Literature DB >> 23135681

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication.

Kevin J S Zollman1, Carl T Bergstrom, Simon M Huttegger.   

Abstract

Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.

Mesh：

Year:  2012        PMID： 23135681      PMCID： PMC3574420          DOI： 10.1098/rspb.2012.1878

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Biol Sci        ISSN： 0962-8452            Impact factor:   5.349


  9 in total

1.  The validity of the handicap principle in discrete action-response games

Authors: 
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1999-06-21       Impact factor: 2.691

2.  Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language.

Authors:  M Lachmann; S Szamado; C T Bergstrom
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2001-10-30       Impact factor: 11.205

3.  Mate selection-a selection for a handicap.

Authors:  A Zahavi
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1975-09       Impact factor: 2.691

4.  Biological signals as handicaps.

Authors:  A Grafen
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1990-06-21       Impact factor: 2.691

5.  Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney game.

Authors:  Simon M Huttegger; Kevin J S Zollman
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2010-02-24       Impact factor: 5.349

6.  The effect of predation on begging-call evolution in nestling wood warblers.

Authors: 
Journal:  Anim Behav       Date:  1999-04       Impact factor: 2.844

7.  A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts.

Authors:  R Selten
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1980-05-07       Impact factor: 2.691

8.  Cheap talk when interests conflict.

Authors: 
Journal:  Anim Behav       Date:  2000-02       Impact factor: 2.844

9.  The cost of display in the non-resource-based mating system of the satin bowerbird.

Authors:  G Borgia
Journal:  Am Nat       Date:  1993-05       Impact factor: 3.926
  9 in total
  20 in total

1.  Honest signalling with costly gambles.

Authors:  Frazer Meacham; Aaron Perlmutter; Carl T Bergstrom
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2013-07-31       Impact factor: 4.118

2.  Signal verification can promote reliable signalling.

Authors:  Mark Broom; Graeme D Ruxton; H Martin Schaefer
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2013-09-25       Impact factor: 5.349

3.  The hidden cost of sexually selected traits: the metabolic expense of maintaining a sexually selected weapon.

Authors:  Ummat Somjee; H Arthur Woods; Meghan Duell; Christine W Miller
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2018-11-14       Impact factor: 5.349

4.  The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty.

Authors:  Jay M Biernaskie; Alan Grafen; Jennifer C Perry
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2014-09-07       Impact factor: 5.349

5.  Some dynamics of signaling games.

Authors:  Simon Huttegger; Brian Skyrms; Pierre Tarrès; Elliott Wagner
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2014-07-14       Impact factor: 11.205

6.  A sheep in wolf's clothing: levels of deceit and detection in the evolution of cue-mimicry.

Authors:  Shahab Zareyan; Sarah P Otto; Christoph Hauert
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2019-09-04       Impact factor: 5.349

7.  When does reputation lie? Dynamic feedbacks between costly signals, social capital and social prominence.

Authors:  Marion Dumas; Jessica L Barker; Eleanor A Power
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

8.  Low-quality birds do not display high-quality signals: The cysteine-pheomelanin mechanism of honesty.

Authors:  Ismael Galván; Kazumasa Wakamatsu; Pablo R Camarero; Rafael Mateo; Carlos Alonso-Alvarez
Journal:  Evolution       Date:  2014-12-04       Impact factor: 3.694

9.  Nodes having a major influence to break cooperation define a novel centrality measure: game centrality.

Authors:  Gabor I Simko; Peter Csermely
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2013-06-28       Impact factor: 3.240

10.  An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.

Authors:  Patrick Kane; Kevin J S Zollman
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-09-08       Impact factor: 3.240
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