Thomas Stompe1, Kristina Ritter, Hans Schanda. 1. Universitätsklinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Medizinische Universität Wien, Währinger Gürtel 18-20, 1090, Wien, Österreich. thomas.stompe@meduniwien.ac.at
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Suicide and homicide rates are the ultimate expressions of violence. The rates are globally almost distributed mirror-reverted. Rich, modern democratic countries with a functioning legal system have high suicide and low homicide rates, traditional states with a weak central government high homicide and low suicide rates. Exceptions are some Eastern European countries, in which both, the rates of homicide and suicide are very high. These states are located on the territory of the former Bloodlands (Snyder, Bloodlands: Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 2011), where between 1930 and 1945 14 million people were civilian victims of the Soviets and the National Socialists. We addressed the question of whether these eight countries (Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) differ from the other European countries of the former East bloc, from the Asian countries of the former USSR and the Western European countries in social, economic and psychosocial factors. METHODS: The data used for analyses were taken of various data sets from the WHO, the UN and the CIA. The statistical comparison of the four regions was carried out by nonparametric tests. RESULTS: The States on the grounds of the former Bloodlands and the other European countries of the former East bloc are comparable concerning important social and economic parameters such as level of modernization, Democracy-index and Rule of Law-Index. Statistically significant differences were found only in the annual alcohol consumption per capita and the divorce rates. CONCLUSIONS: We hypothesize that the high suicide and homicide rates in some Eastern European countries may be the result of the traumatic experience of extreme violence of nearly the entire population between 1930 and 1945. Possible paths of the transgenerational transmission as well as conceivable chains of causality between the trauma in the first generation and suicidal or homicidal behavior in the following generations are presented.
BACKGROUND: Suicide and homicide rates are the ultimate expressions of violence. The rates are globally almost distributed mirror-reverted. Rich, modern democratic countries with a functioning legal system have high suicide and low homicide rates, traditional states with a weak central government high homicide and low suicide rates. Exceptions are some Eastern European countries, in which both, the rates of homicide and suicide are very high. These states are located on the territory of the former Bloodlands (Snyder, Bloodlands: Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 2011), where between 1930 and 1945 14 million people were civilian victims of the Soviets and the National Socialists. We addressed the question of whether these eight countries (Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) differ from the other European countries of the former East bloc, from the Asian countries of the former USSR and the Western European countries in social, economic and psychosocial factors. METHODS: The data used for analyses were taken of various data sets from the WHO, the UN and the CIA. The statistical comparison of the four regions was carried out by nonparametric tests. RESULTS: The States on the grounds of the former Bloodlands and the other European countries of the former East bloc are comparable concerning important social and economic parameters such as level of modernization, Democracy-index and Rule of Law-Index. Statistically significant differences were found only in the annual alcohol consumption per capita and the divorce rates. CONCLUSIONS: We hypothesize that the high suicide and homicide rates in some Eastern European countries may be the result of the traumatic experience of extreme violence of nearly the entire population between 1930 and 1945. Possible paths of the transgenerational transmission as well as conceivable chains of causality between the trauma in the first generation and suicidal or homicidal behavior in the following generations are presented.