OBJECTIVE: To clarify advance measures for business continuity taken by disaster base hospitals involved in the Great East Japan Earthquake. METHODS: The predisaster situation regarding stockpiles was abstracted from a 2010 survey. Timing of electricity and water restoration and sufficiency of supplies to continue operations were investigated through materials from Miyagi Prefecture disaster medicine headquarters (prefectural medical headquarters) and disaster base hospitals (14 hospitals) in Miyagi Prefecture after the East Japan earthquake. RESULTS: The number of hospitals with less than 1 day of stockpiles in reserve before the disaster was 7 (50%) for electricity supplies, 8 (57.1%) for water, 6 (42.9%) for medical goods, and 6 (42.9%) for food. After the disaster, restoration of electricity and water did not occur until the second day or later at 8 of 13 (61.5%) hospitals, respectively. By the fourth postdisaster day, 14 hospitals had requested supplies from the prefectural medical headquarters: 9 (64.3%) for electricity supplies, 2 (14.3%) for water trucks, 9 (64.3%) for medical goods, and 6 (42.9%) for food. CONCLUSIONS: The lack of supplies needed to continue operations in disaster base hospitals following the disaster clearly indicated that current business continuity plans require revision.
OBJECTIVE: To clarify advance measures for business continuity taken by disaster base hospitals involved in the Great East Japan Earthquake. METHODS: The predisaster situation regarding stockpiles was abstracted from a 2010 survey. Timing of electricity and water restoration and sufficiency of supplies to continue operations were investigated through materials from Miyagi Prefecture disaster medicine headquarters (prefectural medical headquarters) and disaster base hospitals (14 hospitals) in Miyagi Prefecture after the East Japan earthquake. RESULTS: The number of hospitals with less than 1 day of stockpiles in reserve before the disaster was 7 (50%) for electricity supplies, 8 (57.1%) for water, 6 (42.9%) for medical goods, and 6 (42.9%) for food. After the disaster, restoration of electricity and water did not occur until the second day or later at 8 of 13 (61.5%) hospitals, respectively. By the fourth postdisaster day, 14 hospitals had requested supplies from the prefectural medical headquarters: 9 (64.3%) for electricity supplies, 2 (14.3%) for water trucks, 9 (64.3%) for medical goods, and 6 (42.9%) for food. CONCLUSIONS: The lack of supplies needed to continue operations in disaster base hospitals following the disaster clearly indicated that current business continuity plans require revision.