| Literature DB >> 23308340 |
Charles Efferson1, Sonja Vogt.
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation requires some mechanism that reduces the risk of exploitation for cooperative individuals. Recent studies have shown that men with wide faces are anti-social, and they are perceived that way by others. This suggests that people could use facial width to identify anti-social men and thus limit the risk of exploitation. To see if people can make accurate inferences like this, we conducted a two-part experiment. First, males played a sequential social dilemma, and we took photographs of their faces. Second, raters then viewed these photographs and guessed how second movers behaved. Raters achieved significant accuracy by guessing that second movers exhibited reciprocal behaviour. Raters were not able to use the photographs to further improve accuracy. Indeed, some raters used the photographs to their detriment; they could have potentially achieved greater accuracy and earned more money by ignoring the photographs and assuming all second movers reciprocate.Entities:
Year: 2013 PMID: 23308340 PMCID: PMC3541508 DOI: 10.1038/srep01047
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sci Rep ISSN: 2045-2322 Impact factor: 4.379
Figure 1Back transfers for the 41 second movers who were trusted.
Back transfers are shown as a function of the width-to-height ratios of second mover faces (a) and as a function of the mean attractiveness ratings for second movers (b). Attractiveness levels range from 1 for “very unattractive” to 5 for “very attractive”, and mean attractiveness levels shown here are averages over 28 independent raters of attractiveness (SI). Ordered probit regressions (Tables 1 and 2) provide no evidence for a relationship between back transfers and the facial structure or attractiveness of second movers.
Model selection, ordered probit, back transfers of all 54 second movers. The independent variables include (i) the width-to-height ratios of second mover faces, (ii) the attractiveness levels for second movers, and (iii) a dummy indicating which second movers were trusted. The final columns show the number of parameters estimated, the AIC values, and the Akaike weights (w). AIC is an improved form of Akaike's criterion2436, and Akaike weights rescale AIC values to show the proportional weight of evidence for each model. In this case, because the total Akaike weight over models 1 and 3 is 0.999, the exercise clearly shows that the trust of the second mover's partner is the critical independent variable
| Model | W/H | Att. | Trusted | Parameters | AIC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 9 | 138.719 | 0.061 |
| 2 | ✓ | ✓ | 8 | 151.791 | <0.001 | |
| 3 | ✓ | 7 | 133.268 | 0.938 |
Ordered probit results for model 1 from Table 1. The intercepts reflect the back transfers that actually occurred. Although model 1 is not the best model, it is the full model, and conclusions are robust to model specification. For this reason, we show model 1
| Parameter | Estimate | Robust std. error | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| W/H | 0.516 | 1.252 | 0.41 | 0.680 |
| Att. | −0.070 | 0.314 | −0.22 | 0.826 |
| Trusted | 1.730 | 0.393 | 4.40 | <0.001 |
| Intercept 0/1 | 1.981 | 2.803 | ||
| Intercept 1/3 | 2.103 | 2.788 | ||
| Intercept 3/5 | 2.167 | 2.792 | ||
| Intercept 5/7 | 2.231 | 2.790 | ||
| Intercept 7/8 | 2.414 | 2.788 | ||
| Intercept 8/9 | 2.474 | 2.788 |
Model selection, ordered probit, rater guesses about back transfers for all 54 second movers. The total number of observations is 1512. Independent variables include (i) the width-to-height ratios of second mover faces, (ii) the attractiveness levels for second movers, (iii) a dummy indicating which second movers were trusted, and (iv) the actual back transfers of second movers. The final columns show the number of parameters estimated, the AIC values, and the Akaike weights (w). Because models 1 and 5 constitute over 90% of the total Akaike weight, model selection clearly shows that width-to-height ratios, attractiveness levels, and first mover behaviour are all important predictors of rater inferences
| Model | W/H | Att. | Trusted | BT | Parameters | AIC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 13 | 4785.265 | 0.287 |
| 2 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 12 | 5014.356 | <0.001 | |
| 3 | ✓ | ✓ | 11 | 4789.968 | 0.027 | ||
| 4 | ✓ | 10 | 5022.513 | <0.001 | |||
| 5 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 12 | 4783.730 | 0.618 | |
| 6 | ✓ | ✓ | 11 | 5105.160 | <0.001 | ||
| 7 | ✓ | 10 | 4788.163 | 0.067 |
Ordered probit results for model 1 from Table 3. The intercepts reflect the rater guesses that actually occurred. Although model 1 is not the best model, it is the full model, and conclusions are robust to model specification. For this reason, we show model 1. To account for the fact that we have multiple guesses per rater, we calculated robust standard errors by clustering on rater25
| Parameter | Estimate | Robust std. error | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| W/H | −0.302 | 0.166 | −1.81 | 0.070 |
| Att. | 0.156 | 0.047 | 3.31 | 0.001 |
| Trusted | 1.438 | 0.202 | 7.11 | <0.001 |
| BT | 0.006 | 0.005 | 1.20 | 0.231 |
| Intercept 0/1 | 0.944 | 0.401 | ||
| Intercept 1/2 | 1.028 | 0.394 | ||
| Intercept 2/3 | 1.154 | 0.383 | ||
| Intercept 3/4 | 1.291 | 0.376 | ||
| Intercept 4/5 | 1.448 | 0.370 | ||
| Intercept 5/6 | 1.664 | 0.371 | ||
| Intercept 6/7 | 1.774 | 0.372 | ||
| Intercept 7/8 | 1.919 | 0.374 | ||
| Intercept 8/9 | 1.987 | 0.377 |