003 USA
[ | Survey/19 hospitals in western USA | Structured: 42% | |
| • 28% of HTA committees had direct responsibility for approval. | |||
| • While committees did not have final decision-making power, their recommendations were appropriate and well integrated with the hospital’s overall mission and strategic plan. | |||
| Saaid 2011 Australia
[ | Multicase study/4 hospitals (3 private for-profit, 1 public) | 1/4 has a formal committee | |
| 3/4 have a product review committee | • The impact of HTA as a support tool for decision makers was minimal. | ||
| • Decisions in private for-profit hospitals were informal and driven by business strategy and cost-effectiveness of the technology. | |||
| • For the public hospital, HTA was a requirement in decision-making, but the process was new. | |||
| • Ignorance/unfamiliarity with HTA. | |||
| Weingart 1995 USA
[ | Case study/1 major teaching hospital | ||
| • The technology assessed was qualified as an engineering disaster for various reasons: | |||
| • Decision makers did not go far enough in their discussions to evaluate the institutional strategy or strategic implications of the technology. They lacked expertise in assessing feasibility and profitability. | |||
| • Members of the committee (only physicians) were too optimistic despite limited data. | |||
| • The mandate of the committee was too narrow and did not include comparison with alternative technology. | |||
| • The process was not structured enough ( |
Reported effects and impact—HTA units
| Bodeau-Livinec et al. 2006 France
[ | Semi-directive interviews and survey | |
| • 10 of 13 recommendations had an impact on theintroduction of the technology in health organizations. | ||
| • One recommendation appears not to have had an impact. The impact of two technologies was impossible to assess. | ||
| • The main criterion upon which to base a new technology introduction decision on HTA is the cost. Some medical specialties were more concerned by CEDIT’s work than others—cardiology and medical imaging, for instance. | ||
| • Interviewees viewed the CEDIT as very scientifically reputable. HTA recommendations were used as decision-making tools by administrative staff and as negotiating instruments by physicians in dealing with management. | ||
| Lee et al. 2003 Canada
[ | Case study (review of document and structured consultation) | |
| • Example of one evaluation to address the issue of arthroplasty operations. Savings were estimated at CAN $1 million annually through orthopedic supply standardization and a new contract with vendors. | ||
| • High level of interest for a locally focused HTA and implementation unit. | ||
| McGregor 2012 Canada
[ | Impact study using mixed methods (interviews and financial analysis) | |
| • Impact of 55 HTA reports produced (2004–2011): Of 63 recommendations, 45 (71%) have been accepted and incorporated into hospital policy. | ||
| Update of McGregor and Brophy 2005 Canada
[ | • Most frequent reasons for recommendations not being accepted: failure to identify administrative responsibility to carry this out, lack of funds, complex administrative changes, technology already implanted, technology which would potentially render the hospital vulnerable to legal action. | |
| • 19 accepted reports have resulted in conservation of hospital resources. | ||
| • The extent of these savings could be estimated in the case of 15 reports: estimated overall savings of CAN$ 9,840,270. | ||
| • Over the 8 years of full functioning of the HTA unit: average annual quantifiable savings have been CAN$ 1,140,958. | ||
| Mitchell 2010 USA
[ | Case studies | |
| • Two examples of local data integrated into hospital-based HTA. In both case studies, important differences were found among the hospitals. These differences affected the prioritization of different attributes of a technology and could result in different conclusions being drawn about how the technology should be used at each hospital, even within the same health-care network. | ||
| Veluchamy and Alder 1989 USA
[ | Case study | |
| • The HTA units helped decision makers integrate patient needs and medical staff interests and capabilities with the hospital’s resources (i.e., staff, facilities, financing). | ||
| • It speeded up the delivery of newly developed treatment technologies (9–12 months as compared to 24–36 months before HTA implementation). It identified the most promising technologies and coordinated their acquisition and implementation. | ||
| • It provided better access to these technologies for patients and reduced length of stay (42% reduction for laser angioplasty). | ||
| • Physicians derived personal and professional satisfaction from participation in the HTA units. These units have improved relations between medical staff and hospital management (better communication and physicians’ needs better fulfilled). | ||
| Schumacher and Zechmeister 2013 Austria
[ | Impact study using mixed methods (interviews, questionnaire, download analysis, etc.) | |
| • Hospital associations used HTA for investment/reimbursement decisions, treatment guidelines, and budget allocation, as well as for the preparation of negotiations. | ||
| • Various pressure groups, such as the pharmaceutical industry and the professionals’ association, could explain the inability to implement some HTA recommendations. | ||
| • With the exception of the rapid technology assessment program for single hospital procedures, selective use of HTA reports was identified, rather than standardized inclusion of HTA into the processes. | ||
| • Several technologies, identified as showing patterns of over-usage, were used more restrictively after the HTA report was published, leading to a decrease in expenditure. Expenditure decrease accounted for at least several million euros for single hospital associations. | ||
| • Clearest evidence was available for the “awareness” impact category, while references regarding “acceptance” were rarely mentioned. The LBI-HTA was usually seen as a vehicle for simple cost containment and rationing, rather than a tool supporting redistribution of resources into evidence-based technologies. | ||
| Zechmeister and Schumacher 2012 Austria
[ | Impact study using mixed methods (administrative data analysis and interviews) | |
| • 5 full HTA reports and 56 rapid technology assessments were used for reimbursement decisions, while 4 full HTA reports and 2 rapid assessments were used for disinvestment decisions and resulted in reduced volumes and expenditure. There were 2 full HTA reports showing no impact on decision-making. Impact was most evident for hospital technologies. | ||
| • In 48% of reports produced for reimbursement/investment decisions, the recommendation and decision were totally consistent. In 40% of reports, technologies that were not recommended were included on certain conditions, while the decision was more restrictive than the recommendation for 12% of reports. | ||
| • Several millions of euros were saved due to HTA recommendations. For disinvestment decisions, cost savings were about 3 million euros per report, with huge variation (0–12 million). Savings were frequently for more than one hospital (regional hospital associations). |
Reported effects and impact—mini-HTA and ambassador model
| Ehlers and Jensen 2006 Denmark
[ | Survey/140 Danish hospitals | Mini-HTA | |
| • Mini-HTA is used as a decision support tool at all decision-making levels within the Danish hospital sector. | |||
| • No decision makers based their decisions exclusively on mini-HTAs (but always used them as a supplement). | |||
| • In hospital management sectors, the mini-HTA was often the principal basis for decision-making. | |||
| • A majority of decision makers stated that the mini-HTA eased implementation to a considerable or fair degree. | |||
| • Advantages of using mini-HTAs: | |||
| ○ Based on HTA principles | |||
| ○ The form of the tool, be it a tabular form or a checklist | |||
| ○ The way the form or checklist was being used (flexibility, openness, and timing) | |||
| • Disadvantages mentioned typically centered on insufficiency of the evaluation of the evidence base and the lack of quality control. | |||
| Folkersen and Pedersen 2006 Denmark
[ | Survey/1 of Denmark’s main public hospital | Mini-HTA | |
| • The HTA method has improved the relationships between health professionals and economists, which were previously problematic due to the perception of different or opposing priorities (quality vs. budget). Both parties have become more understanding towards the roles and tasks of the other party due to the implementation of mini-HTA. | |||
| • Overall, 77% of respondents were satisfied with the HTA method. | |||
| • Some dissatisfaction concerning the HTA method included: | |||
| ○ Causing a too great and troublesome administrative burden | |||
| ○ Placing too much or exclusive emphasis on financial factors, while neglecting professional and technical aspects | |||
| ○ Causing limits on budgets, which in turn prevented the purchase of new equipment | |||
| ○ Financial questions were too difficult to answer for some hospital staff | |||
| Rashiq et al 2006 Canada
[ | Pre- and post-session questionnaires/pre: 130 participants; post: 79 (60.8%) | Ambassador model | |
| • The ambassador program was successful in increasing awareness of the best evidence in chronic non-cancer pain management and positively influenced treatment decisions. | |||
| • Some participants (35%) reported practice changes as a result of the workshops. | |||
| • 70% indicated that an action plan has been developed following the workshop. | |||
| • 80% indicated that they disseminated the material to other practitioners. | |||
| • 99% indicated that the workshops had been a useful way of linking research to practice. |