Literature DB >> 24229153

Insight into the so-called spatial reciprocity.

Zhen Wang1, Satoshi Kokubo, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda, Keizo Shigaki.   

Abstract

Up to now, there have been a great number of studies that demonstrate the effect of spatial topology on the promotion of cooperation dynamics (namely, the so-called "spatial reciprocity"). However, most researchers probably attribute it to the positive assortment of strategies supported by spatial arrangement. In this paper, we analyze the time course of cooperation evolution under different evolution rules. Interestingly, a typical evolution process can be divided into two evident periods: the enduring (END) period and the expanding (EXP) period where the former features that cooperators try to endure defectors' invasion and the latter shows that perfect C clusters fast expand their area. We find that the final cooperation level relies on two key factors: the formation of the perfect C cluster at the end of the END period and the expanding fashion of the perfect C cluster during the EXP period. For deterministic rule, the smooth expansion of C cluster boundaries enables cooperators to reach a dominant state, whereas, the rough boundaries for stochastic rule cannot provide a sufficient beneficial environment for the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, we show that expansion of the perfect C cluster is closely related to the cluster coefficient of interaction topology. To some extent, we present a viable method for understanding the spatial reciprocity mechanism in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.

Entities:  

Year:  2013        PMID: 24229153     DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.88.042145

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys        ISSN: 1539-3755


  22 in total

1.  Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.

Authors:  Yinhai Fang; Tina P Benko; Matjaž Perc; Haiyan Xu; Qingmei Tan
Journal:  Proc Math Phys Eng Sci       Date:  2019-07-24       Impact factor: 2.704

2.  Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.

Authors:  Xinyang Deng; Deqiang Han; Jean Dezert; Yong Deng; Yu Shyr
Journal:  IEEE Trans Cybern       Date:  2015-08-13       Impact factor: 11.448

3.  The Evolution of Cooperation is Affected by the Persistence of Fitness Effects, the Neighborhood Size and their Interaction.

Authors:  Eli Thompson; Jasmine Everett; Jonathan T Rowell; Jan Rychtář; Olav Rueppell
Journal:  Lett Biomath       Date:  2015-10-22

4.  Sociality as a natural mechanism of public goods provision.

Authors:  Elliot T Berkman; Evgeniya Lukinova; Ivan Menshikov; Mikhail Myagkov
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-03-19       Impact factor: 3.240

5.  Modelling and computation in the valuation of carbon derivatives with stochastic convenience yields.

Authors:  Shuhua Chang; Xinyu Wang
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-05-26       Impact factor: 3.240

6.  Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

Authors:  Wu-Jie Yuan; Cheng-Yi Xia
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2014-03-14       Impact factor: 3.240

7.  Modelling the effects of selection temperature and mutation on the prisoner's dilemma game on a complete oriented star.

Authors:  Jianguo Ren; Yonghong Xu
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2014-10-14       Impact factor: 3.240

8.  Impact of roles assignation on heterogeneous populations in evolutionary dictator game.

Authors:  Xinyang Deng; Qi Liu; Rehan Sadiq; Yong Deng
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2014-11-07       Impact factor: 4.379

9.  Moderate intra-group bias maximizes cooperation on interdependent populations.

Authors:  Changbing Tang; Zhen Wang; Xiang Li
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2014-02-12       Impact factor: 3.240

10.  Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.

Authors:  Hai-Feng Zhang; Zhi-Xi Wu; Ming Tang; Ying-Cheng Lai
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2014-07-11       Impact factor: 4.379

View more

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.