On the security of two remote user authentication schemes for telecare medical information systems.

The telecare medical information systems (TMISs) support convenient and rapid health-care services. A secure and efficient authentication scheme for TMIS provides safeguarding patients' electronic patient records (EPRs) and helps health care workers and medical personnel to rapidly making correct clinical decisions. Recently, Kumari et al. proposed a password based user authentication scheme using smart cards for TMIS, and claimed that the proposed scheme could resist various malicious attacks. However, we point out that their scheme is still vulnerable to lost smart card and cannot provide forward secrecy. Subsequently, Das and Goswami proposed a secure and efficient uniqueness-and-anonymity-preserving remote user authentication scheme for connected health care. They simulated their scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) tool to ensure that their scheme is secure against passive and active attacks. However, we show that their scheme is still vulnerable to smart card loss attacks and cannot provide forward secrecy property. The proposed cryptanalysis discourages any use of the two schemes under investigation in practice and reveals some subtleties and challenges in designing this type of schemes.