| Literature DB >> 25062306 |
Adam Roth, Damian Hoy, Paul F Horwood, Berry Ropa, Thane Hancock, Laurent Guillaumot, Keith Rickart, Pascal Frison, Boris Pavlin, Yvan Souares.
Abstract
Chikungunya virus (CHIKV) caused significant outbreaks of illness during 2005-2007 in the Indian Ocean region. Chikungunya outbreaks have also occurred in the Pacific region, including in Papua New Guinea in 2012; New Caledonia in April 2013; and Yap State, Federated States of Micronesia, in August 2013. CHIKV is a threat in the Pacific, and the risk for further spread is high, given several similarities between the Pacific and Indian Ocean chikungunya outbreaks. Island health care systems have difficulties coping with high caseloads, which highlights the need for early multidisciplinary preparedness. The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network has developed several strategies focusing on surveillance, case management, vector control, laboratory confirmation, and communication. The management of this CHIKV threat will likely have broad implications for global public health.Entities:
Keywords: Aedes aegypti; Aedes albopictus; CHIKV; Federated States of Micronesia; Indian Ocean; New Caledonia; PPHSN; Pacific; Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network; Papua New Guinea; Yap State; chikungunya; mosquitos; outbreak; preparedness; vector-borne infections; viruses
Mesh:
Year: 2014 PMID: 25062306 PMCID: PMC4111160 DOI: 10.3201/eid2008.130696
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Emerg Infect Dis ISSN: 1080-6040 Impact factor: 6.883
Figure 1Chikungunya epidemic in Papua New Guinea, 2012–2013. Colors denote the time for reports or rumors of emerging clinical disease. When such information was lacking, the date of laboratory confirmation of chikungunya virus infection determined the color coding. Solid colors indicate that cases were laboratory confirmed; striped colors indicate lack of laboratory confirmation.
Spread of chikungunya epidemic based on case reports, Papua New Guinea, 2012–2013*
| Province | Date reports or rumors of cases occurred | Date cases laboratory confirmed | Total no. cases |
|---|---|---|---|
| West Sepik | 2012 Jun | 2012 Oct | >1,500 |
| East New Britain | 2012 Nov | 2013 Jan | >1,500 |
| West New Britain | 2013 Mar | ||
| New Ireland | 2013 Jan | 2013 Jan | |
| Sanambiet Island (Lihir Island) | 2013 Jan | 2013 Jan | |
| Madang | 2012 Dec | 2013 Apr | |
| Morobe | 2012 Dec | 2013 Feb | |
| Jiwaka | 2013 May | ||
| Southern Highlands | 2013 May | ||
| Chimbu | 2013 Mar | 2013 Apr | |
| Eastern Highlands | 2013 Mar | ||
| Oro | 2013 Mar | ||
| National Capital District (Port Moresby) | 2013 Apr | ||
| Milne Bay | 2013 Jun | ||
| Manus | 2013 Apr | 2013 May |
*Blank cells indicate missing or incomplete data. For some provinces, only positive laboratory cases were reported without corresponding reports of cases and vice versa. Few provinces reported total number of cases.
Figure 2Distribution of chikungunya vectors Aedes albopictus and Ae. aegypti mosquitos in the Pacific, 2013. Green outline indicates areas where Ae. albopictus mosquitos are confirmed or strongly suspected. Ae. aegypti mosquitos are found in most locations except New Zealand, Hawaii, Futuna, and some remote islands. Dotted lines indicate member countries of Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network.
Figure 3Direct airline routes to Pacific region destinations from Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby), New Caledonia (Noumea), and Yap State, Federated States of Micronesia.
PPHSN recommendations for enhanced surveillance to the PICT in response to the threat of chikungunya outbreaks in the region
| Category | Recommendations |
|---|---|
| Syndromic surveillance | We recommend enhanced surveillance with the purpose of prompt detection of any possible case in each PICT to organize a rapid response and mitigate the spread and impact as much as possible. National health authorities should ensure that their syndromic surveillance sentinel sites report weekly, adhere to case definitions, and report the number of patients that fit the case definitions of prolonged fever (any fever lasting ≥3 d) and AFR. These should be used as proxies for suspected chikungunya. Data on the other syndromes should be collected as usual. For countries/territories that use the optional syndrome dengue-like illness as part of their syndromic surveillance system, sentinel sites should report weekly also on this syndrome as it fits with chikungunya clinical symptoms. In addition to the existing surveillance system, any extension of the sentinel network or tracking trends at national level to detect chikungunya cases can be explored and discussed, depending on the local situation. |
| Vector control services to gear up in preparation | A review of supplies and equipment should be undertaken, orders placed if required, staff refreshed on community-based activities (larvicide) and spraying methods and protocols (adulticide). |
| Breeding sites elimination using awareness campaigns aimed at the general public | The time and season is appropriate to remind public about their role and responsibilities, and that the health authorities are intensifying relevant surveillance and response mechanisms as well. The campaigns do not have to focus on the risk specifically related to chikungunya but aim at vector control for vector-borne diseases, such as dengue and chikungunya, with a particular focus on container-breeding mosquitoes. Previous studies have shown that community engagement in vector control activities will achieve the greatest impact on reduction of |
| Laboratory confirmation | If there is an unexpected rise in the number of reported cases of prolonged fever, AFR, or dengue-like illness, confirmation of the diagnosis by laboratory testing is recommended. Specimens should be tested for dengue and chikungunya. |
| Strongly suspected exposure (e.g., travel history to an outbreak area) or confirmed case | This should launch an immediate response, including: • recording of information on the case(s), including age, sex, place of residence, travel history, identification of geographic cluster and mobilization of affected communities; • vector control activities at the community level, focused around the residence of suspected cases, should be undertaken to eliminate potential breeding sites, and reduce the number of natural and artificial water-filled container habitats that support the breeding of mosquitoes; • spraying with insecticide to kill adult mosquitoes in the areas where the case-patient(s) reside(s) and work(s). Procedures must be clearly laid out and planned for by vector control services; • using mosquito repellents on affected and exposed people to reduce the transmission of the disease; • keeping potentially viremic patients (within the first 5–7 d of the disease) under impregnated (ideally) mosquito nets if admitted to a health facility; • starting rapid and effective risk communication to inform the public (e.g., provision of information on the situation, how to protect themselves); • disseminating treatment guidelines to hospitals and clinics to reduce the risk of hemorrhagic complications. |
*Further details are available in the Pacific Outbreak Manual on the PPHSN Web site (http://www.spc.int/phs/PPHSN/Surveillance/Syndromic/Pacific_Outbreak_Manual-version1-2.pdf). PPHSN, Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network; PICT, Pacific Island Countries and Territories; AFR, acute fever and rash.