A robust uniqueness-and-anonymity-preserving remote user authentication scheme for connected health care.

User authentication plays an important role to protect resources or services from being accessed by unauthorized users. In a recent paper, Das et al. proposed a secure and efficient uniqueness-and-anonymity-preserving remote user authentication scheme for connected health care. This scheme uses three factors, e.g. biometrics, password, and smart card, to protect the security. It protects user privacy and is believed to have many abilities to resist a range of network attacks, even if the secret information stored in the smart card is compromised. In this paper, we analyze the security of Das et al.'s scheme, and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against the replay attack, user impersonation attacks and off-line guessing attacks. Then, we also propose a robust uniqueness-and-anonymity-preserving remote user authentication scheme for connected health care. Compared with the existing schemes, our protocol uses a different user authentication mechanism to resist replay attack. We show that our proposed scheme can provide stronger security than previous protocols. Furthermore, we demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme through the BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) logic.