Literature DB >> 23601933

From SARS to H7N9: will history repeat itself?

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Year:  2013        PMID: 23601933      PMCID: PMC7139414          DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60865-X

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Lancet        ISSN: 0140-6736            Impact factor:   79.321


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China will never forget the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), for which it paid such a heavy and painful price a decade ago. According to WHO, from Nov 1, 2002, to July 31, 2003, 648 of the 7082 probable cases of SARS in mainland China and Hong Kong died. Many of the patients were front-line health workers. At that time, in the wake of its initial negative response to SARS, as well as proof of its fragmented and ineffective public health system, the Chinese Government's international reputation and domestic credibility were seriously damaged. 10 years on, the shadow of SARS is again hovering over Chinese hearts with the emergence of the novel influenza A (H7N9) virus. By the time The Lancet went to press, 63 confirmed cases of H7N9 human infection, including 14 deaths, had been reported over a wide area, ranging from eastern China (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui provinces), central China (Henan province), to northern China (Beijing). Unavoidably, there are pervasive worries that history might repeat itself. SARS coronavirus and H7N9 virus share some similarities. Neither virus had been reported in human beings previously. Worldwide, people of all ages have had little protective immunity, and there is a global pandemic threat. Both viruses can lead to severe disease, characterised by high fever, severe respiratory symptoms, and deaths. Additionally, the sources fuelling human infections of both viruses remain to be determined. SARS coronavirus is thought to be an animal virus from an as-yet-uncertain animal reservoir (perhaps bats) that spreads to other animals (civet cats) and then to the first infected human beings in southern China in 2002. As for H7N9 virus, the animal reservoir seems to be poultry. However, some patients had contact with poultry just before falling ill, whereas others had not. Unlike SARS coronavirus transmission, sustained transmission of H7N9 virus between human beings has not yet been found. Worryingly, genetic changes among H7N9 virus suggests adaptation to mammals, as discussed in a World Report in this issue, and further adaptations can be expected. The mutations of H7N9 virus might not be controllable, but China's efforts to track and contain the outbreak of H7N9 can be managed and monitored. As for SARS's legacy, China is now better prepared to deal with the H7N9 outbreak. The Chinese Government's response to H7N9 has been much swifter and more transparent than it was in the SARS outbreak, which has earned praise from the international community. “We are very satisfied and pleased with the level of information shared and we believe we have been kept fully updated on the situation”, said Michael O'Leary, WHO's representative in China. Having boosted investment enormously in the public health system since SARS, China has established and strengthened national and local surveillance systems to prevent and control diseases and has also expanded its laboratory capacity. Additionally, China's collaboration and communications with WHO and international scientific communities have been increased and strengthened. The national and provincial government response, however, is not without controversy. There is debate within the Chinese news media and among the public that Shanghai might have deliberately delayed reporting cases of H7N9 human infection. The first infection in man was identified on Feb 19, but no public announcement was made until March 31. Treatment strategies against H7N9 virus infection are also being questioned. Chinese Government officials have suggested that people try the unproven indigowoad root (known as banlangen in Chinese) to prevent H7N9 virus infection. Furthermore, the efficacy of peramivir injection to treat H7N9 infection is as yet unclear, but this antiviral drug received accelerated authorisation on April 6 by the China State Food and Drug Administration to treat H7N9 human infection. Another weak link lies in China's agricultural departments. Unlike people, poultry infected with H7N9 virus show few symptoms, making detection very challenging. Health officials have acted promptly upon laboratory confirmation of cases, but can agricultural officials catch up with speed tracing to identify the animal origins of H7N9 virus? China is once again back in the spotlight with the H7N9 virus outbreak, which will be a test not only for its health and agricultural systems, but also for its political system, and for the new Minister of Health, Li Bin. H7N9 presents China with the opportunity to prove its openness and ability to rapidly share information from its well-developed surveillance system and strong research capacity.
  7 in total

1.  Development of reverse-transcription loop-mediated isothermal amplification assay for rapid detection of novel avian influenza A (H7N9) virus.

Authors:  Juan Liu; Qing-Gong Nian; Jing Li; Yi Hu; Xiao-Feng Li; Yu Zhang; Yong-Qiang Deng; Shun-Ya Zhu; Qing-Yu Zhu; E-De Qin; Tao Jiang; Cheng-Feng Qin
Journal:  BMC Microbiol       Date:  2014-11-14       Impact factor: 3.605

2.  Capacity assessment of the health laboratory system in two resource-limited provinces in China.

Authors:  Bo Liu; Fang Ma; Jeanette J Rainey; Xin Liu; John Klena; Xiaoyu Liu; Biao Kan; Meiying Yan; Dingming Wang; Yan Zhou; Guangpeng Tang; Mingliu Wang; Chihong Zhao
Journal:  BMC Public Health       Date:  2019-05-10       Impact factor: 3.295

3.  Preliminary success in the characterization and management of a sudden breakout of a novel H7N9 influenza A virus.

Authors:  Yan-Ling Wu; Li-Wen Shen; Yan-Ping Ding; Yoshimasa Tanaka; Wen Zhang
Journal:  Int J Biol Sci       Date:  2014-01-09       Impact factor: 6.580

4.  Probable person to person transmission of novel avian influenza A (H7N9) virus in Eastern China, 2013: epidemiological investigation.

Authors:  Xian Qi; Yan-Hua Qian; Chang-Jun Bao; Xi-Ling Guo; Lun-Biao Cui; Fen-Yang Tang; Hong Ji; Yong Huang; Pei-Quan Cai; Bing Lu; Ke Xu; Chao Shi; Feng-Cai Zhu; Ming-Hao Zhou; Hua Wang
Journal:  BMJ       Date:  2013-08-06

5.  Transmission potential of influenza A/H7N9, February to May 2013, China.

Authors:  Gerardo Chowell; Lone Simonsen; Sherry Towers; Mark A Miller; Cécile Viboud
Journal:  BMC Med       Date:  2013-10-02       Impact factor: 8.775

6.  Perceptions on the risk communication strategy during the 2013 avian influenza A/H7N9 outbreak in humans in China: a focus group study.

Authors:  Richun Li; Ruiqian Xie; Chong Yang; Melinda Frost
Journal:  Western Pac Surveill Response J       Date:  2016-07-11

7.  The association between self-perceived proficiency of personal protective equipment and objective performance: An observational study during a bioterrorism simulation drill.

Authors:  Itay Fogel; Osant David; Chaya H Balik; Arik Eisenkraft; Lion Poles; Omri Shental; Michael Kassirer; Tal Brosh-Nissimov
Journal:  Am J Infect Control       Date:  2017-06-30       Impact factor: 2.918

  7 in total

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