| Literature DB >> 23805176 |
Clémence Perraudin1, Marc Le Vaillant, Nathalie Pelletier-Fleury.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Despite the high prevalence and major public health ramifications, obstructive sleep apnea syndrome (OSAS) remains underdiagnosed. In many developed countries, because community pharmacists (CP) are easily accessible, they have been developing additional clinical services that integrate the services of and collaborate with other healthcare providers (general practitioners (GPs), nurses, etc.). Alternative strategies for primary care screening programs for OSAS involving the CP are discussed.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2013 PMID: 23805176 PMCID: PMC3689751 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0063894
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Figure 1Analytic Decision Tree and Markov model of patients according to screening and treatment status.
Key Model Assumptions.
| Variables | Base case | Range | References | Distribution |
|
| ||||
| Sex | Male | - | - | No distribution assigned |
| Age (years) | 50 | - | - | No distribution assigned |
|
| 0.82 | [0.79–0.85] |
| No distribution assigned |
|
| ||||
| PSG specificity | 1.00 | [0.90–1.00] |
| No distribution assigned |
| PSG sensitivity | 0.97 | [0.90–1.00] |
| No distribution assigned |
|
| 2.87 | IC95 [1.17–7.51] |
| No distribution assigned |
|
| ||||
| Initial rate of refusal | 0.102 | [0–0.204] |
| Beta distribution α = 1.15;β = 10.15 |
| Annual rate of cessation | ||||
| Year 1 | 0.10 | [0–0.20] |
| No distribution assigned |
| Years 2–5 | 0.06 | [0–0.12] |
| No distribution assigned |
|
| ||||
| No OSAS | 0.435 | σ = 0.17 |
| Beta distribution α = 3.7;β = 4.8 |
| No OSAS treated | 0.32 | σ = 0.17 |
| Beta distribution α = 2.4;β = 5.1 |
| OSAS untreated | 0.32 | σ = 0.17 |
| Beta distribution α = 2.4;β = 5.1 |
| OSAS treated | 0.55 | σ = 0.26 |
| Beta distribution α = 2.01;β = 1.65 |
|
| 0.454 | [0.25–0.65] | unpublished data | Uniform distribution |
|
| 3% | [0%–5%] | - | No distribution assigned |
|
| ||||
|
| ||||
| In-hospital PSG | €837 | [±20%] | Health insurance fund | Triangular distribution |
| GP visits | €23 | - | Health insurance fund | No distribution assigned |
| Specialist visits | €50 | - | Health insurance fund | No distribution assigned |
|
| ||||
| CPAP per year | €1200 | [€420–€1400] | Health insurance fund, | Triangular distribution |
|
| ||||
| Year 1 (per year) | €75 | - | - | |
| Years 2–5 (per year) | €25 | - | Health insurance fund | - |
|
| €75 | [€25–€125] | Estimation | Triangular distribution |
|
| €1800 | [€441–€2714] |
| Triangular distribution |
We assumed that the 0.17– standard deviation of the utility for untreated OSAS was equivalent for no OSAS and no OSAS treated.
(€1 = $US 1.30).
Cost-effectiveness ratio.
| No screening | Screening strategy without CP | Screening strategy with CP | |||||
| Screening rate: 25% | Screening rate: 35% | Screening rate: 45% | Screening rate: 55% | Screening rate:65% | |||
|
| €6652.28 | €6603.76 | €6631.07 | €6583.38 | €6535.70 | €6488.01 | €6440.33 |
|
| 1.55 | 1.64 | 1.70 | 1.77 | 1.83 | 1.89 | 1.95 |
|
| €4291.79/Q | €4026.69/Q | €3900.63/Q | €3719.42/Q | €3571.42/Q | €3432.81/Q | €3302.73/Q |
Cost-Effectiveness ratios (CE ratio) are expressed in Euros per QALY (€/Q).
Figure 2Costs of different strategies according to their effectiveness and the CP intervention cost.
The strategies included in quadrant I were more effective and more costly than “Screening strategy without CP”. The strategies included in quadrant II were less effective and more costly (dominated); the strategies included in quadrant III were less effective and less costly; and the strategies included in quadrant IV were more effective and less costly (dominant). The slope of the line between any two points represents the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for two pathways.
The results of the one-way sensitivity analysis.
| Scenarios | Screening strategy without CP | Screening strategy with CP | ||||
| Screening rate: 25% | Screening rate: 35% | Screening rate: 45% | Screening rate: 55% | Screening rate: 65% | ||
|
| ||||||
| Low: 0.79 | - | ICER = €553.17/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High: 0.85 | - | ICER = €357.33/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low: 0.90 | dominated | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low: 0.90 | - | ICER = €625.50/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High: 1.00 | - | ICER = €382.33/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low | - | ICER = €1653.25/Q | ICER = €715.75/Q | ICER = €372.23/Q | ICER = €232.41/Q | ICER = €145.90/Q |
| High | dominated | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| No: 0% | - | ICER = €351.67/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High: 5% | - | ICER = €31.03/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low: −20% | - | ICER = €176.83/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High:+20% | - | ICER = €735.17/Q | ICER = €101.69/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low:€420 | dominated | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High:€1400 | - | ICER = €1318.00/Q | ICER = €639.69/Q | ICER = €459.16/Q | ICER = €365.28/Q | ICER = €307.74/Q |
|
| ||||||
| Low:€25 | dominated | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
| High: €125 | - | ICER = €1288.50/Q | ICER = €227.85/Q | dominant | dominant | dominant |
|
| ||||||
| Low: €441 | - | ICER = €6186.67/Q | ICER = €5133.85/Q | ICER = €5071.58/Q | ICER = €5039.20/Q | ICER = €5019.35/Q |
| High:€2714 | dominated | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant | dominant |
Incremental Cost-Effectiveness ratios (ICER) are expressed in Euros per QALY gained (€/Q).
(€1 = $US 1.30).
Figure 3Incremental cost-effectiveness for the 10 000 Monte Carlo simulations on the cost-effective plane.
The scatterplots show the distribution of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for the different strategies. The ellipses show the central 95th percentile of each distribution. The overlaid lines have slopes that are equal to the willingness-to-pay threshold (€40000).