Collective action in the management of a tropical dry forest ecosystem: effects of Mexico's property rights regime.

Dilemmas of natural resources governance have been a central concern for scholars, policy makers, and users. Major debates occur over the implications of property rights for common resources management. After the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), land was distributed mainly as ejidos conceived as a hereditary but unalienable collective form of property. In 1992, a new Agrarian Law was decreed that allows individual ownership by removing various restrictions over the transfer of land. Scholars have examined the reform mainly focusing on land-tenure changes and environmental fragmentation. This study examines how the new ownership regime is affecting collective decision-making in ejidos located in a tropical dry forest (TDF) ecosystem. Information on decision-making processes before and after the 1992 reform was gathered through 52 interviews conducted in four ejidos selected along a gradient including agricultural, cattle-raising, and TDF use. The new individualized land property system reduced collective action in ejidos but did not trigger it. Collective action responses to the 1992 reform were buffered by self-organization each ejido already had. Heterogeneous users who shared a short history and showed little understanding of TDF and low dependence on its resources seemed to explain why ejidos have not been able to share a sense of community that would shape the construction of institutions for the collective management of forest resources. However, when a resource is scarce and highly valuable such as water the same users showed capacities for undertaking costly co-operative activities.